

**Отчет совещания Постоянного комитета  
по выполнению и соблюдению (СКИК)**  
Это предварительный вариант, принятый СКИК  
в пятницу, 18 октября 2024 г.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> В данном случае «предварительный» означает, что Секретариат будет дополнительно проводить вычитку и корректировку.

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**Отчет совещания Постоянного комитета  
по выполнению и соблюдению (СКИК)  
(Хобарт, Австралия, 14–18 октября 2024 г.)**

**Открытие совещания**

1. Совещание Постоянного комитета по выполнению и соблюдению (СКИК) проводилось в Хобарте (Австралия) с 14 по 18 октября 2024 г.
2. Председатель СКИК г-жа М. Энгельке-Рос (США) открыла совещание, приветствовала участников и наблюдателей и поблагодарила Секретариат за его поддержку. Председатель также выразила благодарность странам-членам за межсессионную работу по подготовке к совещанию СКИК.

**Организация совещания**

Повестка дня

3. СКИК рассмотрел принятую Комиссией Повестку дня СКИК.

**Рассмотрение мер и систем, связанных с соблюдением и выполнением**

Система документации уловов (СДУ)

Предложение о пересмотре Фонда СДУ

4. СКИК рассмотрел предложение Секретариата, касающееся выделения средств из Фонда Системы документации уловов видов *Dissostichus* (СДУ) (ССАМЛР-43/20). СКИК отметил, что предложения, утвержденные на АНТКОМ-42, были успешно реализованы в части технического обслуживания э-СДУ и очного обучения по СДУ в Таиланде и Колумбии, а остаток средств, выделенных на проведение этих двух мероприятий, был возвращен в Фонд СДУ.
5. СКИК напомнил об утверждении на АНТКОМ-42 (ССАМЛР-42, п. 18) выделения средств на организацию онлайн-обучения по СДУ в 2024 и 2025 гг. и отметил, что это планируется осуществить в конце 2024 г. и в течение 2025 г., а очный Семинар по СДУ и портовой инспекции запланирован на 2025 г.
6. СКИК высоко оценил введение Секретариатом обновленной э-СДУ и отметил текущую работу по техническому обслуживанию, которая ведется для обеспечения функционирования э-СДУ.

7. Принимая во внимание требование МС 10-05, Дополнение 10-05/В, о назначении Наблюдательного совета для рассмотрения предложений по расходам из Фонда СДУ и вынесения рекомендаций Комиссии, СКИК созвал встречу Наблюдательного совета Фонда СДУ, в состав которого вошли представители Австралии, Республики Корея (Корея), Новой Зеландии, России, Соединенного Королевства и Соединенных Штатов Америки.

8. Наблюдательный совет Фонда СДУ поблагодарил Секретариат за подробное предложение и рекомендовал выделить средства из фонда э-СДУ на поддержку следующих предложений:

- (i) Фонд технического обслуживания э-СДУ в размере А\$20 000 в год в течение трех лет (2025–2027 гг.), с добавлением ежегодного увеличения на 2,5% для покрытия ИПЦ, общая сумма которого составит А\$61 513. Совет рекомендовал Секретариату в дальнейшем характеризовать данную статью расходов как запрос на модернизацию и развитие, чтобы пояснить, что она не является стандартной, повседневной деятельностью Секретариата.
- (ii) Очное обучение СДУ по запросу, на общую сумму в А\$60 000 для покрытия расходов на проведение двух очных учебных Семинаров по СДУ в 2025 и 2026 гг. по запросу Договаривающихся сторон (ДС) или Недоговаривающихся сторон (НДС). Совет рекомендовал установить степень приоритета запросов на обучение в зависимости от объема документов по вылову и истории нарушений соблюдения.
- (iii) Предоставление А\$30 000 на 2025 и 2026 гг. для содействия осуществлению Стратегии и плана действий по вовлечению НДС (ССАМЛР-43/16) для мероприятий, в которых существует потенциальная заинтересованность в сотрудничестве с АНТКОМ в рамках внедрения СДУ.
- (iv) Организация очного Семинара по СДУ в Сингапуре; выделение средств на сумму А\$25 000 для покрытия расходов на проезд, проживание и сопутствующие учебные материалы для проведения семинара в 2025 или 2026 гг. Наблюдательный совет отметил, что в последний раз обучение в Сингапуре проводилось в 2017 г., и с тех пор произошла определенная смена кадров.

9. Совет рекомендовал Секретариату в дальнейшем включать в ежегодный отчет о расходах средств из Фонда СДУ результаты обучения, в том числе улучшение соблюдения и подтверждение компетентности в использовании СДУ. Кроме того, Совет рекомендовал Секретариату сосредоточить внимание на разработке модулей э-СДУ и ресурсов онлайн-обучения для содействия дальнейшим возможностям виртуального обучения, чтобы оказывать поддержку всем ДС и НДС в организации регулярного обучения СДУ.

10. Совет не удовлетворил просьбу о выделении А\$30 000 на очное обучение по СДУ для Мексики, отметив, что Мексика импортирует очень мало рыбы видов *Dissostichus* (0,09% от общего объема импорта рыб видов *Dissostichus* в 2023 г.) и необходимо принимать во внимание соотношение затрат и результатов. Кроме того, совет отметил, что в Мексике не назначено контактное лицо по вросам СДУ, и рекомендовал

продолжить виртуальную работу с Мексикой и изучить возможность проведения дистанционного обучения прежде, чем проводить очные семинары. Наблюдательный совет отметил, что если от Мексики поступит запрос на очное обучение, то его можно будет провести за счет средств, выделенных на очное обучение по запросам, как указано выше в п. 3.1.5(ii).

11. СКИК выразил признательность Наблюдательному совету Фонда СДУ за проделанную работу и одобрил предлагаемые расходы.

#### Реализация СДУ

12. СКИК принял к сведению отчет о реализации Системы документации уловов для видов *Dissostichus* (ССАМЛР-43/21) и отметил, что СДУ пользуются 15 стран-членов, три (3) присоединившиеся государства и одна (1) Недоговаривающаяся сторона (НДС), сотрудничающая с АНТКОМ путем участия в СДУ. Корея поблагодарила Чили за их усилия как государство порта, которое обрабатывает наибольшее количество выгрузок клыкача и последующего выпуска Формы регистрации улова видов *Dissostichus* (DCD).

13. Южная Африка обратила внимание на соглашение о том, что судно под флагом Уругвая может вести промысловую деятельность в Подрайоне 58.7 по разрешению обеих стран, отметив, что для этого необходимо, чтобы заполнение DCD было начато Уругваем, как государством флага, а затем завершено Южной Африкой, как государством порта.

14. В 2024 г. были выданы два SVDCD: один Аргентиной (COMM CIRC 24/66) и один Испанией (COMM CIRC 24/07). Европейский союз пояснил, что улов, относящийся к испанскому SVDCD, был изъят властями и помещен на хранение в холодильную камеру на время проведения расследования. По окончании расследования оператору был выписан штраф, а улов был возвращен вместе с сопроводительным SVDCD.

15. Аргентина сделала следующее заявление:

‘The Argentine Republic recalls that the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas are an integral part of Argentine national territory and that, being illegally occupied by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, they are the subject of a sovereignty dispute between the two countries, recognised by the United Nations.

Consequently, the Argentine Republic makes it known that it does not recognise the toponymy mentioned in this note, nor does it recognise the intervention in catch documents made by the alleged authorities of the Islands.

It is recalled that all names given to the disputed areas must be in accordance with United Nations Editorial Directive ST/CS/SER.A/42.

Likewise, Argentina wishes to record that all fishing carried out in FAO zone 41.3.2 in waters under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic must have the corresponding fishing permit from the Argentine authorities.’

16. Соединенное Королевство сделало следующее заявление:

‘The UK rejects Argentina’s statement. The UK once again reiterates that it has no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia & the South Sandwich Islands, and their surrounding maritime zones, as is well known to all delegates.’

17. СКИК, приняв к сведению объяснения соответствующих стран-членов по поводу выпуска SVDCD, рекомендовал Комиссии не предпринимать никаких дальнейших действий.

18. В соответствии с МС 10-05, Дополнение I0-05/С, п. С9, СКИК рассмотрел текущий статус сотрудничества, предоставленный Колумбии, Мексике, Сингапуру и Таиланду. СКИК признал, что Секретариат уже три года пытается обеспечить назначение контактного лица Мексики для организации обучения по СДУ; СКИК поддерживает дальнейшие усилия Секретариата в данном направлении.

19. СКИК отметил положительные результаты очного обучения по СДУ, проведенного в Таиланде и Колумбии в 2024 г. СКИК поблагодарил Секретариат за сверку данных СДУ с торговыми данными из Таиланда после Семинара по СДУ. СКИК признал усилия, приложенные многими странами-членами для расследования и составления отчетов о выявленных несоответствиях.

#### Инспекция судов

20. СКИК провел обзор соблюдения МС 10-03 и Инспекционной системы в промысловом сезоне 2023/24 г. (документ CCAMLR-43/15), в котором отмечается, что было проведено 132 инспекции в порту и 12 инспекций в море.

21. СКИК отметил, что в сезоне 2023/24 г. произошло четыре случая, когда судам пришлось зайти в порт из-за того, что один из членов команды нуждался в медицинской помощи, и что в двух из этих случаев Часть А Отчета о портовой инспекции не была предоставлена по крайней мере за 48 часов до предполагаемого времени прибытия. СКИК выразил обеспокоенность тем, что в МС 10-03 не предусмотрена возможность для государства порта не проводить портовую инспекцию или для судна не представлять Часть А Отчета о портовой инспекции в случаях экстренного захода в порт.

22. СКИК напомнил, что безопасность и благосостояние человеческой жизни на море имеют первостепенное значение и что ситуации, связанные с форс-мажорными обстоятельствами, бедствием или медицинскими чрезвычайными ситуациями, требуют особого внимания. СКИК также отметил, что правила АНТКОМ, разрешающие экстренный заход в порт, должны быть приведены в соответствие с международным правом.

23. СКИК одобрил поправки к МС 10-03, касающиеся форс-мажорных обстоятельств, бедствий и оказания срочной медицинской помощи.

24. СКИК отметил, что в ходе СКИК-2023 Секретариат представил измененную форму портовой инспекции (CCAMLR-42/16), которая может быть использована в

сочетании с Соглашением о мерах государства порта (СМГП) для устранения дублирования работы рыбинспекторов. СКИК отметил, что измененная форма инспекции и сопутствующие изменения к МС 10-03 были одобрены на СКИК-2023, однако Комиссия не достигла консенсуса. СКИК одобрил измененную форму и поправки к МС 10-03.

25. СКИК одобрил предложенный план проекта (ССАМЛР-43/15, Дополнение I) по совершенствованию доступности и улучшению качества содержания материалов для инспекторов.

26. СКИК одобрил планы Секретариата по дальнейшей работе над модернизацией сайта АНТКОМ и созданием электронной инспекционной отчетности (ССАМЛР-43/BG/20).

27. Китай предложил сделать электронные системы отчетности доступными на языках всех стран-членов. Китай также предложил провести дополнительное взаимодействие с заинтересованными сторонами, чтобы учесть мнения операторов судов о текущих ресурсах для инспекторов и развитии электронной отчетности по инспекциям.

28. СКИК рассмотрел представленную Соединенным Королевством информацию о разработке электронной версии удостоверения личности, которое носят назначенные на должность инспекторы АНТКОМ (ССАМЛР-43/BG/30). Многие страны-члены отметили, что это упростит процесс создания удостоверений инспекторов и соответствует плану работы по наращиванию ресурсов для инспекторов (п. 24).

29. Россия попросила продолжить рассмотрение любых изменений в существующей системе удостоверений инспекторов и поручила Секретариату включить данное предложение в свой план работы над ресурсами.

30. СКИК не одобрил включение электронного удостоверения личности инспектора в предложенный план работ (ССАМЛР-43/15, Дополнение I).

31. СКИК рассмотрел представленную Соединенным Королевством информацию о патрулировании в зоне действия Конвенции судном HMS Protector в промысловом сезоне 2023/24 г. (ССАМЛР-43/BG/25). СКИК рассмотрел необходимость в разработке формы для проведения радиоинспекции и формы для проведения воздушного патрулирования, отметив экстремальные и суровые условия, в которых АНТКОМ проводит промысловые операции и инспекции.

32. СКИК поблагодарил Соединенное Королевство и все страны-члены, осуществляющие патрулирование в зоне действия Конвенции. Некоторые страны-члены отметили, что радио и воздушные инспекции могут способствовать более полному соблюдению мер по сохранению АНТКОМ, предоставляя информацию о работе судов, когда плохая погода или другие неблагоприятные обстоятельства препятствуют проведению инспекции в море.

33. Некоторые страны-члены выразили обеспокоенность по поводу передачи потенциально конфиденциальной информации во время радио инспекций. Россия также выразила обеспокоенность тем, что языковые барьеры могут привести к передаче

неверной информации во время радио инспекций, а также тем, что технические элементы дистанционных инспекций не ясны. Китай указал на некоторые ошибки в названиях и на фотографиях судов под китайским флагом в документе CCAMLR-43/BG/25, а также выразил обеспокоенность тем, что фотографии в документе могут не отражать точное время проведения инспекции.

34. Соединенное Королевство поблагодарило страны-члены за высказанные предложения и выразило готовность включить их в будущие отчеты и любые будущие предложения для СКИК.

35. СКИК приветствовал представленную Чили информацию (CCAMLR-43/BG/41) об инспекциях, проведенных чилийским судном OPV-83 *Marinero Fuentealba* в Подрайоне 48.1 в сезоне 2023/24 г., в ходе которых было проинспектировано в общей сложности шесть (6) судов, и все суда продемонстрировали соблюдение всех мер АНТКОМ по сохранению, и еще с пятью судами была установлена радиосвязь.

36. СКИК выразил благодарность капитанам судов за их сотрудничество с Инспекционной системой АНТКОМ. СКИК также выразил признательность Чили за ее усилия по проведению инспекционных мероприятий от имени всех стран-членов, отметив, что Чили проводит наибольшее количество портовых инспекций и выдает наибольшее количество документов CDS.

Система мониторинга судов (СМС) и перемещение судов в зоне действия Конвенции

37. СКИК рассмотрел отчет о применении Системы мониторинга судов (СМС), представленный Секретариатом (CCAMLR-43/BG/16), и отметил выполнение МС 10-04 Договаривающимися сторонами.

38. СКИК напомнил, что суда и страны-члены должны обеспечить представление отчетов о передвижении судов в формате, описанном в Приложении 10-04/А.

39. СКИК предложил, чтобы в будущем Секретариат представлял все отчеты о выполнении, содержащие рекомендации, в виде рабочих документов, а не вспомогательных документов, чтобы привлечь внимание стран-членов к любым рекомендациям, требующим рассмотрения СКИК.

40. СКИК рассмотрел документ CCAMLR-43/BG/14, содержащий отчет о ходе работы и запланированной деятельности в рамках гранта, предоставленного Европейским союзом в 2022 и 2024 гг. и направленного на укрепление систем запроса на данные СМС и автоматической обработки данных. В документе также рассматриваются варианты размещения СМС и положения о безопасности, приведенные в МС 10-04, Приложение В. СКИК поблагодарил Европейский Союз за предоставление средств для этой работы.

41. В свете усовершенствований системы уведомления о передвижении судов в рамках СМС, освещенных в документе CCAMLR-43/BG/14, СКИК рассмотрел содержащееся в документе CCAMLR-43/BG/16 (п. 20 (iii)) предложение заинтересованным странам-членам назначить суда для включения в испытание

эффективности автоматизированного уведомления о передвижении судов в рамках СМС.

42. Некоторые страны-члены попросили предоставить более подробную информацию о функциональности автоматизированного уведомления о передвижении в рамках СМС и выразили заинтересованность в участии в испытании, как только будут предоставлены соответствующие детали.

43. СКИК решил, что в случае возникновения каких-либо технических или административных проблем в ходе испытания, для участвующих судов это не будет иметь последствий с точки зрения соблюдения.

44. Несколько стран-членов подчеркнули важность разработки сферы компетенции для проведения проекта и определения параметров, в т.ч. определение сроков испытательного периода. СКИК поручил тем странам-членам, которые выразили заинтересованность в участии в испытании, тесно сотрудничать с Секретариатом в межсессионный период для разработки набора руководящих указаний или сферы компетенции с указанием четких целей испытания, сроков и ожидаемых результатов.

45. СКИК поручил Секретариату представить отчет о результатах испытания, включая оценку эффективности системы, и изложить последующие шаги по более широкому внедрению, которые будут рассмотрены на совещании СКИК-2025.

46. СКИК принял к сведению продление соглашений по поисково-спасательным работам (ПСР), заключенных в 2024 г. между пятью морскими спасательно-координационными центрами (МСКЦ) и Секретариатом АНТКОМ (ССАМЛР-43/17). СКИК отметил, что эти обновленные соглашения доступны зарегистрированным пользователям сайта АНТКОМ и что следующая предполагаемая дата продления будет приходиться на 2029 г., если не поступит запрос на более ранний пересмотр в соответствии с п. (С) соглашений.

47. СКИК отметил усовершенствования системы запроса ПСР АНТКОМ и поблагодарил Секретариат и пять МСКЦ за их работу.

48. СКИК рассмотрел рекомендацию о добавлении новой группы пользователей для каждого МСКЦ для улучшения процедуры управления разрешениями на доступ к системе запроса ПСР в соответствии с МС 10-04 и соответствующим соглашением с МСКЦ.

49. Многие страны-члены поддержали предложение о расширении доступа пользователя для представителей МСКЦ и отметили важность участия в работе по улучшению и поддержке координации ПСР в зоне действия Конвенции АНТКОМ.

50. Россия выразила обеспокоенность по поводу потенциальных последствий данного предложения с точки зрения доступа и конфиденциальности и попросила разъяснить роль Администратора сторон в отношении утверждения учетных записей.

51. Секретариат представил разъяснения относительно этого процесса, в соответствии с которым первоначальное утверждение представителя МСКЦ будет осуществляться администратором/ами стороны, утвержденным страной-членом, и дополнительные аккаунты могут быть созданы этим уполномоченным представителем,

при этом доступ к данным и их использование будут соответствовать правилам соглашения и положениям, содержащимся в МС 10-04, п. 17(iii).

52. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса относительно изложенного в документе ССАМЛР-43/17 предложения о добавлении новой группы пользователей для каждого МСКЦ, и отметил, что требуется дальнейшее обсуждение данного вопроса.

#### Содействие соблюдению в АНТКОМ

53. СКИК принял к сведению отчеты о замеченных судах (ССАМЛР-43/13), в которых содержится сводная информация за промысловый сезон 2023/24 г., и рекомендовал принять стандартную форму для содействия работе Секретариата по представлению и сведению воедино отчетных данных. В этой сводке отмечается, что с лицензированных промысловых судов, работающих в подрайонах 88.1 и 88.2, в Секретариат поступило 98 сообщений о замеченных других лицензированных промысловых судах, круизных судах, научно-исследовательских судах и судах снабжения. СКИК отметил, что ни в одном из этих отчетов о замеченных судах не упоминается незаконный, нерегистрируемый и нерегулируемый (ННН) промысел.

54. Некоторые страны-члены предложили ограничить отчеты о замеченных судах информацией о судах, которые либо ведут ННН промысел или связанную с ним деятельность, либо являются лицензированными судами, ведущими подозрительную деятельность. СОЛТО напомнила, что АНТКОМ уже располагает рядом инструментов мониторинга, таких как централизованная Система мониторинга судов (СМС), требования к уведомлению о перемещениях, Автоматическая идентификационная система (АИС) и требования к отчетности об уловах, и попросила СКИК рассмотреть возможность запроса информации только о нелицензированных судах, которая может быть актуальной и необходимой как для лицензированных судов, так и для государств флага.

55. СКИК напомнила, что в Мере по сохранению 10-02, Приложение А, предусмотрен двухэтапная процедура сообщения о замеченных судах, согласно которой суда должны отправлять сообщения о замеченных судах государству флага. Если по оценке государства флага замеченное судно соответствует критериям пункта 3 Меры по сохранению 10-06 или пункта 8 Меры по сохранению 10-07, отчет следует представить в Секретариат. Несмотря на это, суда на добровольной основе сообщают информацию о замеченных судах в Секретариат.

56. СКИК одобрил рекомендацию об использовании стандартной формы Excel для сообщений о замеченных судах и попросил разместить ее на странице форм данных на сайте АНТКОМ. СКИК обратился к Секретариату с просьбой ежегодно представлять СКИК отчеты по всем сообщениям о замеченных судах, передаваемым в Секретариат.

57. СКИК поблагодарил Новую Зеландию, Корею, Австралию и Секретариат за обновленную информацию о ходе выполнения согласованного Плана работ по решению вопроса неопознанных промысловых снастей в зоне действия Конвенции (ССАМЛР-43/BG/17). СКИК отметил важность работы, напомнил о запланированных дальнейших действиях и призвал продолжать межсессионное участие в [э-группе](#).

58. СКИК отметил важность продолжения взаимодействия и консультаций с отраслью для продвижения Плана работ и призвал к дальнейшему взаимодействию.

59. COLTO отметила, что она была приглашена, но не смогла присутствовать на онлайн-обсуждениях за круглым столом, посвященных возможным вариантам предложения по маркировке снастей, поскольку в это время она проводила Семинар по орудиям лова в Норвегии. COLTO рекомендовала, чтобы любые изменения в требованиях к маркировке снастей были проверены перед внедрением, основывались на рисках и были экономически эффективными. COLTO также подчеркнула важность поэтапного подхода к внедрению.

60. АСОК напомнила о том, что СКИК одобрила форму добровольного сообщения о замеченных неопознанных орудиях лова (ПКИК-2023, п. 42), и призвал к ее широкому использованию.

61. СКИК принял к сведению отчет Украины о маркировке орудий лова на украинских ярусоловах (WG-FSA-IMAF-2024/48), отметив, что этот отчет также рассматривался на WG-FSA-IMAF (WG-FSA-IMAF-2024, пп. 8.1–8.3). СКИК поддержал рекомендацию о добровольном представлении странами-членами отчетов о маркировке орудий лова, отметив, что это поможет с определением утерянных орудий лова, обеспечит прозрачность документации по орудиям лова, которые будут использоваться в предстоящем промысловом сезоне, а также поможет выявлять и пресекать ННН промысел в зоне действия Конвенции.

62. СКИК рассмотрел отчет COLTO о Семинаре COLTO по орудиям лова, состоявшемся в Осло, Норвегия, 15–16 августа 2024 г. (CCAMLR-43/BG/02 Rev. 1). COLTO подчеркнула рекомендации АНТКОМ рассмотреть возможность отсрочки начала промысла в море Росса, чтобы избежать обширного ледового покрова и свести к минимуму потери снастей, разрешить попытки вернуть потерянные промысловые снасти вне периодов открытого промысла, а также вопрос об использовании снастей, отслуживших свой срок.

63. В качестве вклада в важную работу по обеспечению соблюдения мер по сохранению и выявлению ННН промысла Новая Зеландия представила краткую информацию о своей регулярной деятельности по воздушному патрулированию в регионе моря Росса. Воздушное патрулирование осуществляется назначенными АНТКОМ инспекторами в соответствии с правилами и процедурами АНТКОМ.

64. СКИК поблагодарил Новую Зеландию за патрулирование с воздуха в сезоне 2023/24 г., о чем сообщается в документе CCAMLR-43/BG/24, и за данное ими обязательство проводить регулярное патрулирование региона моря Росса в будущем. СКИК далее выразил свою признательность странам-членам, которые осуществляют патрульное наблюдение и инспекционную деятельность от имени АНТКОМ.

65. СКИК отметил необходимость проведения дальнейшей работы по разработке протокола о проведении воздушного наблюдения в зоне действия Конвенции. Некоторые страны-члены подчеркнули необходимость соблюдения баланса прав и обязанностей как инспекторов, так и инспектируемых.

66. СКИК далее отметил протокол, изложенный в МС 10-04, п. 21, касающийся обязательства Договаривающихся сторон, ведущих активное наблюдение и/или инспекционную деятельность АНТКОМ, предоставлять информацию о проведении такой деятельности соответствующему государству(-ам) флага после завершения деятельности без необоснованной задержки.

67. Китай указал на необходимость повышения прозрачности мероприятий по воздушному наблюдению и отчетов о них, а также подчеркнул важность защиты прав стран-членов СКИК на доступ к отчетам на определенных условиях конфиденциальности. По его мнению, без такого доступа странам-членам трудно правильно расценить какие-либо обвинения, содержащиеся в отчетах.

68. СКИК рассмотрел отчет Чили о внедрении Систем электронного мониторинга (СЭМ), используемых в Чили для контроля выбросов и случайного прилова, а также соблюдения нормативных актов промысла (ССАМЛР-43/ВГ/33). СКИК поблагодарил Чили за документ и одобрил рекомендацию о создании межсессионной э-группы на дискуссионной платформе АНТКОМ для содействия участию стран-членов и наблюдателей в разработке руководящих принципов и стандартов СЭМ в АНТКОМ. В документе ССАМЛР-43/ВГ/33 Rev. 1 содержится проект сферы компетенции для создания дискуссионной платформы АНТКОМ.

69. Соединенное Королевство напомнило о своем отчете в документе ССАМЛР-38/ВГ/40, в котором описывается внедрение Соединенным Королевством СЭМ и поддерживается рекомендация СКИК о создании дискуссионной платформы АНТКОМ для межсессионного сотрудничества. COLTO отметила, что на большинстве судов ее стран-членов установлены СЭМ для контроля соблюдения и содействия в выполнении научных целей, и подчеркнула необходимость дополнительно рассмотреть экономические последствия требований о наличии СЭМ наряду с размещением наблюдателей.

70. СКИК рассмотрел отчет о неофициальном Семинаре по вопросам соблюдения, организованном совместно Кореей и АСОК и посвященном совершенствованию режима соблюдения АНТКОМ, который проходил в режиме онлайн 6 и 7 февраля 2024 г. (ССАМЛР-43/ВГ/39 Rev. 1). СКИК поблагодарил Корею и АСОК за организацию неофициального Семинара и отметил, что в его ходе были определены направления совершенствования режима соблюдения АНТКОМ с упором на приведение в соответствие с лучшими мировыми практиками, стандартизацию сбора данных и обеспечение прозрачности. Ключевыми темами для дальнейшей работы стали перегрузка, отслеживаемость криля, портовые инспекции и мониторинг судов. Участники подчеркнули, что меры по соблюдению должны быть простыми в исполнении и применимыми ко всем судам, учитывая при этом разнообразие промыслов.

71. Соединенные Штаты Америки отметили документы, представленные ими и соавторами документов ССАМЛР-43/40, ССАМЛР-43/42 и ССАМЛР-43/43, направленные на дальнейшее совершенствование режима контроля за соблюдением в АНТКОМ.

## Перегрузка

72. СКИК рассмотрел представленный Секретариатом отчет о выполнении перегрузки (ССАМЛР-43/ВГ/15), отметив, что в сезоне 2022/23 г. было получено 187 уведомлений о перегрузках. СКИК отметил повышение уровня соблюдения МС 10-09 с сезона 2021/22 г.

73. СКИК отметил, что перегрузка морских живых ресурсов, выловленных в зоне действия Конвенции, с промыслового судна на приемотранспортное судно, а затем на другое приемотранспортное судно может затруднить отслеживаемость продукции. Далее СКИК отметил, что перегрузки, осуществляемые Недоговаривающимися сторонами (НДС), вызывают беспокойство и что 25 перегрузок, осуществленных двумя судами, плавающими под флагом Либерии, в сезоне 2022/23 г., могут представлять собой риск, требующий дальнейшего рассмотрения. СКИК напомнил, что Стратегия вовлечения НДС (ССАМЛР-43/16) предусматривает включение НДС, участвующих в перегрузках морских живых ресурсов, добытых в зоне действия Конвенции.

74. Россия отметила, что выявление рискованных видов деятельности должно распространяться не только на рассмотрение действий отдельных государств флага, и подчеркнула важность обеспечения объективного толкования риска в этом контексте.

75. СКИК рассмотрел анализ Добровольного руководства ФАО по перегрузке и положений АНТКОМ по перегрузке, представленных Кореей и Коалицией по Антарктике и Южному океану (АСОК) (ССАМЛР-43/ВГ/38), отметив, что 38 руководств были определены как выполняемые частично или не подлежащие выполнению вообще, а 15 – как выполняемые в полном объеме. Анализ показал, что руководства, которые полностью согласуются с АНТКОМ, включают в себя отчеты о перегрузках и процедуры по устранению несоблюдения. Кроме того, в ходе анализа было отмечено, что ряд мер АНТКОМ, касающихся перегрузок, применяется только к промысловым судам, тогда как в Руководстве рекомендуется применять их как к промысловым, так и к рыбоприемным судам. Кроме того, вопреки Руководству, АНТКОМ не требует механизмов независимой проверки перегрузок, таких как наблюдатели или электронный мониторинг, а значительная часть информации о перегрузках и рыбоприемных судах отсутствует в открытом доступе.

76. СКИК поблагодарил Корею и АСОК за информацию, представленную в данном документе, и отметил, что в целом поддерживает ужесточение процедур перегрузок. Многие страны-члены признали, что АНТКОМ отстает от других международных организаций и региональных рыбохозяйственных организаций (РРХО) в вопросах мониторинга, контроля и наблюдения за операциями по перегрузкам и высказались за усиление регулирования перегрузок со стороны АНТКОМ.

77. Китай согласился с необходимостью ужесточить правила перегрузки в зоне действия Конвенции. Китай напомнил, что СКИК достиг консенсуса по предложению о внесении поправки в МС 10-09, которая должна была создать Реестр АНТКОМ по рыбоприемным судам, но предложение было отозвано авторами в ходе совещания Комиссии (ССАМЛР-XXXV, пп. 3.32–3.37). Китай и Российская Федерация высказали мнение, что конкретное предложение будет способствовать обсуждению улучшения МС 10-09.

78. США выразили заинтересованность в разработке предложения по ужесточению контроля АНТКОМ за перегрузками и предложили другим заинтересованным странам-членам присоединиться к работе по данной теме; несколько стран-членов выразили такую заинтересованность.

79. СКИК подчеркнул наличие пробелов между Руководствами и мерами по сохранению и отметил, что данный анализ поможет СКИК в работе по рассмотрению будущих предложений по разработке предложений с сопутствующими изменениями мер по сохранению.

80. СКИК отметил роль, которую играет мониторинг перегрузок в борьбе с незаконным, нерегистрируемым и нерегулируемым (ННН) промыслом и обеспечении безопасности цепочек поставок.

81. Несколько стран-членов отметили, что АНТКОМ должен разработать список уполномоченных рыбоприемных судов, требования к СМС на рыбоприемных судах и повысить эффективность действий в портах для более полного мониторинга перегрузочных операций.

#### Осуществление Системы международного научного наблюдения (СМНН)

82. СКИК рассмотрел представленный Секретариатом отчет об осуществлении Системы АНТКОМ по международному научному наблюдению (СМНН) (WG-FSA-IMAF-2024/11 Rev. 1). В отчете приводится сводная информация о размещении всех наблюдателей, назначенных в рамках СМНН на судах, работающих в зоне действия Конвенции в промысловом сезоне 2023/24 г., обновленная информация о формах и инструкциях на сезон 2025/26 г., а также сведения о разработке инициативы по признанию заслуг наблюдателей на промыслах криля.

83. СКИК поблагодарил Секретариат за доведение этого документа до его сведения и выразил признательность всем наблюдателям СМНН за их добросовестную работу по предоставлению высококачественных данных, которые позволяют Научному комитету в его деятельности.

84. Многие страны-члены напомнили о продолжающихся дискуссиях по расширению охвата наблюдателей СМНН на промысле криля и призвали страны-члены продолжать рассматривать этот вопрос в будущем. Некоторые страны-члены выразили мнение, что национальные наблюдатели, назначенные в рамках СМНН, могут выполнять те же функции, что и международные наблюдатели, назначенные в рамках СМНН.

85. Китай отверг все сомнения по поводу качества данных, собираемых национальными научными наблюдателями, на основании их национальной принадлежности, подчеркнув, что и национальные, и международные научные наблюдатели соответствуют одним и тем же научным требованиям и протоколам согласно МС 51-06.

86. Некоторые страны-члены указали на рекомендации председателя Научного комитета и подчеркнули важное значение наблюдателей СМНН для работы АНТКОМ, их независимость и особые требования, предъявляемые к наблюдателям СМНН на борту

судов, которые могут не предъявляться к национальным наблюдателям (п. 7). Некоторые страны-члены признали высокое качество работы национальных наблюдателей в АНТКОМ, но вновь заявили, что систематический сбор данных на всех судах в соответствии с требованиями СМНН расширяет возможности АНТКОМ по корректировке ограничений на вылов и оценке воздействий на экосистему.

87. Российская Федерация выразила озабоченность тем, каким образом отчет (WG-FSA-IMAF-2024/11 Rev. 1) был представлен в СКИК, и задала вопрос, почему документ от научной рабочей группы был представлен без какого-либо конкретного контекста или предложений для рассмотрения СКИК.

88. СКИК принял к сведению объяснение Секретариата о том, что отчет был представлен только в целях ознакомления, как это обычно делалось на прошлых совещаниях при подготовке отчетов о выполнении в рамках данного пункта повестки дня. СКИК рекомендовал в будущем включать во введение отчетов аннотацию, разъясняющую причину представления любых документов рабочих групп в СКИК.

#### Стратегия вовлечения НДС

89. СКИК принял к сведению результаты обзора реализации Стратегии вовлечения НДС на 2023–2024 гг. (ССАМЛР-43/16). СКИК отметил усилия Секретариата по развитию отношений с Недоговаривающимися сторонами (НДС) с целью содействия их сотрудничеству с АНТКОМ.

90. СКИК одобрил Стратегию вовлечения НДС на 2025–2026 гг. (ССАМЛР-43/16, Приложение 2) и План действий (ССАМЛР-43/16, Приложение 3).

91. Многие страны-члены выразили поддержку направлению Стратегии вовлечения НДС на 2025–2026 гг. и расширению взаимодействия Секретариата с НДС. Корея отметила, что включение НДС, участвующих в перегрузках в зоне действия Конвенции, является ценным дополнением к Стратегии вовлечения НДС.

92. Россия поблагодарила Секретариат за своевременное указание на необходимость прямого взаимодействия со странами Ближнего Востока в связи с увеличением количества рыбы видов *Dissostichus*, импортируемой в данный регион. Россия предложила определить приоритетные страны для взаимодействия и отметила преимущества предоставления в СКИК информации о конкретных странах данного региона, задействованных в Стратегии вовлечения НДС.

93. СКИК отметил сотрудничество Секретариата с Центром развития промыслов Юго-Восточной Азии (SEAFDEC) и Региональный план действий для содействия ответственной промысловой практике, включая борьбу с ННН промыслом (РПД–ННН) в рамках Стратегии вовлечения НДС. СКИК призвал Секретариат продолжать взаимодействие с SEAFDEC и РПД–ННН, включая приглашение Секретариата АНТКОМ принять участие в координационном совещании партнеров РПД–ННН в начале ноября 2024 г. СКИК одобрил рекомендацию о приглашении обеих организаций в качестве наблюдателей на будущие совещания АНТКОМ.

94. СКИК призвал Договаривающиеся стороны активно участвовать в реализации Стратегии вовлечения НДС, посредством посещения и представления докладов на семинарах, участия в официальном диалоге с НДС, а также предоставления технических консультаций и поддержки.

Предложения о новых и пересмотренных мерах по сохранению, связанных с соблюдением

#### Мера по сохранению 10-03

95. СКИК рассмотрел выполнение МС 10-03 и Инспекционной системы в промысловом сезоне 2023/24 г. (ССАМЛР-43/15), а также предложение о внесении изменений в МС 10-03, разрешающих проведение инспекций с задержкой и предоставляющих освобождение от требования о предварительном представлении информации в Приложении 10-03/А в случаях захода в порт для экстренной медицинской помощи. Предложенные изменения были одобрены СКИК и переданы для принятия в Комиссию.

96. СКИК рассмотрел предложение, ранее согласованное на СКИК-2023 (п. 26), о внесении изменений в МС 10-03 и добавлении альтернативной формы портовой инспекции АНТКОМ, которая может использоваться инспекторами совместно с формой инспекции Соглашения о мерах государства порта (СМГП), чтобы сократить дублирование работы инспекторов. Предлагаемые изменения к МС 10-03, включая добавление альтернативной формы отчета об инспекции АНТКОМ (МС 10-03, Приложение С), были утверждены СКИК и переданы в Комиссию на принятие.

97. СКИК рассмотрел представленное делегациями Австралии, Кореи, Новой Зеландии и США предложение о внесении в МС 10-03 изменения (ССАМЛР-43/42), требующего от Договаривающихся сторон проводить портовые инспекции всех промысловых судов, транспортирующих виды и продукты, отличные от видов *Dissostichus*, которые были выловлены в зоне действия Конвенции. Кроме того, были внесены предложения по включению в Приложение 10-03/В ссылок на МС 25-03, 51-01, 51-02, 51-03 и 51-04 для отражения инспекции устройств для отчуждения морских млекопитающих на траловых орудиях лова и других смягчающих мер, связанных с сокращением смертности морских птиц, а также по включению кодов «вареный», «очищенный» и «масло» для продукции из криля. Одновременно были представлены два связанных между собой документа (ССАМЛР-43/40, пп. 3.8.27–3.8.29; ССАМЛР-43/43, пп. 3.8.6–3.8.8).

98. Многие страны-члены поддержали предложенные поправки к МС 10-03 и подчеркнули необходимость согласования ее требований ко всем промыслам АНТКОМ, особенно в рамках рассматриваемого Комиссией подхода к управлению промыслом криля.

99. Некоторые страны-члены напомнили о существовании различий между промыслами, также отметив необходимость дополнительного рассмотрения разных уровней риска ННН деятельности.

100. Китай сделал следующее заявление:

‘The difference between established krill fisheries and exploratory toothfish fisheries rest in the Convention, in particular the conservation principles set out in Article II. With respect to toothfish fisheries, they are established fisheries and exploratory fisheries, subject to different conservation measures. The difference between the krill fisheries and toothfish fisheries should by no means be the pretext for revising relevant conservation measures. In this respect, Article IX of the Convention stipulates clearly that the Commission shall identify conservation needs, analyse the effectiveness of conservation measures, and revise conservation measures on the basis of best scientific evidence available.’

101. СКИК обсудил возможные варианты улучшения предложенного текста с учетом опасений, высказанных странами-членами, однако в настоящее время не смог утвердить пересмотр МС 10-03 по этому предложению. Данное предложение было передано в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

#### Мера по сохранению 10-04

102. СКИК рассмотрел представленное делегациями Австралии, Новой Зеландии, Кореи, Норвегии, Соединенного Королевства и США предложение о внесении в МС 10-04 (ССАМЛР-43/43) изменения, требующего от Договаривающихся сторон, промысловые суда которых работают в зоне действия Конвенции, передавать данные СМС в Секретариат АНТКОМ не позднее одного часа после их получения.

103. Многие страны-члены поддержали данное предложение, подчеркнув важность передачи данных СМС в режиме реального времени для проведения мониторинга и промысловой деятельности. Важность передачи данных о перемещениях в режиме реального времени была дополнительно подчеркнута в контексте Подхода к управлению промыслом криля и изменений, необходимых для содействия реализации этого подхода в случае его утверждения.

104. Некоторые страны-члены выразили обеспокоенность по поводу практической выполнимости данной меры.

105. Некоторые страны-члены отметили, что отдельные страны-члены, ведущие промысел криля, уже передают данные СМС практически в режиме реального времени, и что все промысловые суда, лицензированные АНТКОМ, ежечасно передают данные СМС государству своего флага.

106. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса по предложению об изменении МС 10-04. Данное предложение было передано в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

#### Меры по сохранению 21-01 и 21-02

107. СКИК рассмотрел предложение Европейского Союза об изменении МС 21-01 и 21-02 (ССАМЛР-43/45). Предлагаемые изменения предусматривают требование

присутствия на борту научного наблюдателя, назначенного в соответствии с системой СМНН, для новых промыслов в соответствии с МС 21-01, а также уточнение в МС 21-02, что научные наблюдатели должны быть назначены в соответствии с СМНН.

108. Многие члены поддержали предложенные поправки, однако некоторые страны-члены напомнили, что в этом году не было подано ни одного уведомления о новых промыслах и что эти промыслы носят скорее научный характер, а требование о дополнительном наблюдателе приведет к увеличению расходов на их реализацию.

109. СКИК не достиг консенсуса по данному предложению и передал его в Комиссию для дальнейшего обсуждения.

#### Мера по сохранению 23-01

110. СКИК рассмотрел предложение Секретариата (ССАМЛР-43/19) о внесении поправки в МС 23-01, направленную на оптимизацию сроков предоставления отчетов для судов в случаях, когда от Договаривающихся сторон требуется сообщать Исполнительному секретарю данные об улове и усилении. В документе также предлагаются поправки к данной мере, согласно которым Секретариат должен сообщать о закрытии промыслов не только Договаривающимся сторонам, но и промысловым судам.

111. СКИК выразил благодарность Секретариату за усилия по разработке практических решений в связи с недавним превышением вылова криля. СКИК одобрил предложение по изменению МС 23-01, п. 2, касающееся сроков представления отчетов, и передал его в Комиссию для принятия. Некоторые страны-члены поставили вопрос о том, будут ли предложенные изменения в п. 7 МС 23-01 оказывать влияние на промысел клыкача, и выразили обеспокоенность по поводу предложенной формулировки и ее применения к различным видам промысла. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса относительно изменений в МС 23-01, п. 7.

#### Мера по сохранению 31-02

112. СКИК рассмотрел представленные Российской Федерацией предложения (ССАМЛР-43/34 и ССАМЛР-43/35) изменить МС 31-02 с целью уточнения процедуры управления, применяющиеся в случае задержки с поднятием ярусных снастей после закрытия промыслов в подрайонах 88.1 и 88.2. Многие страны-члены выразили признательность за документ и отметили, что он был представлен в прошлом году на совещании СКИК-2023, а также отметили, что предложения по разработке, ранее представленные по этому вопросу, должны быть учтены в любых будущих предложениях.

113. Некоторые страны-члены выразили мнение, что повторяющиеся случаи позднего извлечения снастей не являются систематической проблемой и не оказывают влияния на управление запасами, однако готовы продолжить рассмотрение предложения при условии внесения доработок по данной мере.

114. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса относительно изменений в МС 31-02 и передал предложение в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

#### Меры по сохранению 41-01 и 41-10

115. СКИК рассмотрел два предложения по изменению МС 41-01. Первое предложение было представлено Секретариатом (ССАМЛР-43/18), чтобы пересмотреть и уточнить соответствующие требования МС 41-01 и МС 41-10 в отношении требования проведения исследовательских выборок при промысле в SSRU Н Подрайона 88.2. СКИК одобрил изменения, предложенные для МС 41-01 и МС 41-10, и передал их в Комиссию для принятия.

116. Второе предложение по поправкам к МС 41-01, рассмотренное СКИК, было представлено Австралией (ССАМЛР-43/49), чтобы разрешить судам прекратить исследовательскую выборку для предотвращения потери снастей, обеспечения безопасности судна и людей на борту или безопасности жизни на море, принимая во внимание определенные обстоятельства. СКИК одобрил предложенную поправку к МС 41-01 и передал ее в Комиссию для принятия.

#### Район гнездования рыб

117. СКИК рассмотрел предложение Европейского союза и его государств-членов (ССАМЛР 43/01) о новой МС 32-XX по защите районов гнездования нототениевых рыб в зоне действия Конвенции путем закрытия таких районов для промысла. Многие страны-члены отметили, что Научный комитет рекомендовал обеспечить охрану таких участков.

118. Многие страны-члены приветствовали данное предложение, напомнив, что эта тема подробно обсуждалась в предыдущие годы, и подчеркнув необходимость защиты ключевых мест обитания.

119. Некоторые страны-члены заявили, что не могут поддержать это предложение в данный момент, отметив необходимость проведения дополнительной работы.

120. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса по этому предложению и передал его в Комиссию для дальнейшего обсуждения.

#### Симпозиум по согласованию

121. Корея представила отчет о Симпозиуме по согласованию (HS-2024), состоявшемся в Конгресс-центре Сонгдо в Инчхоне (Республика Корея) 16–20 июля 2024 г. (ССАМЛР-43/29), основная цель которого заключалась в «представлении АНТКОМ рекомендаций по последовательности действий для согласования введения пересмотренного Подхода к управлению промыслом криля (КФМА) и создания МОР в Области 1 (О1МОР) в регионе Антарктического п-ова, а также в разработке

рекомендаций по практическому и экономически эффективному сбору и анализу данных».

122. В документе было перечислено множество рекомендаций по совершенствованию КФМА, однако ни одного конкретного изменения в мерах по сохранению для рассмотрения СКИК предложено не было. СКИК поблагодарил Корею за представление данного документа.

#### Резолюция о стандартах условий труда и техники безопасности

123. СКИК рассмотрел представленный США документ (ССАМЛР-43/32) с предложением о принятии Резолюции о стандартах условий труда и техники безопасности на промыслах АНТКОМ, отметив, что нарушениям условий труда и техники безопасности на промысловых судах в последние годы по праву уделяется большое внимание и что для СКИК это не является новой темой обсуждения.

124. Многие страны-члены признали, что, несмотря на достигнутые АНТКОМ в последние годы успехи в деле повышения безопасности жизни на море, он не отстает от темпов работы других международных промысловых органов (таких, как РРХО), препятствуя прогрессу в столь важной сфере. Многие страны-члены также отметили, что предложение учитывает опыт таких организаций, предлагая не имеющую обязательной силы Резолюцию, и призвали АНТКОМ рассмотреть примеры передовой практики в области трудовых стандартов, предотвращения нарушений условий труда и обеспечения безопасных и справедливых условий труда и жизни на борту всех промысловых судов, задействованных на промыслах АНТКОМ.

125. Некоторые страны-члены сослались на Резолюцию АНТКОМ 23/XXIII (Безопасность на борту судов, ведущих промысел в зоне действия Конвенции), отметив, что потребуются дополнительно рассмотреть вопрос в отношении степени выполнения предлагаемой Резолюции, и поэтому они не могут поддержать предложение в настоящей момент. Многие страны-члены отметили, что Резолюция 23/XXIII недостаточно для решения сложных вопросов трудовых стандартов, поскольку в ней говорится только о предоставлении оборудования и одежды.

126. США представили предложение с поправками (Rev 1) со ссылкой на Резолюцию 23/XXIII в преамбуле и с учетом комментариев, полученных от стран-членов в ходе совещания СКИК.

127. СКИК отметил всеобщее согласие с важностью вопроса и поблагодарил США за подготовку предложения и содействие обсуждениям во время совещания.

128. США поблагодарили СКИК за конструктивные обсуждения и выразили надежду на продолжение обсуждения в Комиссии.

129. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса для одобрения Резолюции о стандартах условий труда и техники безопасности на промыслах АНТКОМ на данный момент. Пересмотренное предложение было передано в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

## Система АНТКОМ по международному научному наблюдению (СМНН)

130. СКИК рассмотрел предложение делегаций Аргентины, Австралии, Новой Зеландии, Норвегии, Соединенного Королевства и США о внесении поправки в МС 51-06 (ССАМЛР-43/40), требующей назначения на каждое судно как минимум одного наблюдателя в соответствии с Системой международных научных наблюдений (СМНН).

131. Китай выразил мнение, что национальные научные наблюдатели проходят обучение по выполнению требований по сбору данных в соответствии с задачами СМНН и следуют тем же руководящим принципам для получения данных аналогичного качества.

132. Некоторые страны-члены отметили, что наблюдатели СМНН являются независимыми и могут по-разному расставлять приоритеты.

133. Россия указала на отсутствие каких-либо доказательств того, что национальные научные наблюдатели не в состоянии выполнять те же задачи, что и наблюдатели СМНН.

134. СКИК не достиг консенсуса по данному предложению. Данное предложение было передано в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

## ССАМЛР Compliance Evaluation Procedure (ССЕР)

135. SCIC considered the Secretariat's report and analysis of the CCEP (ССАМЛР-43/11), drawing attention to the high compliance rates of greater than 98% across the majority of compliance measures analysed. SCIC noted the improved compliance with CM 10-09 from year-to-year, with a decrease in the number of non-compliance events associated with this Conservation Measure. However, SCIC also noted that there has been an increase in the number of non-compliance events associated with CM 26-01.

136. SCIC considered the request from the Secretariat to advise what steps should be taken to better clarify the reporting requirements when reporting discards and offal in fine-scale catch and effort data, noting that Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023 states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard later shall be reported in the C2 data as “Retained” and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as “Discarded”. SCIC sought the advice of the Chair of the Scientific Committee on the proper completion of the C2 data form with respect to the reporting of discards.

137. SCIC recalled the request that Panama report back with additional information on the status of sanctions applied to two vessels for breaches of CM 10-09 that were considered at SCIC-2023 (SCIC-2023, paragraph 112). SCIC noted that further information was provided by Panama and circulated to Members in COMM CIRC 24/76.

138. SCIC endorsed the recommendation that Contracting Parties biennially report aggregated trade data for the purpose of enhancing CDS implementation. Submissions by

Contracting Parties shall contain details on trade flow (import/export), year, country, species and quantity.

#### Provisional Compliance Report

139. In accordance with CM 10-10, paragraph 3(i), SCIC considered the 68 potential compliance incidents in the CCEP Summary Report (CCAMLR-43/11). SCIC held protracted discussions on the compliance issues presented in the CCEP Summary Report and reached a common understanding of what would be the appropriate compliance statuses for 55 of the incidents. However, because SCIC could not agree on the remaining issues, it was unable to reach consensus to adopt its annual Provisional Compliance Report in accordance with CM 10-10. The compliance issues considered are identified in Appendix I.

#### Conservation Measure 10-03

140. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 1, by New Zealand regarding the requirement to undertake port inspections of all fishing vessels carrying *Dissostichus* spp. in item 1 of Appendix I.

141. In its response to the draft compliance report New Zealand had provided the following:

‘This issue in relation to CM 10-03 paragraph 1 is a matter relating to safety at sea.

The San Aotea II made an unscheduled stop to allow medical services to remove a crew member for transport to Dunedin hospital.

There were no compliance issues reported in the Inspection report and the vessel was inspected within the 48-hour time period specified in CM 10-03 upon arriving at the intended port (Timaru).

Other than the injured crew member, no other crew or product was discharged from the vessel during its emergency call in Dunedin.

Further Action: No further action required

Preliminary Status: No compliance status assigned’

142. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of no compliance status proposed by New Zealand.

143. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 4, by Chile regarding the requirement for vessels to provide the information in CM 10-03, Appendix 10-03/A, at least 48 hours in advance of port entry in item 2 of Appendix I.

144. In its response to the draft compliance report Chile has provided the following:

‘ In relation to this case, we are able to point out that the absence of notification for the call at the port of Bluff in New Zealand by the fishing vessel Puerto Ballena, was due to a medical emergency of a crew member, which was duly communicated to and

coordinated with the Competent Authority of New Zealand (RCCNZ) who suggested proceeding in that manner (“The medical advice we have for you remains unchanged and we recommend you make your way to New Zealand for your crewman to receive higher level care.”). Given the above, it is not possible to classify this activity in port as a fishing operation as such (e.g. provisions, refueling, disembarking, crew change), but rather as a medical emergency.

Given the above, and in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of CM 10-03, it is considered that the general rule of the procedure does not apply, since what happened is explained by a forced stopover due to a medical emergency.

Preliminary Status: No compliance status assigned’

145. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of no compliance status assigned proposed by Chile.

146. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 5, by Korea (item 3 of Appendix I) and Uruguay (item 4 of Appendix I) regarding the requirement for a port inspection to be conducted within 48 hours of port entry.

147. In its response to the draft compliance report Korea has provided the following:

‘The Procyon enter the port at 09:30, September 17, 2023, which was delayed by 25 hours and 30 minutes from the estimated time of arrival (06:00, September 16, 2023). The inspection took place at 10:11, September 18, 2023, within the span of 24 hours 41 minutes. Therefore, this case is compliant. However, the actual time of arrival was not indicated in the inspection report, which led to the identification of the alleged inspection delay. The inspection authority will make sure that the actual arrival time will be clearly indicated in all port inspection reports in order to prevent any future confusions.

Further Action: No further action required

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

148. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of compliant proposed by Korea.

149. In its response to the draft compliance report (Item 4 of Appendix I) Uruguay has provided the following:

‘Situación excepcional, la inspección se realizó con un retraso por imposibilidad de acceso al buque. Anualmente se realizan 15 inspecciones en el puerto de Montevideo sin retrasos.

Exceptional circumstance: the inspection was delayed because of impediments to accessing the vessel. 15 inspections are carried out annually in the port of Montevideo without delays.

Further Action: Se continúa con la mejora de los procesos de control para las inspecciones  
Ongoing improvements of monitoring processes regarding inspections.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

150. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by Uruguay.

151. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-03, paragraph 8, by France (item 5 of Appendix I) and South Africa (item 6 of Appendix I) regarding the transmission of a port inspection report to the Secretariat more than 30 days after the inspection date.

152. In its response to the draft compliance report France (item 5 of Appendix I) has provided the following:

'France acknowledges that the report was sent after the 30 days deadline. The inspection was delayed compared to the usual deadlines because the ship did not have access to its refrigerators in port. In fact, these had been requisitioned by the prefecture because of a breakdown in other fridges in the south of the island.

Reminders to the competent authorities of the territorial fisheries administration based in La Reunion of the importance of the 30 days deadline have been made.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

153. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by France.

154. In its response to the compliance report South Africa (item 6 of Appendix I) provided the following:

'The report was submitted on time via email but due to a technical glitch the mail was not delivered. The report was communicated as soon as the matter was raised.

Further Action: For future communication, a mail notification has been set up which will notify the sender when mail has been delivered thereby making the sender attentive about the non-delivery.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

155. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by South Africa.

#### Conservation Measure 10-04

156. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-04, paragraph 13, by the Chilean vessel *Antarctic Endeavour* (item 7 of Appendix I), the French vessels *Albius* (items 8 and 9 of Appendix I) and *Sainte Rose* (item 10 of Appendix I), the Korean vessel *Greenstar* (item 11 of

Appendix I), the Spanish vessel *Tronio* (item 12 of Appendix I) and the United Kingdom vessel *Nordic Prince* (item 13 of Appendix I) regarding the requirement for Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.

157. In its response to the compliance report for the *Antarctic Endeavour* (item 7 of Appendix I) Chile provided the following:

‘In relation to this case, we are able to point out that the notification of the vessel “Antarctic Endeavour” was made within the time established by measure CM10-04, paragraph 13. This is because the Chilean Navy guard operator sent an email to the CCAMLR Secretariat, on March 20th at 23:26 local time.

The notification in local time was correct: March 20th, 2024, at 22:26.

The problem occurred with the reported “UTC” time zone, since, by adding 3 hours, that is, “UTC+3”, the notification moved to the next day, that is, March 21 at 01:26 hours. This involuntary error by the Chilean operator was not detected when sending the notification, since he kept the day March 20 and did not change the date.

Given the above, this finding would not correspond to a non-compliance, but only to an involuntary error. The above has already been corrected with the Secretariat by email, explaining what happened.

Preliminary Status: Compliant”

158. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of compliant for the Chilean vessel *Antarctic Endeavour* proposed by Chile.

159. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 8 in Appendix I for the *Albius* (items 8 and 9 of Appendix I) France provided the following:

‘France acknowledges that the notification was provided after the 24h-deadline because the vessel had problems with its mailbox.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

160. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for item 8 in Appendix I for the French vessel *Albius* proposed by France.

4.1.23 In its response to the compliance report identified as item 9 in Appendix I for the *Albius* France provided the following:

‘France acknowledges that the notification was provided after the 24h-deadline. Reminders to the competent authority of the fisheries monitoring center have been issued.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

161. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for item 9 in Appendix I for the French vessel *Albius* proposed by France.

162. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 10 in Appendix I for the *Sainte Rose* France provided the following:

‘France acknowledges that the notification was provided after the 24h-deadline. The ship forgot to transmit the notification. A reminder was sent by the French fisheries monitoring center on 05/02/2024 at 08:16. The CCAMLR Secretariat received the notification on 05/02/2024 at 09:03. Reminders to the ship have been issued.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

163. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the French vessel *Sainte Rose* proposed by France.

164. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 11 in Appendix I for the *Greenstar* Korea provided the following:

‘The *Greenstar* completed its 2-moth research activities in Research Block No.5 in Subarea 88.3 at 08:31 (UTC) on April 13, 2024 and made a north-bound trip to exit the Convention Area. While steaming North-East, the vessel crossed the boundary between subareas 88.3 and 48.1 ( 65°03'46.2"S, 70°00'00"W) at 22:45 (UTC) on April 13, 2024. The vessel mistook that they were still in Subarea 88.3 and sent an exit report to the Secretariat at 08:13 (UTC) on April 15, 2024 notifying that the vessel was leaving Subarea 88.3.

Later, the operator found that the subarea from which the vessel departed was 48.1, not 88.3 and submitted an exit report for 48.1 at 05:49 (UTC) on April 16, 2024. Considering the vessel submitted an entry report for Subarea 48.1 on April 16, they genuinely believed that they were entering 48.1 on April 16 and made an exit report within 24 hours on the same day.

This was an honest mistake from the vessel and rectified as soon as the mistake had been identified. As the vessel had been sending its VMS data on an hourly basis to the Secretariat, its activities can be verified. The authorities issued a strong warning on this case, and the operator is committed to strengthening its compliance with all the conservation measures of CCAMLR.

Further Action: No further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

165. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the Korean vessel *Greenstar* proposed by Korea.

166. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 12 in Appendix I for the Spanish vessel *Tronio*, the EU provided the following:

‘We have investigated this issue further and confirm that due to human error (confusion on the part of the Master who used the SSRU map in CM 41-01 and reported movements based upon the SSRUs listed), the required movement notification was not sent. The competent authorities have since clarified the movement notification obligations under

CM 10-04, paragraph 13, with the Master of the vessel to prevent this issue from happening in the future.

Further Action: no further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

167. SCIC reached a common understanding on a proposed compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the Spanish vessel *Tronio*.

168. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 13 in Appendix I for the *Nordic Prince* United Kingdom provided the following:

'The UK investigated this potential infringement.

After reviewing the onboard tamper proof electronic monitoring system and VMS, the UK can confirm that the *Nordic Prince* transited through the northern edge of Subarea 48.3, entering at approximately 15:18 UTC on the 13 April, exiting at approximately 07:35 UTC on the 14 April. The vessel was transiting at speeds between 9.0 – 10.6 knots.

The transiting crew incorrectly interpreted the requirement to notify entry and exit reports as only be required in relation to fishing activity, rather than also during transit.

The vessel provided the relevant entry/exit notification report on 18 April. The transit crew have been thoroughly briefed on CCAMLR requirements and reminded of the reporting requirements within the Convention Area.

Further Action: None

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

169. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the United Kingdom vessel *Nordic Prince* proposed by the United Kingdom.

#### Conservation Measure 10-05

170. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-05, paragraph 6, by Argentina (item 14 of Appendix I), Chile (item 15 of Appendix I), France (item 16 of Appendix I), the Netherlands (item 17 of Appendix I), Peru (item 18 of Appendix I), South Africa (item 19 of Appendix I), Spain (item 20 of Appendix I), the United States of America (item 21 of Appendix I), and Uruguay (item 22 of Appendix I). regarding the prohibition on exporting or re-exporting toothfish without an accompanying Dissostichus Export Document (DED) or Dissostichus Re-Export Document (DRED).

171. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 14 in Appendix I Argentina provided the following:

‘With regard to this incident, the Argentine National Directorate of Fisheries Coordination and Supervision has informed that all the steps in the e-CDS of this document were completed and validated on June 29, 2023, prior to the date of export, except for Step 4, where the signature was omitted due to an inadvertent error. Alerted to this by the exporting company about the box that had been left unvalidated, this error was corrected. The merchandise was able to enter its destination in Port Everglades.

Further Action: No further action needed

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

173. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of compliant proposed by Argentina.

174. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 15 in Appendix I, Chile provided the following:

‘In relation to the finding of the Secretary, regarding the the non-compliance with paragraph 6 of CM 10-05 on the identification of 74 DEDs that were validated late. However, it should be noted that this error affects only 2.2% (4) of the total shipments of *Dissostichus* spp. (180) made by Chile during the period analysed.

In addition to the above, it is important to note that a characteristic of the e-CDS system implemented by Chile is the large number of DCDs and DEDs that are validated (over 50% of the world total), which is explained by the fact that the TOP catches made in our EEZ by industrial and artisanal vessels (6 and 169 for the period analysed, respectively) have to be registered in the e-CDS system, which consequently implies the generation of a large number of export documents (DEDs). Given this, national shipments of *Dissostichus* spp. fluctuated, during the period analysed, between 1 and 67 DEDs per shipment (an average of 9 DEDs), with maritime shipments generally accounting for the largest number of DEDs.

In summary, the validation of certificates with a post-export date is explained by two reasons: i) involuntary errors by fishing inspectors by not validating step 4 in the e-CDS system for some of the DEDs considered in the shipments (2 cases), ii) late validations of the DEDs associated with the shipments (2 cases), given a failure to comply with the instructions and their control systems. Notwithstanding the above, we wish to affirm that our traceability analyses for the 74 DEDs validated late show that these documents are not related to IUU fishing activities.

Finally, it should be noted that, as corrective measures, adjustments have been made to the control systems and training regarding the procedures that apply to this type of certification, institutionally instructing and urging both Fisheries Heads and Inspectors to strictly comply with the provisions of MC 10-05.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)’

175. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2) proposed by Chile.

176. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 16 in Appendix I for France, the EU provided the following:

‘Regarding the three DEDES identified, the French authorities realised that some information were not accurately reflected (for DED FR-23-0028-E, it was not the correct Bill of Lading number and for DED FR-23-0025-E, the trainee entered the same export information twice for 2 different DED numbers). For DED FR-23-0015-E, the modification was made to the transport vessel and its departure date. Therefore, the DEDES were modified to reflect the correct information, and validated at that moment. The competent authorities have been reminded of the importance of ensuring that consignments of *Dissostichus* spp. are not exported without completed and validated DED/DREDS and to take the necessary actions to prevent this to happen in the future.

Further Action: no further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

177. SCIC reached a common understanding on a proposed compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1).

178. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 17 in Appendix I for the Netherlands, the EU provided the following:

‘Response submitted to the Secretariat by the EU via email:

1. One DRED was issued after the declared export date. The issuing of the DRED was delayed due to a technical issue encountered with the e-CDS system on 24 May 2024 (cause unknown). Despite various attempts using different browsers (e.g., Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, Firefox), it was not possible to complete the DRED that day, which was a Friday. The DRED could be completed after the weekend and was issued on Monday, 27 May 2024.

Proposed preliminary status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1), no further action required

2. In the case of the second DRED, there has been an administrative error. The initial DRED was submitted to the Dutch authorities for validation on 30 August 2023. The application provided the same information as an earlier application and was refused. On 12 September 2023, the export was requested again with a different catch document. However, the correct supporting documents were not available and essential information was still missing, resulting in various exchanges between the Dutch authorities and the exporter between 12 and 18 September 2023. After the missing information was provided, the DRED was issued on 18 September 2023 and the export happened the same day. However, due to an oversight, the issuing officer did not update the initial export date. The DRED therefore listed an incorrect export date of 30 August 2023. The correct export date was 18 September 2023. The DRED was issued the same day, prior to export.

Proposed preliminary status: Compliant, no further action required’

179. SCIC reached a common understanding on a proposed compliance statuses of minor non-compliant (Level 1) and compliant.

180. SCIC noted that Peru did not provide a response to the compliance report identified as item 18 in Appendix I. In recalling that Peru's compliance with CM 10-05 has been considered previously at SCIC-2022 and SCIC-2023, SCIC reached a common understanding to the compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1). SCIC requested Peru report back to SCIC with their response to the draft compliance report.

181. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 19 in Appendix I, South Africa provided the following:

'Notifications of intent to offload in SA ports were received from the two vessels Southern Ocean (21 February 2024) and Hong Jin No. 707 (16 February 2024), i.e. well in advance of the actual vessels offloads.

All 18 x DEDs which "account for 38 % of South Africa's exports and <1 % of all CDS exports" implicated in this non-compliance incidents are applicable to one offload of each of these two vessels and noting that one DED was issued for each container stacked for these exports.

a. 8 DEDs (8 containers) were issued between 6 - 10 days (1 DED 6 days and 7 DEDs 9 days) after declared export date for Southern Ocean - KR-24-0009-E

b. 10 DEDs (10 containers) were issued between 21 - 50 days (29 days) after declared export date for Hong Jin No. 707 - KR-24-0008-E

South Africa authorised official, Mr Johan De Goede, immediately requested an explanation from the exporter company Hongjin Corporation through their South African vessel agent Hanill Shipping, why DED applications were received late.

Full cooperation by the vessel agent as well as by the exporting company Hongjin Corporation was received during the entire investigation. A satisfactory explanation was provided (letter attached) by the exporting company Hongjin Corporation why the unavoidable situation occurred.

Considerations:

1) Both the Vessels No 707 Hong Jin and Southern Ocean submitted its required Advance Request to Enter Port (AREP) applications prior to entering the SA EEZ and in which their catches were declared.

2) Both Vessels No 707 Hong Jin and Southern Ocean applied for and were issued with the necessary permits to possess, land, sell Toothfish as required under South African legislation.

3) Both Vessels No 707 Hong Jin and Southern Ocean were timeously and fully inspected by the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) Fishery Control Officers. Inspection reports were submitted to CDS and is available online. All catches were verified by the DFFE Fishery Control Officers when the containers were packed.

4) Letter of explanation provided by exporter company Hongjin Corporation.

Decision:

Given the explanation provided by Hongjin Corporation, required domestic permits issued, notifications timeously received, port inspections properly conducted by Fishery Control Officers during the entire offloads, landing and catch verifications conducted, the authorised South African official was confident that the DEDs should be issued, albeit late. There was no intent from the Hongjin Corporation to delay DED applications, in fact all attempts were made to get their Bill of Ladings etc. timeously issued by the shipping lane well in advance.

The matters were satisfactorily explained and addressed accordingly. The vessels agent was made aware of the challenges and CCAMLR requirements for these products in attempt to avoid similar situations in future.

Further Action: No further actions required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)”

182. SCIC noted that the delay in receiving Bill of Ladings resulted in delayed applications for the *Dissostichus* Export Documents (DEDs) and the toothfish had departed South Africa at the time these DED applications were received. South Africa proceeded with the late issuance of the DEDs after an investigation was conducted and the matters were explained satisfactorily by Korean exporters. SCIC noted the seriousness of the matter and reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2).

183. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 20 in Appendix I for Spain, the EU provided the following:

‘Under previous versions of the e-CDS application, for the validation of DED/DREDS it was possible to obtain the catch document in pdf and therefore to export/re-export *Dissostichus* spp. consignments without completion of step 4 “Export State Confirmation”. Following updates in the e-CDS application, the 4 DREDS concerned were notified as “Items Pending Action”.

Even though these DREDS were still pending completion of step 4, due to administrative error they were understood as having been validated by the authorities and export was allowed to proceed. We have since completed step 4 for these DREDS, which is why they have a validation date after the declared export date. Given the improvements in the e-CDS application since these issues occurred, it will now be evident when a DED/DRED has not been validated, preventing this from happening in the future. Moreover, the competent authorities have been reminded of the importance of ensuring that consignments of *Dissostichus* spp. are not exported without completed and validated DED/DREDS and to take the necessary actions to prevent this to happen in the future.

Further Action: no further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

184. SCIC recalled the implementation of moratorium on compliance assessments put in place for DED and DREDS older than two years to address the administrative matter associated

with completing documents identified through the e-CDS upgrade (SCIC-2023, paragraph 90). SCIC noted that the four Spanish Dissostichus re-export documents (DREDs) identified as non-compliant were identified in this administrative process, however, were less than two years old. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for Spain.

185. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 21 in Appendix I, the United States of America provided the following:

‘This was an administrative error which was only brought to our attention when the new interface for the e-CDS was implemented in May 2023. The shipment documented under this DRED was accompanied by a DRED but lacked the Export Government Authority Validation. Given the improvements to the e-CDS it will now be evident when a DED/DRED has not been validated, preventing this from happening in the future.

Further Action: No further action needed

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

186. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by the United States of America.

187. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 22 in Appendix I, Uruguay provided the following:

‘Se revisó el período julio 2023 a junio 2024 y se completaron 101 DED. El 50 % de los DED que no se completaron a tiempo se refieren a cargas menores a 1000 kg procedentes de barcos de arrastre. Los retrasos se explican por la falta de personal dedicado y retrasos en el envío de la documentación verificable por parte de las empresas y representantes legales (información detallada de exportador e importador). En relación a la falta de personal, durante el año 2024 se incorporó más personal y asistieron a los cursos de capacitación.

The July 2023–June 2024 period was reviewed: 101 DEDs were completed. 50% of the DEDs that were not completed in time correspond to cargoes of less than 1000 kg from trawlers. These delays can be attributed to the shortage of dedicated staff and to delays by companies and legal representatives in the submission of verifiable documentation (detailed exporter and importer information). As to the staff shortage, additional staff has been engaged and they attended training courses earlier in the year.

Further Action: Paralelamente se comunicó a las empresas que se exigirá mayor puntualidad con la documentación. Uruguay ha solicitado asistencia a FAO para revisar y mejorar los procedimientos relativos a las Medidas del Estado Rector del Puerto.

Also, companies were informed that deadlines for the submission of documentation will be more strictly enforced. Uruguay has requested assistance from FAO to review and improve the procedures relating to the Port State Measures Agreement.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

188. SCIC noted that 50% of the Uruguayan DEDs identified as non-compliant were exports less than one tonne. Furthermore, SCIC noted that the officials responsible for implementing the CDS in Uruguay are facing human resource challenges, which is complicated with administrative issues, and increasing documentation and workloads leading to delayed processing times of DEDs. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2).

#### Conservation Measure 10-09

189. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 2, by the Panamanian vessels *Frio Aegean* (items 23 and 24 of Appendix I), *Frio Marathon* (item 25 of Appendix I), *Frio Oceanic* (item 26 of Appendix I), and *Procyon* (item 27 of Appendix I), and the Ukrainian vessel *More Sodruzhestva* (item 28 of Appendix I) which requires that each Contracting Party as a Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area.

190. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 23 in Appendix I for the *Frio Aegean*, Panama provided the following:

‘Panama confirms that the information provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat, according to the date of the notification received and the possible date of the activity reported by the vessel FRIO AEGEAN, is correct; and the vessel has been informed of the obligation to comply with the time limits for submitting the format for notification of resources regulated by the Commission, both to the Secretariat and to the Authority. However, in the confirmation form reported by the vessel, the actual date of transshipment reported did comply with the established time (74h 43m). Therefore, Panama considers a preliminary status of Compliant.

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

191. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 24 in Appendix I for the *Frio Aegean*, Panama provided the following:

‘Panama confirms that the information provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat, according to the date of the notification received and the possible date of the activity reported by the vessel FRIO AEGEAN, is correct; and the vessel has been informed of the obligation to comply with the time limits for submitting the format for notification of resources regulated by the Commission, both to the Secretariat and to the Authority. However, in the confirmation form reported by the vessel, the actual date of transshipment reported did comply with the established time (72h 53m). Therefore, Panama considers a preliminary status of Compliant.

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

192. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 25 in Appendix I for the *Frio Marathon*, Panama provided the following:

‘Panama confirms that the information provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat, according to the date of the notification received and the possible date of the activity

reported by the vessel FRIO MARATHON, is correct; and the vessel has been informed of the obligation to comply with the time limits for submitting the format for notification of resources regulated by the Commission, both to the Secretariat and to the Authority. However, in the confirmation form reported by the vessel, the actual date of transshipment reported did comply with the established time (103h 14m). Therefore, Panama considers a preliminary status of Compliant.

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

193. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 26 in Appendix I for the *Frio Oceanic* Panama provided the following:

'Panama confirms that the information provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat, according to the date of submission and the possible date of the notification reported by the vessel FRIO OCEANIC, is correct; and has informed the vessel of the obligation to comply with the time limits for the submission of notifications to both the Secretariat and the Authority, of the activities within the area regulated by the Commission. In view of the fact that in the activity confirmation report, the actual date and time of the transshipment also occurred with less time than the established time limit (69h 56m), Panama considers an evaluation of minor non-compliance (Level 1) that can be corrected by the vessel.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

194. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 27 in Appendix I for the *Procyon*, Panama provided the following:

'Panama confirms that the information provided by the CCAMLR Secretariat, according to the date of the notification received and the possible date of the activity reported by the vessel PROCYON, is correct; and the vessel has been informed of the obligation to comply with the time limits for submitting the format for notification of resources regulated by the Commission, both to the Secretariat and to the Authority. However, in the confirmation form reported by the vessel, the actual date of transshipment reported did comply with the established time (72h 14m). Therefore, Panama considers a preliminary status of Compliant.

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

195. SCIC noted that in responses to items 23, 24, 25 and 27, of Appendix I the transshipment occurred 72 hours after the notification was sent, however, the notified start of the transshipments was less than 72 hours from when the notification was sent. SCIC reiterated that notifications to transshipment must be transmitted at least 72 hours in advanced of the intended transshipment start time. SCIC also noted the response to item 26 of Appendix I assigned the compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1). SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for all five cases for Panama.

196. SCIC noted Ukraine's response to the compliance report identified as item 28 in Appendix I circulated in COMM CIRC 24/94 and noted that upon receiving the information the Secretariat identified that there was a data entry error when entering the transshipment

information. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliant status of compliant proposed by Ukraine.

197. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 3, by the Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea* (item 29 of Appendix I) and the Uruguayan vessel *Ocean Azul* (item 30 of Appendix I) which requires each Contracting Party to notify the Secretariat at least two hours in advance of the transshipment if any of its vessels propose to tranship items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel within the Convention Area.

198. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 29 in Appendix I for the *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea*, Norway provided the following:

‘Investigations have confirmed that the vessel did not provide the notification to the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance of the intended transshipment operation due to a human error.

Further Action: No Further Action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

199. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea* proposed by Norway.

200. In its response to the compliance report identified as item 30 in Appendix I for the *Ocean Azul*, Uruguay provided the following:

‘Existe intención de cumplimiento de la MC 10-09. Según el informe del observador se pasó una ecosonda al Elena Ndume.

Willingness to comply with CM 10-09 is confirmed. According to the observer's report, an echo sounder was transhipped to the Helena Ndume.

Further Action: Se advirtió a la empresa sobre el incumplimiento. Debe mejorar el procedimiento en situaciones semejantes en el futuro.

The company received a warning of non-compliance. The company must improve procedures in case similar situations arise in the future.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

201. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the Uruguayan vessel *Ocean Azul* proposed by Uruguay.

202. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 5, by the Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea* (item 31 of Appendix I) requiring that each Contracting Party provide confirmation of transshipment to the Secretariat within three (3) working days of any of its vessels having transhipped within the Convention Area.

203. In its response to the compliance report identified for the *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea*, Norway provided the following:

‘Investigations have shown that the confirmation for the transshipment of crew and provisions was not provided.

However, the notified transshipment was not conducted due to bad weather.

Further Action: No Further Action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

204. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliance (Level 1) for the Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Provider* and *Saga Sea* proposed by Norway.

205. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 10-09, paragraph 8, by the Vanuatuan vessel *Hai Feng 718* (item 32 of Appendix I) which states that no vessel may conduct transshipment within the Convention Area for which prior notification, pursuant to CM 10-09, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, has not been given.

206. In its response to the compliance report for the *Hai Feng 718*, Vanuatu provided the following:

‘Prior Notification was sent on the 3rd of February 2024

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

207. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of additional information required for the Vanuatuan vessel *Hai Feng 718*, and requested the Secretariat to follow up with Vanuatu to clarify the date the notification was transmitted.

#### Conservation Measure 22-07

208. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 22-07, paragraph 8, by the United Kingdom vessel *Argos Georgia* which requires the vessel to report in accordance with CM 23-07 the total benthos recovered in a daily period in item 33, Appendix I.

209. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Argos Georgia*, the United Kingdom had provided the following:

‘The UK investigated this potential infringement.

On 19 December the FV *Argos Georgia* landed a small amount of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystem (VME) indicator species. This was correctly recorded on the C2 report and submitted to the CCAMLR Secretariat for the relevant period. This information was unfortunately not included on the daily catch and effort report due to human error.

Given the information was recorded on the C2 data submission, we conclude that the vessel did not intentionally omit the VME reporting on the daily catch report.

Further Action: None

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

210. SCIC reached a common understanding on a status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) for the United Kingdom vessel *Argos Georgia* proposed by the United Kingdom.

211. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 22-07, paragraph 9, by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (items 34, 35, 36 and 37 of Appendix I) and the Uruguayan vessel *Proa Pioneer* (items 38 and 39) which states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the Scientific Committee and management actions are determined by the Commission.

212. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 34 in Appendix I for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона провела детальное расследование данных случаев. В виду повреждения файлов на носителе информации компьютера на судне, координаты ряда VME risk area отображались некорректно, что привело к непредумышленной установке ярусов в пределах VME risk area. Одновременно это не снимает ответственности судовладельца. Судовладельцу рекомендовано обеспечить установку на компьютеры надежное антивирусное программное обеспечение, дублирование информационных баз. Status Minor Non-compliant.

The Russian Federation has conducted a detailed investigation into these cases. Due to corrupted files on the ship's computer storage media, the coordinates of several VME risk areas were displayed incorrectly, resulting in the unintentional deployment of longlines within the VME risk area. At the same time, this does not remove the shipowner's responsibility. The shipowner was recommended to ensure the installation of reliable anti-virus software on computers and the duplication of information databases.

Status: Minor non-compliant.

Further Action:

Устранение технических пробелов.

Addressing technical gaps.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

213. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 35 in Appendix I for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона провела детальное расследование данных случаев. В виду повреждения файлов на носителе информации компьютера на судне, координаты ряда VME risk area отображались некорректно, что привело к непредумышленной установке ярусов в пределах VME risk area. Одновременно это не снимает ответственности судовладельца. Судовладельцу рекомендовано обеспечить установку на компьютеры надежное антивирусное программное обеспечение, дублирование информационных баз. Status Minor Non-compliant.

The Russian Federation has conducted a detailed investigation into these cases. Due to corrupted files on the ship's computer storage media, the coordinates of a number of VME risk areas were displayed incorrectly, resulting in the unintentional deployment of longlines within the VME risk area. At the same time, this does not remove the shipowner's responsibility. The shipowner was recommended to ensure the installation of reliable anti-virus software on computers and the duplication of information databases.

Status: Minor non-compliant.

Further Action:

Устранение технических пробелов

Addressing technical gaps

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

214. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 36 in Appendix I for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона провела детальное расследование данных случаев. В виду повреждения файлов на носителе информации компьютера на судне, координаты ряда VME risk area отображались некорректно, что привело к непредумышленной установке ярусов в пределах VME risk area. Одновременно это не снимает ответственности судовладельца. Судовладельцу рекомендовано обеспечить установку на компьютеры надежное антивирусное программное обеспечение, дублирование информационных баз. Status Minor Non-compliant.

‘The Russian Federation has conducted a detailed investigation into these cases. Due to corrupted files on the ship's computer storage media, the coordinates of a number of VME risk areas were displayed incorrectly, resulting in the unintentional deployment of longlines within the VME risk area. At the same time, this does not remove the shipowner's responsibility. The shipowner was recommended to ensure the installation of reliable anti-virus software on computers and the duplication of information databases.

Status: Minor non-compliant.

Further Action:

Устранение технических пробелов.

Addressing technical gaps.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

215. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 36 in Appendix I for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона провела детальное расследование данных случаев. В виду повреждения файлов на носителе информации компьютера на судне, координаты

ряда VME risk area отображались некорректно, что привело к непредумышленной установке ярусов в пределах VME risk area. Одновременно это не снимает ответственности судовладельца. Судовладельцу рекомендовано обеспечить установку на компьютеры надежное антивирусное программное обеспечение, дублирование информационных баз. Status Minor Non-compliant.

The Russian Federation has conducted a detailed investigation into these cases. Due to corrupted files on the ship's computer storage media, the coordinates of a number of VME risk areas were displayed incorrectly, resulting in the unintentional deployment of longlines within the VME risk area. At the same time, this does not remove the shipowner's responsibility. The shipowner was recommended to ensure the installation of reliable anti-virus software on computers and the duplication of information databases.

Status: Minor non-compliant.

Further Action:

Устранение технических пробелов

Addressing technical gaps.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)'

216. SCIC noted that in responses to items 33, 34, 35 and 37, of Appendix I the software issues experienced at sea had been resolved to prevent future reoccurrence. SCIC also noted the fishing in these VME closed areas is a serious issue and reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2) for all items.

217. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 38 in Appendix I for the *Proa Pioneer*, Uruguay had provided the following:

'Dos periodos de pesca dentro áreas de riesgo VME:

1) Lance 16: 21 dic 2023 Lat 74.17S-112.79W;

2) Lance 19: 22 dic 2023 Lat 74.17S-112.79W.

La presencia de organismos fue muy baja y la afectación mínima.

Two fishing periods within VME risk areas:

1) Haul 16: 21 Dec 2023 Lat 74.17S–112.79W;

2) Haul 19: 22 Dec 2023 Lat 74.17S–112.79W.

Very low presence of organisms; impact was minimal.

Further Action:

Se advierte a la empresa sobre el incumplimiento y se condiciona renovación de la licencia de pesca.

The company was issued a warning of non-compliance and conditions were imposed for the renewal of the fishing licence.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

218. In its response to the draft compliance report identified as item 39 in Appendix I for the *Proa Pioneer* Uruguay had provided the following:

‘Dos periodos de pesca dentro áreas de riesgo VME:

1) Lance 16: 21 dic 2023 Lat 74.17S-112.79W;

2) Lance 19: 22 dic 2023 Lat 74.17S-112.79W.

La presencia de organismos fue muy baja y la afectación mínima.

Two fishing periods within VME risk areas:

1) Haul 16: 21 Dec 2023 Lat 74.17S–112.79W;

2) Haul 19: 22 Dec 2023 Lat 74.17S–112.79W.

Very low presence of organisms; impact was minimal.

Further Action:

Se advierte a la empresa sobre el incumplimiento y se condiciona renovación de licencia.

The company was issued a warning of non-compliance and conditions were imposed for the renewal of the fishing licence.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

219. SCIC considered the responses to items 38 and 39, of Appendix I and noted that the crew tried to set the fishing gear around the VME closed areas. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2) for both items.

#### Conservation Measure 22-08

220. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 22-08, paragraph 1, prohibits fishing in exploratory fisheries shallower than 550 m by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in item 40, Appendix I.

221. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘После рассмотрения отчета наблюдателя в части возможного случая несоблюдения МС 22-08 не подтверждается информация о наличии несоответствия в данных постановки яруса судном. Комментарий наблюдателя не

отражает процедуру заполнения формы С2 при занесении данных о постановке ярусов на свалах с резким перепадом глубин и учетом смещения ярусов под воздействием подводного течения.

After reviewing the observer's report regarding possible non-compliance with CM 22-08, the information on the inconsistency in vessel longline setting data is not confirmed. The observer's comment does not reflect the procedure for completing the C2 Form when entering longline deployment data for places with a drastic depth difference and does not reflect the allowance for the shift of longlines due to underwater currents.

Further Action: не требуется

Not required

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

222. SCIC considered the additional explanation by Russia that the location the fishing took place had a number of seamounts which created difficulties in calculating depth, in addition to pull of the current on the fishing gear.

223. Russia suggested SCIC assign the compliance status of “Additional information required” and noted that investigation into the matter is ongoing and they will provide an update to SCIC. Several Members urged Russia to make all possible efforts to provide additional information on this incident during the meeting of CCAMLR-43, noting this issue should be able to be clarified through available data sources including VMS data and national observer records. These Members further noted their concern with proposed compliance status of “Additional information required” without providing an agreed deadline for the submission of additional information and would be willing for a compromised approach.

224. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux*, in item 40, Appendix I.

#### Conservation Measure 23-04

225. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 23-04, paragraph 3, which requires the total target catch must be reported by species and the total by-catch must be reported by species or to the lowest taxonomic level possible by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in items 41 and 42 of Appendix I.

226. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* Russia in item 41 of Appendix I had provided the following:

‘После рассмотрения отчета наблюдателя российская сторона сообщила в Секретариат и назначающей стране-члену о неточностях, как только они выявлены. В отчете (logbook) международного наблюдателя указано 3 потерянных яруса. Координаты по всем ярусам указаны. В отчете по итогам рейса включен еще один потерянный ярус. 27 августа 2024 года получен комментарий корейской стороны. Однако ответ не проясняет расхождения с ранее

предоставленной международным наблюдателем информации. Тем не менее возникли дополнительные вопросы по данной проблеме, которые требуют урегулирования сторонами.

After reviewing the observer's report, the Russian Federation informed the Secretariat and the Appointing Member State of inaccuracies as soon as they were identified. The International Observer's report (logbook) indicated three (3) lost longlines. Coordinates for all longlines are provided. One more lost longline is included in the final cruise report. A comment from Korea was received on 27 August 2024. However, the response did not clarify the discrepancy with the information previously provided by the International Observer. Nonetheless, additional issues have arisen on this matter that need to be addressed by the parties.

Further Action: Требуется дальнейшие консультации с корейской стороной.

Further consultations with Korea are required.

Preliminary Status: Additional information required'

227. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia in item 42 of Appendix I had provided the following:

После рассмотрения отчета наблюдателя российская сторона сообщила в Секретариат и назначающей стране-члену о неточностях 29 мая 2024 года.

By-catch data for each line was recorded by both observers on a special form that was kept on the vessel. These forms are saved and can be presented. No evidence of intentional discards of by-catch species was provided. 27 августа 2024 года получен ответ корейской стороны. Тем не менее возникли дополнительные вопросы по данной проблеме, которые требуют урегулирования сторонами.

After reviewing the observer's report, the Russian Federation informed the Secretariat and the Appointing Member State of inaccuracies on 29 May 2024. Both observers recorded by-catch data for each line on a special form kept on the vessel. These forms are saved and can be presented. No evidence of intentional discards of by-catch species was provided. A reply from Korea was received on 27 August 2024. Nonetheless, additional issues have arisen on this matter that need to be addressed by the parties.

Preliminary Status: Additional information required'

228. Russia provided an update on their intersessional engagement with Korea on the matter and noted that their investigations verified the data recorded in the vessel's logbook but could not verify the information recorded in the observer's logbook.

229. Korea confirmed that consultations with Russia have been occurring, and noted these were needed to continue on the matter. Korea supported the proposed compliance status of "Additional information required", and committed to also provide updates on the matter.

230. Several Members, noting that there appeared to be sufficient information available to determine a compliance status, recalled their concerns with applying a compliance status of "Additional information required" without providing an agreed deadline for the submission of

additional information and urged the relevant Members to make all possible efforts to provide additional information on this incident during the meeting of CCAMLR-43, and no later than 1 February 2025.

231. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in items 41 and 42, Appendix I.

#### Conservation Measure 25-02

232. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 25-02, paragraph 6, regarding the prohibition of dumping of offal and discards while longlines are being set by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in item 43 of Appendix I.

233. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux*, Russia had provided the following:

‘По данному вопросу провНесмотря на наличие расхождений по ряду позиций в отчете наблюдателя по итогу рейса к судовладельцу применен ряд санкций:

Отстранен капитан судна от возможности участия в рейсах в АНТКОМ;

Часть команды судна отправлена на проверку квалификационным требованиям;

Компания прекратила трудовые отношения с директором, отвечавшим за данный рейс.

едено тщательное расследование.

Despite the discrepancies on many items in the Observer's Cruise Report, several sanctions were applied to the shipowner:

- The ship's Master was suspended from the opportunity to participate in CCAMLR cruises.
- Part of the vessel's crew was referred for a qualification review.
- The company terminated its employment contract with the Director in charge of the voyage.

A thorough investigation has been carried out.

Further Action: Не требуются.

Not required

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)’

234. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of non-compliant (Level 2) proposed by Russia.

235. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 25-02, paragraph 8, by the New Zealand vessel *Janas* (item 44 of Appendix I) and the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 45 of Appendix I) which requires a streamer line to be deployed during longline setting.

236. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Janas* (item 44 of Appendix I), New Zealand had provided the following:

‘As per the requirements of CM 25-02 paragraph 8, the *Janas* had a streamer line deployed. However, during the setting of line 108, the streamer line became tangled around the rudder.

The crew responded quickly, and the streamer line was tied to the stern before it was cut whilst they deployed the spare streamer line. The cut streamer line was then pulled in by hand.

New Zealand officials believe that the *Janas* crew took all reasonable steps to ensure they remained compliant under CM 25-02 during this incident. However, during the period that these steps were taken, some magazines were set in absence of a streamer line.

Further Action: No further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

237. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by New Zealand.

238. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* (item 45 of Appendix I), Russia had provided the following:

‘A thorough investigation was conducted into this matter.

Two streamer lines were regularly used during vessel cruise.

One streamer line was deployed only due to heavy ice conditions.

Further Action: Требуется дополнительные консультации с корейской стороной по содержанию отчета.

Additional discussions with Korea regarding the report's content are necessary.

Preliminary Status: Additional information required’

239. Several Members, noting that there appeared to be sufficient information available to determine a compliance status, recalled their concerns with applying a compliance status of “Additional information required” without providing an agreed deadline for the submission of additional information and urged the relevant Members to make all possible efforts to provide additional information on this incident during the meeting of CCAMLR-43, and no later than 1 February 2025.

240. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in item 45 of Appendix I.

241. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 25-02, Annex A, paragraph 3, by the French vessel *Sainte Rose* (item 46 of Appendix I) and the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 47 of Appendix I) which requires the streamer line be a minimum of 150 m in length.

242. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Sainte Rose* (item 46 of Appendix I), France had provided the following:

‘One of the observers on board during this campaign confirmed that the streamer lines complied with CCAMLR obligations. The reference to streamer lines measuring 120m is a typing error. There is no compliance issue.

Preliminary Status: Compliant’

243. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of compliant proposed by France

244. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* (item 47 of Appendix I), Russia had provided the following:

‘По данному вопросу проведено расследование. При подготовке судно в рейс осуществлялись стандартные промеры the streamer line и их длина была не меньше 150 метров. В конфигурацию стримерных линий не вносились изменения. Повреждения на стримерных линиях (если имелись) возможны в результате обрыва во льдах. По данному вопросу, как и по отчету наблюдателя в целом существует ряд замечаний.

Несмотря на наличие расхождений по ряду позиций в отчете наблюдателя по итогу рейса к судовладельцу применен ряд санкций:

Отстранен капитан судна от возможности участия в рейсах в АНТКОМ;

Часть команды судна отправлена на проверку квалификационным требованиям;

Компания прекратила трудовые отношения с директором, отвечавшим за данный рейс.

This matter has been investigated. During the preparation of the vessel for the voyage, the standard measurements of the streamer lines were taken, and their length was not less than 150 metres. No changes were made to the configuration of the streamer lines. Damage to the streamer lines (if any) is possible as a result of breaking in the ice. There are many comments on this issue, as well as on the observer's report in general.

Despite the discrepancies on many items in the Observer's Cruise Report, several sanctions were applied to the shipowner:

- The ship's Master was suspended from the opportunity to participate in CCAMLR cruises.

- Part of the vessel's crew was referred for a qualification review.
- The company terminated its employment contract with the Director in charge of the voyage.

Further Action: Требуется дальнейшие консультации с корейской стороной.

Further consultations with Korea are required.

Preliminary Status: Additional information required'

245. Several Members, noting that there appeared to be sufficient information available to determine a compliance status, recalled their concerns with applying a compliance status of "Additional information required" without providing an agreed deadline for the submission of additional information and urged the relevant Members to make all possible efforts to provide additional information on this incident during the meeting of CCAMLR-43, and no later than 1 February 2025.

246. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in item 47 of Appendix I.

247. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 25-02, Annex A, paragraph 4, which requires streamers be branched each comprising of two strands of a minimum of 3 mm diameter, by the Korean vessel *Sunstar* in item 48, Appendix I.

248. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Sunstar*, Korea had provided the following:

'All vessels under the operation of TNS industries, including the *Sunstar*, use bright green plastic tube of 4mm diameter as branch streamers in accordance with paragraph 4 of Annex A of CM25-02. The vessels use (PP) 9mm(3S/T) ropes as streamer lines and 4mm tubes as branch streamers. The gear diagrams registered to CCAMLR websites indicate the vessels do not use ropes whose diameters are 3mm or less. Therefore, the 1.5 mm polypropylene tubes indicated in the observer's report have never been used in any of the TNS vessels.

During the steaming into the Convention Area for its operation for the 2023/24, two observers-SISO and Korean national-on board the *Sunstar* checked the size and specifications of the streamer lines and verified the compliance with Annex A of CM 25-02.

Also, after its trip, the vessel entered the port of Punta Arenas at 19:30 (UTC), February 14, 2024 and was inspected by the Chilean authority at 12:30 (UTC), February 15, 2024 in accordance with paragraph 5 of CM10-03, who confirmed the vessel's compliance with all the relevant CCAMLR CMs.

The operator contacted the Designating Member (South Africa) and received clarifications that the Observer's Cruise Report submitted to the Secretariat on June 1 had been incomplete, and they submitted another report to the Secretariat on August 14 that contained the correct information on the size and specification of the streamer ropes and tubes.

Further Action: No further action required

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

249. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of compliant proposed by Korea.

#### Conservation Measure 26-01

250. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 26-01, paragraph 8, prohibiting the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S by the Chilean vessel *Puerto Ballena* (item 49 of Appendix I), the Namibian vessel *Helena Ndume* (item 50 of Appendix I), the United Kingdom vessel *Argos Georgia* (item 52 of Appendix I), the Uruguayan vessels *Ocean Azul* (item 53, Appendix I) and *Proa Pioneer* (item 54, Appendix I) and the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 51, Appendix I).

251. In its response to the compliance report for the *Puerto Ballena* identified as item 49 in Appendix I, Chile provided the following:

'In relation to this case, we can point out that, although the Catch by set ("Haul Catch") form of the C2 forms associated with the vessel PUERTO BALLENA indicates the discard of species south of 60° S (Columns G and H), in the "Comments" field (Column N) of the mentioned form it is specified that each of the discards were processed in a crusher to later be stored in a retention pond. The retention ponds were emptied during the navigation of the vessel north of 60°, on its return transit to a Chilean port.

This is corroborated by the statement included in the Campaign Report sent to CCAMLR and prepared by the scientific observers on board the vessel. In point 6.3 of such report, regarding the treatment of fish waste, it indicates: "the waste of unprocessed fish and by-catch fauna was crushed and stored in tanks to then be thrown into the sea outside the CCAMLR Area."

Given the above, this finding would not correspond to a non-compliance, since the discard carried out by the Puerto Ballena vessel was outside the CCAMLR Area.

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

4.1.113 In its response to the compliance report for the *Helena Ndume* identified as item 50 in Appendix I, Namibia provided the following:

'Namibia consulted the vessel management and it appears misunderstanding of the word discarding and retention on completing C2 data form. The fish caught was supposed to be recorded as retained. The fish was grounded to offal and only released north of 60S as per CM 26-1, paragraph 8. The Ukrainian International Scientific Observer reported this in his report that was submitted to CCAMLR Secretariat.

Further Action: The Right Holder investigation report into the matter attached.

Namibia will conduct pre-season training session for the next fishing season on all CM to be complied with at all times.

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

252. In its response to the compliance report for the *Argos Georgia* identified as item 52 in Appendix I, the United Kingdom provided the following:

'The UK investigated this potential infringement.

For the period in question the UK reviewed the SISO observer report, which indicated there were no discards within the Convention Area.

The vessel's internal system for reporting to its shore-based operators confirmed that the discards were retained for later release outside of the Convention Area, as per the usual practice. However, this data was incorrectly entered as discarded in the relevant C2 report. As soon as the operators became aware of the issue, the C2 data was amended to correctly reflect the retention of all discards. The operator has been reminded to be vigilant when entering data into the C2 report.

Further Action: None

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

253. In its response to the compliance report for the *Ocean Azul* identified as item 53 in Appendix I, Uruguay provided the following:

'Descarte de productos orgánicos al sur Lat 60S, 11 dic 2023-28 ene 2024. Descarta 39220 ind, 33 ton aprox. 11 especies. Error en las anotaciones en el formulario C2 al no incluir como retenidas las especies a macerar y descartar posteriormente. Según el informe del observador: El vertido de desechos fue el día 08/02/2024, comenzó a las 15:15 hora UTC, latitud 60°00S-longitud 090° 06,4W y finalizó el mismo día a las 18:30 hora UTC, latitud 59°45,7S-longitud 089°24,2W, el vertido total fue de 64 m3.

Discarding of organic matter south of Lat 60S, 11 Dec 2023–28 Jan 2024. Discard of 39 220 ind[ividuals], 33 tonnes approx. 11 species. Error when completing the C2 Form: species to be macerated and subsequently discarded were not recorded as retained. According to the observer's report, the discharge of discards took place on 08/02/2024, starting at 15:15 UTC, at 60°00S-090° 06.4W, ending the same day at 18:30 UTC, at 59°45.7S-089°24.2W. The discharge totalled 64 m3.

Further Action: Se advierte a la empresa sobre el incumplimiento y se condiciona la renovación de la licencia de pesca.

The company was issued a warning of non-compliance and conditions were imposed for the renewal of the fishing licence.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)'

254. In its response to the compliance report for the *Proa Pioneer* identified as item 54 in Appendix I, Uruguay provided the following:

‘Descarte de productos orgánicos al sur Lat 60S. 19 dic 2023-25 ene 2024. Descarta 481 ind, 1763kg de *Dissostichus mawsoni*. Posible error en la anotación del formulario C2 al no incluir los individuos que fueron almacenados para descarte posterior como "retenidos". El capitàn declara que no hubo descarte fuera de la zona habilitada.

Discarding of organic matter south of Lat 60S. 19 Dec 2023–25 Jan 2024. Discard of 481 ind[ividuals], 1763 kg of *Dissostichus mawsoni*. Possible error when completing the C2 Form: fish that may have been stored for later discard would not been recorded as “retained”. The captain declared that there was no discarding outside authorised areas.

Further Action: La empresa fue advertida y se condiciona renovación de la licencia de pesca.

The company was issued a warning and conditions were imposed for the renewal of the fishing licence.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

255. SCIC requested the Scientific Committee Chair to advise on the completion of the fine-scale catch and effort reports and the declaration of discards north or south of 60° South. SCIC noted the advice to consider modifying the fine-scale catch and effort report forms. COLTO suggested that modification of the instructions be considered as an alternative.

256. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Compliant to items 49, 50, and 52 as proposed by the respective Members and agreed to a revision of the compliance status of item 54 of Appendix I to Compliant. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Non-compliant (Level 2) for item 53 of Appendix I as proposed by Uruguay.

256. In its response to the compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* identified as item 51 in Appendix I, Russia provided the following:

‘Несмотря на наличие расхождений по ряду позиций в отчете наблюдателя по итогу рейса к судовладельцу применен ряд санкций:

Отстранен капитан судна от возможности участия в рейсах в АНТКОМ;

Часть команды судна отправлена на проверку квалификационным требованиям;

Компания прекратила трудовые отношения с директором, отвечавшим за данный рейс.

A thorough investigation was conducted into this matter.

In general offal discarding was not take place during setting or during hauling.

70% offal and discards was crash to disposal for port side setting and hauling. And 30% offal and discards was packed in bags and stored in the freezer or fish hold for disposal on shore. For each identified fact, sanctions are applied to the ship owner.

Further Action: Не требуются

Not required

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)'

257. SCIC noted the further explanation from Russia that sanctions applied to the vessel resulted in all crew removed from the *Alpha Crux* except the mechanics, with the vessel Master as the individual with ultimate responsibility of the vessel receiving a ban from participating in future CCAMLR fishing activities.

258. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Non-compliant (Level 2) proposed by Russia.

#### Conservation Measure 31-01

259. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 31-01, which states that for each fishing season the Commission shall establish such limitations or other measures, as necessary, around South Georgia (Subarea 48.3), in connection with the fishing activities of the United Kingdom vessels *Argos Georgia* (item 55 of Appendix I), *Argos Helena* (item 56 of Appendix I) and *Nordic Prince* (item 57 of Appendix I).

260. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Argos Georgia* (item 55 of Appendix I), *Argos Helena* (item 56 of Appendix I) and *Nordic Prince* (item 57 of Appendix I) the United Kingdom had provided the following:

'The UK rejects the assertions contained in COMM CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70, concerning the compliance of the named vessels with CM 31-01.

COMM CIRCs 22/39, 22/51, 22/69, 23/39 and 24/69 set out the UK's consistent position in regards to the Patagonian toothfish fishery in the part of the proclaimed maritime zone of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands that lies within statistical Subarea 48.3.

There is no scientific or legal justification for any Member seeking the closure of the Patagonian toothfish fishery in Subarea 48.3. All Members of the Commission, apart from Russia, agreed that the proposed terms on which CM 41-02 was to be re-adopted at CCAMLR42 were consistent with the best available science and in accordance with the CCAMLR decision rules.

In relation to CM 31-01, this CM requires CCAMLR to 'establish such limitations or other measures, as necessary' for fishing in Subarea 48.3, but does not provide, or imply, that if CCAMLR does not adopt such a measure (even if objectively required), any limitation on fishing will nonetheless come into existence. In connection with this, the UK notes that fishing for toothfish took place in Subarea 48.3 prior to a catch limit being set for that species, including in the years after Conservation Measure 31-01 was adopted. There is no suggestion (such as in the records of meetings at the time) that such fishing prior to the adoption of a catch limit was contrary to the CAMLR Convention or any Conservation Measure, including Conservation Measure 31-01.

For the information of Members, the UK has operated the South Georgia toothfish fishery consistently with all relevant CCAMLR CMs including, but not limited to, CM 10-02, CM 10-04, CM 10-05 and CM 23-01.

Further Action: None

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

261. Argentina made the following statement:

'Argentina considers that there is a serious breach of Conservation Measure 31-01 by the vessels Argos Georgia, Argos Helena and Nordic Prince, which is why the vessels should be listed as Non-compliant at level 3.'

262. The United Kingdom reiterated that they have already set out their position on CM 31-01 and consider the three vessels compliant with CM 31-01.

263. Russia expressed its support for the position stated by Argentina, noting that the regulation of toothfish fished in Subarea 48.3 is exercised by the Commission. Russia noted that the Commission did not reach consensus on the catch limit for Subarea 48.3 in 2023 and due to this CM 41-02 was not extended. Russia expressed regret that consensus to assign a status of non-compliance (Level 3) for these cases was blocked.

264. Some Members expressed the opinion that differences in interpretation of CM 31-01 should not stop CCAMLR from adopting a conservation measure setting a catch limit in Subarea 48.3 based upon best available science. These Members expressed their frustration on the repeated refusal of adopting such a conservation measure.

265. China expressed concerns that the issues have repeated over years. China indicated that all concerned fishing activities should be assessed against CM 31-01, and failure to reach consensus on conservation measures setting a catch limit by the Commission should not be used as an excuse for conducting illegal fishing. China urged SCIC to take effective and efficient actions to end these persistent, serious violations, which have undermined the objective of the Convention.

266. Argentina made the following statement:

'Argentina wishes to reiterate, as it has been saying for a long time, that it agrees with the comments made regarding the importance of working towards the approval of a conservation measure on this issue. In this regard, it considers that work must continue to achieve consensus to approve a conservation measure that enables the fishing of Patagonian toothfish in Subarea 48.3, but until the measure is approved, it is appropriate that no fishing activity be carried out without a conservation measure that enables it.'

267. The United States made the following statement:

'Members' differences should not prevent us from working together toward our common goal of setting a toothfish catch limit in Subarea 48.3, based on the recommendations of the Scientific Committee and relying upon the best available science. We have been frustrated in previous years by one Member's refusal to adopt such a Conservation Measure, and hope that we can get past that reluctance this year.'

Like other Members, we believe that CCAMLR should adopt a Conservation Measure establishing catch limits, by-catch limits, mitigation measures, data collection and reporting, and other requirements for toothfish fishing in 48.3. We know that different Members have different reasons for wanting a Conservation Measure. The United States has the same position regarding this matter for the past season that we have had in previous years.’

268. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status on items 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix I noting the strong divergent views by Members.

#### Conservation Measure 31-02

269. SCIC considered the implementation by the Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Endurance* (item 58 of Appendix I), *Antarctic Sea* (item 59 of Appendix I), and *Saga Sea* (item 60 of Appendix I) of CM 31-02, paragraph 1, stating that vessels shall remove their fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time, and the implementation of CM 31-02, paragraph 4 that states a vessel shall notify the Secretariat should the vessel appear likely to be unable remove all its fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time.

270. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Antarctic Endurance* (item 58 of Appendix I), *Antarctic Sea* (item 59 of Appendix I), and *Saga Sea* (item 60 of Appendix I), Norway had provided the following:

‘Prior to the 2023/24 fishing season the CCAMLR Secretariat issued COMM CIRC 23/123 CCAMLR operational fishery management for krill fisheries in the 2023/24 season (all areas). Paragraph 5.3 of this COMM CIRC states that “the Secretariat will notify the closure of a fishery by COMM CIRC, which will also be sent by email to Fishery Update Contacts and vessels notified and licensed to participate in the applicable fishery.” The procedure described in COMM CIRC 23/123 is consistent with the practice that has been followed for many years.

The closure was notified via COMM CIRC 24/53 of 16 May where the last paragraph states that “This closure notice has been issued as outlined in COMM CIRC 23/123 and in accordance with CM 23-01, paragraph 7, and CM 31-02.” The Secretariat has confirmed that COMM CIRC 24/53 was issued to Contracting Parties, but it was not sent separately to the individual vessels. Hence, the closure notification process was not in accordance with the procedure outlined in COMM CIRC 23/123 and not consistent with previous years’ practice.

Unfortunately, due to a public holiday in Norway, followed by a weekend, COMM CIRC 24/53 did not come to the attention of Norwegian authorities until early morning (UTC) of 20 May. Thus, the *Antarctic Endurance* was unaware of the closure notice at the time of closure and was not able to follow up accordingly. As soon as Norwegian authorities became aware of the closure notice, the vessel was instructed to stop fishing immediately. It was confirmed that the vessel stopped fishing and retrieved the nets once the information was received.

Norway has reviewed and improved its internal procedures to ensure that this does not reoccur.

Further Action: No further action required.

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

271. The Norway noted that the continued fishing was because the Secretariat did not email COMM CIRC 24/53 - SC CIRC 24/41 regarding the closure of the krill fishery in Subarea 48.1 to the vessels in the fishery which was noted in COMM CIRC 23/123 - SC CIRC 23/107 regarding the CCAMLR operational fishery management for krill fisheries in the 2023/24 season.

272. Russia noted that the fishing activities of the *Antarctic Endurance*, *Antarctic Sea*, and *Saga Sea* continued after the Flag State was notified of the fishery closure and this would be a basis to consider the vessels for inclusion on the CP-IUU Vessel List as per CM 10-06, and is a serious violation of CM 31-02 and should be assigned a status of seriously, frequently or persistently Non-compliant (Level 3). As such, Russia asked the Secretariat why the vessels were not included in the Draft CP-IUU Vessel List. The Secretariat clarified that they did not include the vessel on the Draft CP-IUU Vessel List due to the submission of the report on delayed fishing gear retrieval from Subarea 48.1 (COMM CIRC 24/58) and other mitigating factors which prevented a clear assessment that these vessels would meet the test for inclusion.

273. China and Russia recalled that the Secretariat fulfilled its obligations and issued a closure notice to all Contracting Parties in accordance with the requirements of CM 23-01, paragraph 7, and noted that vessels of other Members participating in this fishery did not receive an email from the Secretariat either, but ceased fishing as the fishery closed. Given the significant amount of krill, 4327 tonnes, harvested from the 3 Norwegian vessels after the fishery closure, China and Russia recommended that the proceeds associated to the catches after the closure should be seized and contributed to establish a special fund in CCAMLR.

274. Norway stated that it would take its responsibility as a Flag State and would agree to change the status from Compliant to Minor non-compliant (Level 1).

275. New Zealand noted that CM 31-02, paragraph 6, requires the investigation into the late gear retrieval to assess whether all reasonable efforts were made to remove the fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time or as soon as possible after the notification that it would appear the vessels will be unable to remove the fishing gear from the water by the closure. Additionally, New Zealand noted the vessel did not take all reasonable efforts to remove the gear by the notified closure date and time, but once made aware of the fishery closure the gear was removed. Acknowledging Norway's recognition of Flag State responsibility in relation to this CM, New Zealand and the United Kingdom suggested a compliance status of Minor non-compliant (Level 1) as suggested by Norway was appropriate given the mitigating circumstances described.

276. Ukraine noted in cases of possible non-compliance with Conservation Measure 31-02 by Norwegian vessels *Antarctic Endurance*, *Antarctic Sea* and *Saga Sea*, that Norway provided comprehensive explanations of the circumstances that led to exceeding the authorised fishing period by these vessels. These circumstances have been confirmed and should be taken into account, and we therefore consider that non-compliance (Level 1) is appropriate in assessing this case. Ukraine noted the transparency and flexibility shown by Norway in considering this precedent.

277. Some Members noted the proposal by the Secretariat in CCAMLR-43/19 to amend CM 23-01 to prevent this from happening in the future (paragraphs 3.8.12 - 3.8.13).

278. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status on items 58, 59 and 60 of Appendix I noting the strong divergent views of Members.

#### Conservation Measure 41-09

279. SCIC considered the implementation of CM 41-09, paragraph 6, by the Uruguayan vessel *Ocean Azul* (item 61 of Appendix I) which requires the vessel to cease fishing in an SSRU for the remainder of the season when the catch of *Macrourus* spp. taken by a single vessel in any two 10-day periods in any SSRU exceeds 1 500 kg in each 10-day period and exceeds 16% of the catch of *Dissostichus* spp. by that vessel in that SSRU.

280. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Ocean Azul* Uruguay had provided the following:

‘Se excede la pesca de 1500kg de *Macrourus* spp. en periodo de 10 días por SSRU. Total de 4 oportunidades de incumplimiento, donde el *Ocean Azul* debió abandonar la pesca en área 88.1-I. Se reconoce incumplimiento.

The catch of 1500 kg of *Macrourus* spp. in a 10-day period per SSRU was exceeded. 4 compliance issues caused the *Ocean Azul* to stop fishing in Subarea 881 I. Non-compliance was acknowledged.

Further Action: La empresa fue advertida y se condiciona renovación de la licencia de pesca.

The company was issued a warning and conditions were imposed for the renewal of the fishing licence.

Preliminary Status: Non-compliant (Level 2)’

281. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Non-compliant (Level 2) proposed by Uruguay.

#### Conservation Measure 91-05

282. SCIC considered the implementation by the Namibian vessel *Helena Ndume* (items 62 and 63 of Appendix I), the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 64 of Appendix I) and the Spanish vessel *Tronio* (item 65 of Appendix I) of CM 91-05, paragraph 24, which requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the RSRMPA.

283. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Helena Ndume* (items 62 and 63 of Appendix I) Namibia had provided the following:

‘Namibia can report that the vessel experienced communication blackout during these periods that affected the emails as well. This was beyond the control of the captain and the reports was submitted as soon as communication was re-established.

Further Action: Pre-season training on all CM for all vessel management and crew for total compliance for upcoming fishing season.

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

284. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by Namibia.

285. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* (item 64 of Appendix I) Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона рассмотрела данный случай и установила, что ввиду технической ошибки с судна уведомление направлено с задержкой. В этой связи проведен инструктаж по вопросам системы мониторинга.

The Russian Federation examined the case and found that the notification was sent with a delay due to a technical error on the part of the ship. In this regard, a briefing on the monitoring system has been conducted.

Further Action: Не требуется.

Not required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

286. SCIC Reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Minor non-compliant (Level 1) proposed by Russia.

287. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Tronio* (item 65 of Appendix I) for Spain, the EU had provided the following:

‘According to preliminary enquiries, the prior entry notification was not sent in a timely manner due to human error. The competent authorities have engaged with the Master and vessel owner regarding the importance of compliance with the prior entry notification requirement and have instructed them to take extra care when sending through entry and exit notifications for the RSR MPA SRZ.

Further Action: no further action required

Preliminary Status: Minor non-compliant (Level 1)’

288. SCIC noted that the EU had provided a revised response to the draft compliance report on this matter in COMM CIRC 24/104, further noting that the vessel sent its movement notification prior to entry into the MPA, and that a revised preliminary compliance status of Compliant had been proposed.

289. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status of Compliant.

## CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation

290. SCIC considered the implementation by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 66 of Appendix I) of the Text of the CCAMLR Scheme of Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (i), which states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not offer a scientific observer, either directly or indirectly, any gratuity, gift, favour, loan, or anything of monetary value, except for meals, accommodations or salary when provided by the vessel.

291. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* (item 66 of Appendix I) Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона изучила информацию в отношении наличия на борту судна текста Меры по сохранению 26-01. Текст Мер по сохранению АНТКОМ на русском языке имелся на борту судна.

Российская сторона детально рассмотрела вопросы, обозначенные в отчете международного научного наблюдателя в отношении возможных неправомерных действий необозначенного представителя команды судна в должности навигатора (navigator). Исходя из представленных данных предположительно идентифицировано единственное лицо в данной должности, которое является гражданином Республики Корея, который был трудоустроен в период рейса и по его завершению убыл с судна. В ходе рейса международный наблюдатель не обращался к капитану судна и не информировал о таких действиях со стороны члена команды судна. Тем не менее, в виду необходимости установления всех обстоятельств дела предполагается продолжить взаимодействие с корейской стороной.

Russian Federation examined the information regarding the availability of the text of Conservation Measure 26-01 on board the vessel. The text of the CCAMLR conservation measures in Russian was available on the ship. The Russian Federation has considered in detail the issues identified in the International Scientific Observer's report regarding possible misconduct by an undisclosed ship crew member in the Navigator role. Based on the reported data, the only person in that position was presumably a citizen of the Republic of Korea, employed for the cruise period and left the vessel at the end of it. During the cruise, the International Observer did not contact the ship's captain or report such actions by a vessel crew member. Nonetheless, further cooperation with Korea is planned, given the need to establish all the circumstances of the case.

Further Action: Дальнейшая коммуникация между страной, назначавшей наблюдателя и принимающей стороной для установления всех обстоятельств.

Further communication between the country that designated the observer and the host country to establish all the circumstances.

Preliminary Status: Additional information required’

292. SCIC noted the explanation that Russia was investigating the matter but as the individual in question who allegedly offered the bribe to the observer may be a Korean national, Russia is

having difficulty identifying them. Russia reiterated individuals in Russia would be prosecuted for bribery or attempted bribery of an observer.

293. Korea made the following statement:

‘As the Designating Member, Korea has engaged in several consultations with Russia to assist the Flag State in investigating the matter, and we acknowledge that the Flag State has diligently carried out its investigation. As a result of our own inquiry, we found that no Korean nationals were involved in the issue but we could not specify the “navigator” indicated in his report. As a SISO designating member, Korea is actively working to strengthen protocols to address similar situations, including incidents of attempted bribery. Korea would also like to emphasise the importance of fostering an onboard environment where observers can perform their duties safely and without interference.’

294. Some Members expressed their concerns of this report of an alleged bribe, underscoring the seriousness of such a situation, and highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of the SISO and to safeguard observers, and requested Russia to continue its investigations to identify the individual or circumstances associated with the allegation and request that SCIC receive an update. These Members further urged Russia to make all possible efforts to provide additional information to the meeting of CCAMLR-43, and no later than 1 February 2025.

295. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* in item 66 of Appendix I.

296. SCIC considered the implementation by the Russian vessel *Alpha Crux* (item 67 of Appendix I) of the Text of the CCAMLR Scheme of Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (ii), which states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not intimidate, or interfere with the duties of a scientific observer.

297. In its response to the draft compliance report for the *Alpha Crux* (item 67 of Appendix I) Russia had provided the following:

‘A thorough investigation was conducted into this matter.

It is unclear from the observer's report how International Observer was able to identify a threat against him in a conversation between Members of the vessel's crew in a foreign language in his absence.

The International Observer was located in the first mate's quarter, which indicates respect for his status. This observer's quarter door had a lock and a matching key.

No unauthorised persons were allowed access to this cabin.

During the vessel cruise, not a single case of crew members refusing to assist the International Observer was recorded. The National observer was also not informed about the Korean observer's problems with TOA processing and biological sampling.

Any requests (verbal or written) from the International Observer to the Russian captain for additional personnel and his refusal were not recorded. In view of the differences in approaches regarding the discrepancies in the content of the observer's report, it is

proposed to continue the discussion with representatives of the Republic of Korea.  
Status Compliant

Further Action: Не требуется

Not required

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

298. Korea and Russia noted that the observer did not directly see the fight, and Russia noted that there could have been a misunderstanding in hearing the word "observer" as it sounds similar to another word when spoken in the Russian language. Russia noted that the observer was provided the appropriate conditions to secure themselves in their personal room and they could have been removed from the vessel if requested.

299. Korea made the following statement:

'In this incident, Korea engaged in multiple discussions with Russia, during which the observer clarified that there was no direct intimidation towards him, but he felt unsafe due to a loud altercation between crew members outside his room. As noted in Russia's responses, the observer confirmed that he did not actually witness the fight. The designating authority provided the observer clear instructions to report any safety-related emergencies right away. However, the designating authority only became aware of the incident after the observer submitted his trip report.

Unfortunately, the consultations between Korea and Russia did not lead to a clear resolution, and our own investigation did not uncover further evidence to support the allegation despite our significant concerns. Nonetheless, Korea would like to stress the importance of ensuring safe conduct on board, given the unique challenges of the operating environment on board. We also emphasise the need to create an onboard atmosphere where observers can remain and carry out their duties without any form of intimidation and the importance of ensuring observers are absolutely safe under any circumstances. As a Designating Member, Korea will work closely with all Flag State Members to ensure the safety of observers.'

300. The UK recalled the obligation not to intimidate or interfere with the duties of an observer and reiterated its view that these obligations had not been met, given the observer had reported that he felt threatened and unsafe. The UK noted that whilst the exact details of what happened may not be entirely clear, on no account could the evidence support a status of 'Compliant' and that observers have a right to expect CCAMLR to take reported concerns and issues seriously. In such circumstances the UK considered these issues to amount to serious non-compliance (Level 3).

301. Many Members noted that regardless of whether the observer saw the fight or misheard the word observer it noted that a serious fight occurred on the vessel which resulted in a crew member being stabbed in the abdomen. The Members noted that there is also a safety of life at sea concern for the crew member, and a report under CM 10-02, paragraph 9, should have been submitted.

302. Some Members expressed that regardless of what occurred on the vessel, the observer reported that he felt unsafe.

303. Some Members queried the previous practice of SCIC in assigning the status ‘Additional information required’ to compliance issues. The Chair expressed her view that this status had, in general, previously been used where SCIC required further information to assign a status, rather than in instances where the relevant Member did not have the information to provide to SCIC for consideration.

304. Many Members reiterated the evidentiary value of observer reports which are made following deployment and expressed their concerns with questions on the veracity of the report to undermine the facts reported. These Members also noted that where observer safety was concerned, such questions could further risk the safety of observers.

305. Many Members noted that the role of an observer is to observe and record what is occurring on a vessel and for the SISO to work that we rely on our trained observers to make observations, most of which occur in real time.

306. Some Members noted that the WCPFC has adopted minimum standards and guidelines under their regional observer program that include a requirement for the observer provider to formally debrief observers shortly after disembarking a vessel, maintaining the integrity of the observer statement and ensuring the safety of the observer after the completion of their post. These Members suggested CCAMLR consider development of such a procedure.

307. SCIC did not reach consensus on the compliance status for the Russian vessel Alpha Crux in item 67 of Appendix I.

308. SCIC considered the implementation by the Russian vessel Alpha Crux (item 68 of Appendix I) of the Text of the CCMALR Scheme of Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (iv), which states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not interfere with or prevent the observer from communicating with the Designating Member, including by preventing the scientific observer from having access to the vessel’s communication equipment.

309. In its response to the draft compliance report for the Alpha Crux (item 68 of Appendix I) Russia had provided the following:

‘Российская сторона детально рассмотрела вопросы, обозначенные в отчете международного научного наблюдателя, в том числе и затрагивающие проблемы коммуникации. По итогам рассмотрения установлено следующее. Предоставление услуг связи, несмотря на наличие договоров между судовладельцем и компанией-оператором связи имело определенные сбои, что могло влиять на качество связи. Однако наблюдатель имел свободный доступ к судовому компьютеру для коммуникации в служебных целях. Функция электронной почты на борту судна ALPHA-CRUX работала исправно. Все электронные письма на борту судна были отправлены лично их авторами. Отправка электронных писем в Национальный научно-исследовательский институт рыболовства осуществлялась корейским наблюдателем самостоятельно и установить причины сбоев в переписке с этим институтом не представляется возможным. Статус выполнение.

The Russian Federation has considered the issues identified in the International Scientific Observer's report, including communication problems. As a result of the

review, it was determined as follows. Despite agreements between the shipowner and the communication operator company, communication services suffered from certain failures, which could affect the quality of communication. However, the observer had full access to the ship's computer to facilitate official communications. Electronic mail on board the ALPHA-CRUX was functioning as intended. All emails on board the ship were personally sent by their authors. The Korean observer sent emails to the National Fisheries Research Institute independently, and it is not possible to determine the reasons for the breakdown in correspondence with that institute.

Status: Compliant.

Further Action: НЕ требуется

Not required

Preliminary Status: Compliant'

310. SCIC noted the explanation provided by Korea that the issue may have been due to the email domain used by one of the two relevant authorities to whom the observer submitted his weekly reports as emails were still being received by the other authority.

311. SCIC reached a common understanding on a compliance status Compliant proposed by Russia.

### **Незаконный, нерегистрируемый и нерегулируемый (ННН) промысел в зоне действия Конвенции**

312. СКИК рассмотрел ННН промысловую деятельность и тенденции в 2023/24 г. в зоне действия Конвенции и списки ННН судов, представленные в документе ССАМЛР-43/14 Rev.1. СКИК отметил, что в 2023/24 г. странами-членами не сообщалось о наблюдении в зоне действия Конвенции судов, включенных в Списки ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон (ДС) или Недоговаривающихся Сторон (НДС).

313. По мнению СКИК, информация в документе ССАМЛР-43/BG/18 Rev. 1 представляет собой обзор потенциальных методов и возможностей повышения осведомленности о деятельности, осуществляемой в зоне действия Конвенции АНТКОМ.

314. Китай попытался уточнить значение термина «Maritime Domain Awareness» (осведомленность о морской области) в контексте данного документа. СКИК отметил, что термин «Осведомленность о морской области» в контексте данного документа означает осведомленность о деятельности, связанной с мониторингом промысла для обеспечения соблюдения мер по сохранению АНТКОМ, а также выявления и пресечения незаконного, нерегистрируемого и нерегулируемого (ННН) промысла и связанной с ним деятельности в зоне действия Конвенции АНТКОМ, и включил эту информацию в сноску в документе ССАМЛР-43/BG/18 Rev. 1.

315. СКИК выразил поддержку усилиям по расширению возможностей для обеспечения более эффективного мониторинга деятельности в зоне действия Конвенции,

включая ресурсы и информацию, представленные в Дополнении I к документу CCAMLR-43/BG/18, чтобы суда стран-членов, выполняющие различные рейсы, могли оказывать содействие работе по обнаружению и пресечению ННН промысла и мониторингу соблюдения правил промысловой деятельности.

316. СКИК рассмотрел Концептуальную записку, содержащуюся в Дополнении I к документу CCAMLR-43/BG/18. Соединенные Штаты объявили о своем намерении провести пилотные испытания этого подхода, и что ледокол береговой охраны США *Polar Star* будет осуществлять патрулирование и сообщать информацию о замеченных судах во время своего рейса на станцию Мак-Мердо и на обратном пути в течение предстоящего сезона.

#### Существующий уровень ННН промысла

317. СКИК рассмотрел документ CCAMLR-43/BG/11 Rev. 1, в котором описывается сотрудничество АНТКОМ с Интерполом в течение 2023 и 2024 гг. в целях выявления и пресечения незаконной, нерегистрируемой и нерегулируемой (ННН) промысловой деятельности, которое финансируется Европейским Союзом посредством гранта на сумму €60 000 (проект Европейского Союза 101092707-CCAMLRSupport2022).

318. СКИК поблагодарил Европейский Союз за предоставленное финансирование и приветствовал сотрудничество с Интерполом, отметив угрозу, которую представляет транснациональная организованная преступность для достижения цели АНТКОМ.

319. СКИК рассмотрел отчет о выполнении Меры по сохранению 10-08 (CCAMLR-43/BG/19) и отметил, что Секретариат не получил новых отчетов, относящихся к Мере по сохранению 10-08 в 2024 г.

320. Уругвай выразил готовность продолжить расследование по поводу включения в список капитана судна уругвайской национальности в отношении плавающего под флагом Южной Африки судна *El Shaddai*.

321. Европейский союз предоставил СКИК обновленную информацию о мерах, предпринятых в отношении испанских граждан, связанных с включенными в ННН список судами *Cobija* и *El Shaddai*. В отношении судна *El Shaddai* Европейский Союз отметил, что в межсессионный период было предпринято несколько попыток получить от государства флага информацию о личных данных капитана промыслового судна, и что в первый день работы АНТКОМ-43 была получена некоторая информация, которая будет рассмотрена далее. Что касается судна *Cobija*, Европейский Союз отметил, что один из граждан, связанных с судном, не был включен в список в Табл. 1 (CCAMLR-43/BG/19), и предоставил СКИК обновленную информацию о мерах, принятых в отношении капитана и владельца судна, а также его законного представителя. На обоих лиц были наложены штрафы, а также запрет на получение кредитов, субсидий или государственной помощи в течение пяти лет, и они были отстранены от осуществления и ведения промысловой деятельности на период в три года.

322. СКИК отметил, что Секретариат столкнулся со значительными трудностями при составлении Таблицы 1, поскольку часто приходилось работать с неубедительной

информацией, и что информационные пробелы могут быть значительно сокращены путем дальнейшего взаимодействия между Договаривающимися сторонами по проведению соответствующих расследований и распространения их результатов, как того требует МС 10-08 и в соответствующих случаях.

323. СКИК также отметил, что Секретариат продолжает обращаться за поддержкой к Интерполу и Объединенной аналитической группе (ОАГ) для расширения объема имеющейся информации, анализа имеющихся доказательств и обмена соответствующей информацией, представляющей ценность для Договаривающихся сторон в борьбе с ННН промыслом в рамках МС 10-06 и МС 10-07, а также для содействия выполнению МС 10-08.

324. СКИК приветствовал дополнительную информацию Договаривающихся сторон по способам улучшения имеющейся информации, ресурсов и механизмов для содействия обмену информацией и усилению анализа/расследования для выполнения МС 10-08 в полной мере.

## Списки ННН судов

### Список ННН судов НДС

325. СКИК рассмотрел Предварительный список ННН судов НДС на 2024/25 г.

326. СКИК рассмотрел заявление Исламской Республики Иран с просьбой исключить судно *Koosha 4* из Списка ННН судов НДС. СКИК также отметил, что Исламская Республика Иран предоставила Секретариату информацию, содержащую изображения и видеозапись судна, предположительно являющегося судном *Koosha 4*, которое находится в процессе сдачи на слом, и эта информация была предоставлена СКИК для ознакомления.

327. СКИК отметил усилия, предпринятые Исламской Республикой Иран в попытке выполнить требования МС 10-07, п. 18.

328. Некоторые страны-члены выразили мнение, что СКИК следует отложить исключение судна *Koosha 4* из Списка ННН судов НДС на 2024/25 г. до получения окончательного подтверждения о сдаче *Koosha 4* на слом.

329. СКИК отметил, что консенсуса по вопросу исключения судна *Koosha 4* из Списка ННН судов НДС на 2024/25 г. достигнуто не было.

330. СКИК обратился с просьбой к Секретариату продолжать обращаться к Исламской Республике Иран за дополнительной информацией о предполагаемом выводе из эксплуатации судна *Koosha 4* или информацией, которая могла бы иным образом удовлетворить требованиям Меры по сохранению 10-07.

331. Европейский Союз напомнил, что ранее Исламская Республика Иран добивалась исключения судна *Koosha 4* из списка в соответствии с МС 10-07, п. 18(iii), на основании

того, что его владелец изменился. Европейский Союз отметил, что для того, чтобы СКИК на этом основании исключил судно *Koosha 4* из Списка ННН судов НДС, Исламская Республика Иран должна предоставить доказательства того, что судно сменило владельца, включая бенефициарную собственность, если известно, что она отличается от зарегистрированной, и доказать, что предыдущий владелец больше не имеет никаких юридических, финансовых или реальных интересов в судне, или не осуществляет контроль над ним, и что новый владелец не участвовал в ННН промысле.

#### Список ННН судов ДС

332. СКИК рассмотрел проект Списка ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон на 2024/25 г. в дополнение к существующему Списку ННН судов ДС на 2023/24 г., отметив предлагаемое включение судов *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena* и *Nordic Prince* и просьбу Южной Африки об исключении судна *El Shaddai* из существующего Списка ННН судов ДС.

333. СКИК выразил соболезнования жертвам затонувшего судна *Argos Georgia*.

334. Аргентина сделала следующее заявление:

‘Argentina would like to clarify the reason for including the vessels *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena* and *Nordic Prince* in the list of vessels fishing illegally. It is very clear that this is illegal fishing because there is no conservation measure that allows such fishing, as required by Conservation Measure 31-01. On the other hand, Argentina would like to express its concern about the future consequences of this non-compliance. Conservation measure 31-01 was adopted in 1986, with the aim of preventing Subarea 48.3 from being excluded from the Convention and its multilateral order. This Conservation Measure, which the United Kingdom and another country now want to relativize in terms of its application, establishes, both in its letter and its spirit, all the conditions for fishing for Patagonian toothfish in Subarea 48.3, including a catch limit, based on the best scientific data available, approved by consensus and not unilaterally. Also in that same year, paragraph 53 of the Commission's report states that Conservation Measure 7/V, which is now 31-01, would allow the Commission at its 1987 meeting to set catch limits for the 1987/88 season as an obligatory measure, and that such a recommendation would make it possible to proceed in a similar manner for subsequent seasons. This measure was respected by all parties since 31-01 came into force, since there was always a Conservation Measure, 41-02, which established catch limits and other conditions for fishing for Patagonian toothfish in Subarea 48.3. That was the case until a few years ago, when one party did not give consensus so that this Conservation Measure could be re-adopted. Now, since there is no conservation measure that enables fishing, fishing should not take place. And this was understood by almost all countries, since several countries that fished there stopped doing so because they understand that it is not appropriate to fish, and those who imported that fish stopped importing it, also because there is a failure to comply with Conservation Measure 31-01.

The relativization of the obligation of a conservation measure worries us because of the fact that illegal fishing is taking place at this moment, but also as a precedent for the future. We wish to highlight that, in the same way that 31-01 determines guidelines for

fishing and then requires other conservation measures, so does, for example, Conservation Measure 21-02, which regulates exploratory fisheries, and on the basis of which the Commission adopts specific conservation measures in different subareas every year. If the Commission were to accept the UK's argument on the relativization of 31-01 as valid, then by analogy the adoption of a conservation measure for exploratory fisheries would not matter either, since countries would be free to take unilateral measures, which would result in a serious erosion of the Convention.'

335. Соединенное Королевство сделало следующее заявление:

'The UK has previously set out its position on this issue, most recently in Comm Circ 24/69. It has also been extensively discussed in previous meetings of both SCIC and the Commission.

The UK entirely refutes any assertion that the UK vessels operating within Subarea 48.3 can be characterised as illegal, unreported or unregulated, including under Conservation Measure (CM) 10-06. There is no basis on which any of these vessels might be said to have engaged in any of the activities referred to in paragraph 5 of CM10-06 and they should not therefore have been included on the draft CP-IUU list.

The UK does not agree to the inclusion of these vessels on the final CP-IUU Vessel List on the basis of their participation in a fishery under lawful domestic regulation, consistent with the Convention.'

336. Российская Федерация сделала следующее заявление:

'The UK's flagged vessels *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena* and *Nordic Prince* engaged in prohibited activities according to subsections (iii) and (viii) of paragraph 5 of CM 10-06, as they fished in closed area in contravention of CM 31-01. In this regard, Russia recommends to include mentioned UK-flagged vessels on the CP-IUU Vessel List taking into account information circulated to Members (COMM CIRC 24/47, COMM CIRC 24/61) and current status for the *Argos Georgia*.'

337. Норвегия выразила мнение, что в возникновении данной ситуации виновен АНТКОМ, а не какая-либо конкретная страна-член, и что отсутствие согласованной Меры по сохранению для конкретного подрайона не означает запрета на промысел в данном подрайоне. Норвегия также выразила мнение, что цель Меры по сохранению заключается в создании дополнительного нормативного уровня, а не в разрешении той или иной операции.

338. Украина отметила, что не поддерживает включение судов *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena* и *Nordic Prince* в Список ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон.

339. Аргентина сделала следующее заявление:

'Argentina's concern is related to the fact that there are interpretations of conservation measures that seek to relativize their obligatory nature, which would allow those parties that want to fish in a certain subarea to simply block the consensus to do so, and take unilateral measures claiming that they are broadly complying with some stipulations of the Convention.

Regarding the United Kingdom's claim to apply unilateral measures in Subarea 48.3, Argentina reiterates that the Chairman's statement of 1980 does not authorise the United Kingdom to take this type of measure. This is because the statement, in its point 5, authorises some countries to take measures on their islands within the Convention Area in cases where State sovereignty is recognised by all Contracting Parties. The only islands in which there State sovereignty is not recognised by all the Contracting Parties are the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, because there is a sovereignty dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which means that at least Argentina does not recognise the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom does not recognise the sovereignty of Argentina. The unilateral measures of the United Kingdom cannot be justified on the basis of International Law, either, since when there is a sovereignty dispute the parties to that dispute are obliged not to take unilateral measures that may affect the issue. In this regard, Argentina recalls and reaffirms that in Subarea 48.3 only the multilateral regime of the Convention is applicable.'

340. Соединенное Королевство отклонила заявление Аргентины, сославшись на свои предыдущие заявления в отношении Заявления Председателя от 1980 г.

341. Китай выразил озабоченность по поводу последствий продолжения промысла в Подрайоне 48.3 при таких обстоятельствах, отметив, что если толкование Норвегии, согласно которому в отсутствие установленных Комиссией ограничений на вылов промысел разрешен, приемлемо для СКИК, то это толкование должно быть применимо ко всем странам-членам.

342. СКИК отметил, что консенсуса относительно включения плавающих под флагом Соединенного Королевства судов *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena*, и *Nordic Prince* в предлагаемый Список ННН судов ДС достигнуто не было.

343. Южная Африка представила заявление (Дополнение IV), в котором выразила мнение, что недостатки, выявленные Директором государственной прокуратуры (DPP) и изложенные в СОММ CIRC 24/96, были устранены, равно как и опасения, ранее высказанные странами-членами. Южная Африка выразила мнение, что условия в их нынешнем виде достаточны для демонстрации соблюдения п. 14(iv) МС 10-06 и что условия разрешения и лицензии были пересмотрены и теперь четко определяют, где в открытом море разрешен промысел, чтобы Директор государственной прокуратуры (DPP) мог успешно начать судебное преследование. Южная Африка далее заявила, что, хотя Вraxton не подвергался уголовному преследованию и его право на промысел патагонского клыкача не было аннулировано, его право на промысел было фактически приостановлено после включения в список ННН судов, в результате чего Вraxton не может вести промысел для себя или любого другого правообладателя, что приводит к значительным финансовым потерям, которые должны стать существенным сдерживающим фактором для повторного нарушения.

344. Многие страны-члены поблагодарили Южную Африку за предоставленную информацию, отметили меры, предпринятые Южной Африкой для устранения обстоятельств, которые привели к включению судна *El Shaddai* в Список ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон, и высказались за исключение судна из Списка ННН судов ДС во исполнение МС 10-06, п. 14 (iv).

345. Некоторые страны-члены выразили обеспокоенность тем, что предпринятых Южной Африкой мер недостаточно, чтобы гарантировать, что судно *El Shaddai* не будет участвовать в ННН промысловой деятельности в будущем.

346. Южная Африка представила еще одно заявление (Дополнение V), подтверждающее меры, предпринятые в отношении судна *El Shaddai*, и содержащее дополнительную подробную информацию по данному вопросу. Южная Африка вновь обратилась к СКИК с просьбой одобрить исключение судна *El Shaddai* из Списка ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон.

347. Европейский Союз поблагодарил Южную Африку за предоставленную информацию, но выразил несогласие с тем, что финансовые потери, вызванные включением судна *El Shaddai* в Список ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон, можно считать санкцией, отметив, что наложение санкций является обязанностью государства флага. Европейский Союз отметил, что было бы предпочтительнее, если бы против оператора судна было возбуждено гражданское дело или административное разбирательство после того, как возбуждение уголовного преследования не увенчалось успехом. Европейский Союз выразил обеспокоенность тем, что пересмотренные условия разрешения по-прежнему недостаточно четко определяют, где и при каких обстоятельствах будет разрешен промысел в зоне действия Конвенции. Европейский Союз выразил готовность продолжать диалог с Южной Африкой относительно статуса судна *El Shaddai*, однако посчитал, что условия для исключения этого судна из Списка ННН судов Договаривающихся сторон до настоящего времени не выполнены.

348. СКИК не смог достичь консенсуса по вопросу исключения судна *El Shaddai* из Списка ННН судов ДС и рекомендовал рассмотреть этот вопрос на АНТКОМ-43.

349. Южная Африка поблагодарила те страны-члены, которые поддержали ее просьбу об исключении судна из списка, а также Европейский Союз за его неизменную готовность обсуждать этот вопрос.

350. Россия выразила обеспокоенность тем, что некоторые из обязательных условий исключения судна *El Shaddai* из Списка ННН судов ДС, представленные Европейскому Союзу, выходят за рамки требований соответствующих мер по сохранению.

### **Уведомления о промысле**

351. СКИК рассмотрел отчет Секретариата об уведомлениях о промысле на сезон 2024/25 г. ([CCAMLR-43/BG/09 Rev. 1](#)).

352. Некоторые страны-члены обратились с просьбой исключить три судна, плавающих под флагом Соединенного Королевства – *Argos Georgia*, *Argos Helena* и *Nordic Prince* – из всех уведомлений о промысле, отметив, что эти суда включены в Проект списка ННН судов ДС на 2024/25 г. Россия отметила, что в отношении судна *Argos Georgia* странам-членам следует немедленно уведомлять Секретариат о замене в случае форс-мажорного обстоятельства в соответствии с МС 21-02, п. 11, однако Соединенное Королевство не выполнило этого обязательства. Россия также призвала Норвегию отменить уведомление о промысле для промысловых судов, которые участвовали в промысле в закрытом районе в предыдущем сезоне.

353. Некоторые страны-члены выразили мнение, что совершенное Норвегией несоблюдение было незначительным и они не согласны с тем, что этот случай является ННН промыслом.

354. Соединенное Королевство отметило, что оно будет соблюдать требования МС 21-02, п. 11, в отношении судна, которое заменит *Argos Georgia*, а затем сделала следующее заявление:

‘The UK has several serious concerns over the two Russian vessel notifications for the upcoming Ross Sea toothfish fishery. As we expressed last year, we have seen repeated compliance issues and there remain outstanding a number of investigations in respect of Russian-flagged vessels.

Just this year, we have been considering numerous compliance issues relating to the FV *Alpha Crux* - some of which have been addressed and some of which require further investigation. In respect of the latter, we would hope that the outcome of these further investigations will be considered by SCIC next year.

Russia has also notified for the FV *Yantar 31*. This vessel has previously experienced very high catch rates which have yet to be explained by Russia. The sister vessel *Yantar 35*, owned and operated by the same company, also experienced significantly high catch rates and subsequently had its data quarantined – again Russia has failed to provide any information or analyses to explain these extraordinarily high catch rates. We also note in SC CCAMLR 33 para 5.75 none of the 1,792 tags released by the *Yantar 35* in subareas 48.5, 88.1 and 88.2 have been recaptured. In CCAMLR 35/BG/29 Rev 1 the Russian delegation stated that a decision to suspend the shipowner from participating in fishing activities in the CCAMLR Convention Area was made – however this operator – Orion Co Ltd – is listed as the current owner/operator of *Yantar 31*.

Given these serious compliance issues we cannot support the inclusion of these vessels in the Ross Sea toothfish fishery in the upcoming season.’

355. Российская Федерация ответила, что их уведомления соответствуют всем требованиям Меры по сохранению и что во время проведения оценки ПАОС они открыто говорят обо всех поднятых вопросах соблюдения, и опасения Соединенного Королевства необоснованны.

356. Некоторые страны-члены отметили, что вопрос о том, что суда Соединенного Королевства, ведущие промысел в Подрайоне 48.3, были задействованы в ННН промысле, согласован не был. Они напомнили, что первопричиной этой очень сложной ситуации является подрыв научной основы принятия решений АНТКОМ по ограничениям на вылов в Подрайоне 48.3, и настоятельно призвали страны-члены продолжить работу по достижению консенсуса по ограничению на вылов для этого района.

357. Аргентина сделала следующее заявление:

‘Argentina aligns itself with the previous point regarding the importance and need for a conservation measure in Subarea 48.3 to end the illegal fishing that has been taking place there for three seasons. Illegal fishing occurs due to non-compliance with

Conservation Measure 31-01. In this regard, we would like to point out that in the same inspection report carried out by the United Kingdom on UK vessels, this Conservation Measure appears as mandatory. The report erroneously states that vessels comply with this Conservation Measure, when they do not, because 31-01 requires a conservation measure such as 41-02. For this reason, we hope to have a conservation measure for Patagonian toothfish fishing in Subarea 48.3 in order to end the illegal fishing that has been taking place for three seasons in this Subarea.

We also emphasise that, beyond the reason why there is no conservation measure, if there is no conservation measure, we cannot fish.’

358. Некоторые страны-члены отметили, что Россия взяла на себя ответственность за некоторые вопросы в ПАОС, но при этом они по-прежнему обеспокоены количеством серьезных нерешенных вопросов, связанных с соблюдением. Они выразили обеспокоенность по поводу повторяющихся серьезных проблем с соблюдением и остающихся незавершенными расследований в отношении судов, плавающих под российским флагом. Эти страны-члены настоятельно призвали Россию в срочном порядке завершить расследования и представить дополнительную информацию на этом совещании, чтобы продемонстрировать, что Россия может осуществлять эффективный контроль за своими судами, соблюдать правила АНТКОМ и обеспечить безопасность при размещении наблюдателей СМНН.

359. Соединенное Королевство напомнило о своих ранее заявленных позициях по этим вопросам.

360. Многие страны-члены напомнили, что в соответствии с МС 21-02 и МС 21-03 единственным основанием для отклонения уведомления о судне является его включение в список ННН судов, несоблюдение процедуры оплаты уведомлений АНТКОМ, не предоставление соответствующих документов, таких как планы ведения промысла (ПВП) и оценки воздействия на УМЭ, или официальная отмена страной-членом. Было также отмечено, что в соответствии с МС 21-02, п. 11, о замене судов по законным оперативным причинам или при форс-мажорных обстоятельствах необходимо немедленно сообщать в Секретариат.

361. СКИК отметил озабоченность, высказанную некоторыми странами-членами, и решил передать этот вопрос в Комиссию на дальнейшее рассмотрение.

362. Секретариат представил отчет о сведениях о снастях, указанных в уведомлениях о промысле ([CCAMLR-43/12](#)), в котором выделены расхождения между описаниями снастей, опубликованными на сайте АНТКОМ, и теми, которые приводятся в планах ведения промысла (ПВП) и оценках уязвимых морских экосистем (УМЭ). Несколько стран-членов выразили благодарность за отчет Секретариата и заявили о своем намерении повысить точность представляемых данных о снастях.

363. СКИК одобрил следующие рекомендации Секретариата:

- (i) Комиссии рассмотреть требование об обязательном включении технической схемы для описания каждого набора снастей, представленного странами-членами, и размещение на веб-странице судна на сайте АНТКОМ.

- (ii) Комиссии подтвердить, что для целей соблюдения МС 21-02, пп. 6(ii)(b), 11(iii) и 13, должно существовать только одно официальное описание «заявленных в уведомлении снастей», и что таковым будет описание снастей, представленное странами-членами на веб-странице судна на сайте АНТКОМ.

364. СКИК обратилась к Секретариату с просьбой более подробно изложить в инструкциях для стран-членов, как и когда представлять или обновлять информацию, касающуюся промысловых снастей, в рамках процедур уведомления, в том числе привести рабочие примеры требуемой технической информации или схем.

### **Рекомендации Научного комитета для СКИК**

365. СКИК рассмотрел рекомендации Председателя Научного комитета д-ра С. Карденаса (Чили) по нескольким вопросам и поблагодарил его за уделенное время.

#### **Научные наблюдатели**

366. Председатель Научного комитета подчеркнул большую ценность данных, регистрируемых научными наблюдателями, напомнил о текущих обсуждениях в Научном комитете, касающихся стратегии управления промыслом криля, и отметил необходимость обеспечения того, чтобы при сборе дополнительных данных учитывалась приоритетность поставленных требований. Председатель Научного комитета далее отметил важность определения и сбора точных данных научными наблюдателями для более полного понимания промысла и текущих проблем, таких как прилов мелкой рыбы и личинок и побочная смертность, связанная с промыслом.

367. СКИК и Председатель Научного комитета обсудили комментарии к предложениям по требованию 100% охвата наблюдателями СМНН на всех судах, ведущих промысел криля, и на новых промыслах. Председатель Научного комитета напомнил о продолжающихся дискуссиях по изучению и оценке различий между национальными наблюдателями и наблюдателями СМНН в плане сбора данных. Председатель Научного комитета отметил, что руководящие указания для наблюдателей СМНН являются четкими и они определяют работу Научного комитета и его рабочих групп как приоритетную. Он также признал необходимость учитывать существующую рабочую нагрузку при удовлетворении запросов.

368. Китай задал вопрос о разнице между данными, собираемыми национальными научными наблюдателями, и данными, собираемыми международными научными наблюдателями, учитывая, что и национальные, и международные научные наблюдатели работают с соблюдением одних и тех же требований и протоколов. Председатель Научного комитета ответил, что международные научные наблюдатели проводят большую работу, включая наблюдение и мониторинг морских млекопитающих. Председатель Научного комитета отметил, что при удовлетворении дополнительных потребностей в будущем может возникнуть необходимость рассмотреть вопрос о размещении второго наблюдателя. Кроме того, Председатель Научного комитета указал, что имеются опасения по поводу независимости национальных научных наблюдателей.

369. Китай попросил председателя Научного комитета представить СКИК последнюю информацию о состоянии промысла на участках 58.4.1 и 58.4.2, отметив, что ранее эти участки считались участками с недостаточным объемом данных. Председатель Научного комитета подтвердил, что никакой новой информации о состоянии исследовательского промысла в этих районах не поступало, отметив далее, что сбор данных в этих районах не проводился с 2018 г., что и привело к пробелу в данных. Председатель Научного комитета указал, что Научный комитет продолжит работу по сбору данных на этих участках для содействия проведению исследований в будущем.

370. Отвечая на вопросы Австралии, Председатель Научного комитета сообщил, что Научный комитет рассмотрел представленное Австралией, Кореей и Японией предложение (ССАМЛР-43/38), но не выработал каких-либо конкретных рекомендаций СКИК. Председатель Научного комитета напомнил, что в 2022 и 2023 гг. комитет обсуждал вопрос о путанице в применении п. 6(iii) МС 21-02, а также в применении таких планов исследований, и указывал, помимо прочего, на рекомендации 2023 г. о том, чтобы Комиссия (i) рассмотрела новое приложение к МС 21-02, определяющее требования к планам исследований плавниковых рыб в соответствии с МС 21-02, п. 6(iii) (Приложение А), и (ii) изменила название МС 24-01, Приложение 24-01/А, Формат 2, чтобы убрать ссылку на МС 21-02 (Приложение В), – с тем, чтобы устранить путаницу (SC-CAMLR-42).

371. Российская Федерация попросила Председателя Научного комитета разъяснить, следует ли рассматривать промысел, который не велся в течение двух предыдущих сезонов, как новый промысел в соответствии с МС 21-01, п. 1 (iii).

372. Председатель Научного комитета заявил, что комитет не предоставил каких-либо рекомендаций по этому вопросу в 2024 г., но эти районы не отвечают требованиям нового промысла в соответствии с МС 21-01, поскольку в этих районах данные по уловам и усилию были представлены до двух последних сезонов, а текущая мера по сохранению относится к поисковым промыслам.

## Выбросы

373. СКИК и Председатель Научного комитета обсудили вопрос о регистрации выброшенной рыбы к югу от 60° ю.ш. в форме для мелкомасштабных данных по уловам и усилию (С2 для ярусного промысла), отметив, что рыбу, которая выбрасывается в месте вылова, следует регистрировать как «выброшенная», а рыбу, которая сохраняется, даже если она сохраняется только для выброса к северу от 60° ю.ш., следует регистрировать как «удержанная». СКИК счел, что хотя инструкции по заполнению формы С2 относительно понятны, описания полей данных в форме могут быть истолкованы неверно. СКИК признал, что неправильная регистрация данных в результате неверного толкования требований, касающихся регистрации выброшенной рыбы, может иметь последствия для этих данных и последующих оценок степени соблюдения. СКИК отметил, что уточнение инструкций или описаний полей данных в форме данных С2 для проведения различия между уловами может помочь устранить несоответствия. СКИК рекомендовал Комиссии поручить Научному комитету и его рабочим группам рассмотреть вопрос об уточнении инструкций в руководстве по промысловым данным, касающихся регистрации выброшенной и удержанной рыбы.

## Позднее изъятие снастей

374. Россия попросила Председателя Научного комитета разъяснить, какое воздействие оказало превышение вылова после закрытия промысла *Euphausia superba* в Подрайоне 48.1 и был ли проведен дополнительный анализ соответствующих данных С1.

375. Председатель Научного комитета отметил, что эта тема пока не обсуждалась на совещании. Научный комитет признает важность и сложность данного вопроса. Председатель Научного комитета далее отметил, что предлагаемая стратегия по разработке КФМА может помочь решать подобные проблемы в будущем.

## Симпозиум по согласованию

376. Корея напомнила об отчете Симпозиума по согласованию (ССАМЛР-43/29) и согласованных на нем рекомендациях, и попросила Председателя Научного комитета подтвердить, были ли эти рекомендации рассмотрены на совещании комитета. Председатель Научного комитета отметил, что, хотя некоторые из рекомендаций были обсуждены частично, дальнейшее их подробное обсуждение состоится в Комиссии.

## Рассмотрение Второй оценки работы

377. СКИК рассмотрел заключительный отчет о Второй оценке работы (ОР2) (ССАМЛР-43/06), в котором содержится краткий обзор действий, предпринятых после совещания АНТКОМ-XXXVII. СКИК, а также Комиссии и Научному комитету, было предложено определить любые дополнительные действия, которые еще не представлены в обзоре.

378. СКИК поблагодарил Секретариат за составление отчета, отметил ценность ежегодного отслеживания прогресса в выполнении рекомендаций, перечисленных в ОР2, и поблагодарил тех, кто внес свой вклад в достижение прогресса на сегодняшний день.

379. СКИК отметил конкретные области, в которых был достигнут прогресс, и отметил, что Рекомендация 11 (ii), касающаяся ПАОС, фактически может быть включена в список выполненных. СКИК также выделил области, по которым продолжают поступать предложения, и те, где следует рассмотреть конкретные нерешенные вопросы (напр., Рекомендации 7 (МОР), 4(iii) (участие КСДА) и 12 (перегрузки) ОР2).

## Прочие вопросы

380. СКИК рассмотрел документ ССАМЛР-43/31, в котором представлено подробное предложение о проведении Третьей оценки работы (ОР3) в межсессионный период 2024-2025 г. с представлением отчета ОР3 на АНТКОМ-44.

381. СКИК поблагодарил Европейский Союз и его государства-члены за это предложение и отметил ценность предыдущих отчетов (ОР1 и ОР2) и представленных в них рекомендаций, подчеркнув, что они оказались очень ценными для АНТКОМ.

382. Некоторые страны-члены выразили мнение, что дополнительная информация, касающаяся охвата, структуры и сроков реализации предлагаемой ОРЗ, была бы целесообразной. Китай предложил провести всестороннюю оценку Третьей оценки работы с учетом положений Конвенции, в частности Статьи II, а в состав группы по рассмотрению включить двух независимых экспертов, как минимум одного представителя отрасли. В этом смысле Китай считает, что необходимо разработать подробную Сферу компетенции для предлагаемой ОРЗ, на что потребуется время.

383. СКИК не достиг консенсуса по утверждению предложения о проведении Третьей оценки работы в межсессионный период 2024-2025 г.

384. СКИК рассмотрел представленный АСОК документ CCAMLR-43/BG/40, в котором к сведению СКИК была представлена информация о событиях, связанных с безопасностью промысловых судов и окружающей среды.

385. АСОК сделала следующее заявление:

*'In recent years, ASOC has brought to the attention of SCIC developments relevant to fishing vessel and environmental safety adopted by the International Maritime Organization. A number of new guidelines and now regulations have been adopted in recent years that are of direct relevance to fishing vessels operating in the CCAMLR Area, including requirements for safe navigation and voyage planning that will be mandatory for all fishing vessels over 24m in length from 1st January 2026.*

*ASOC would like to highlight the need for CCAMLR Resolutions 23 and 34 to be updated to reflect these new developments. Furthermore, we wish to draw attention to ongoing work by the IMO to address the threat from marine plastic litter including the marking of fishing gear and the reporting of lost or discharged fishing gear. I would also like to reiterate ASOC's recommendation that CCAMLR develop its own action plan to reduce all sources of plastics and microplastics. Finally, ASOC recommends that CCAMLR consider including the management of gray water from fishing vessels in the future workplan, including discussion of current practices and ultimately consideration of the need for regulation of untreated gray water.'*

386. СКИК принял к сведению представленную АСОК информацию в документе CCAMLR-43/BG/40.

387. СКИК утвердил предложение о включении постоянного пункта в свою повестку дня будущих совещаний в разделе «Прочие вопросы». В рамках этого нового пункта повестки дня СКИК будет рассматривать различные задачи, возложенные на Секретариат, как в рамках мер по сохранению, так и в тексте отчета, а также определять приоритеты и, возможно, исключать некоторые задачи с учетом прогнозируемых бюджетных ограничений.

388. Председатель приветствовала предложения кандидатур на пост нового Председателя СКИК на 2025–2026 гг. Корея выдвинула кандидатуру Адама Берри. Эта

кандидатура была поддержана Соединенными Штатами и утверждена СКИК. СКИК поздравил г-на Берри с избранием на пост следующего Председателя СКИК.

389. Председатель пригласила выдвинуть кандидатуры на пост Заместителя председателя СКИК, однако предложений не поступило.

390. Председатель поблагодарила всех делегатов, переводчиков и сотрудников Секретариата за работу, способствовавшую плодотворному совещанию. СКИК также выразил признательность Секретариату и поблагодарил Председателя за конструктивное и эффективное руководство на протяжении всего совещания, а также поблагодарил ее за работу в качестве Председателя СКИК.

### **Закрытие совещания**

391. Председатель отметила, что для нее было честью руководить работой совещания в течение всего срока ее полномочий, и поблагодарила делегатов за их терпение, профессионализм и компетентность. Она также поблагодарила Секретариат, устных переводчиков, компанию «CongressRental» и другой вспомогательный персонал за их вклад в продуктивное проведение совещания.

392 СКИК выразил свою искреннюю благодарность г-же Энгельке-Рос за отличное исполнение обязанностей Председателя во время сложного для СКИК совещания, а также за сотрудничество, терпение и доброжелательное руководство в период ее работы в качестве Председателя.

### Compliance Issues 2023/2024

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
01	New Zealand		<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 1</b>, requires Contracting Parties to undertake inspections of all fishing vessels carrying <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. which enter their ports.</p> <p>The inspection report for the San Aotea II for the inspection undertaken by New Zealand on 12 March 2024 in Timaru, New Zealand, not that the vessel's last port call was Dunedin on 11 March 2024 due to an unscheduled emergency.</p> <p>No port inspection report was submitted for San Aotea II's port call in Dunedin.</p> <p>In response to a request for further information New Zealand stated: "The port call into Dunedin on 11 March 2024 was an unscheduled emergency stop due to one of the crew requiring urgent medical assistance. They were only docked long enough for the crew member to disembark before continuing their pre-planned schedule to Timaru."</p>
02	Chile	Puerto Ballena	<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 4</b>, requires vessels seeking entry to port to provide the information contained in Annex 10-03/A at least 48 hours in advance to allow adequate time to examine the required information.</p> <p>The inspection report for the Puerto Ballena for the inspection undertaken by New Zealand on 3 Jan 2024 noted that they vessel entered port without submission of the Port Inspection Report Part A (Annex 10-03/A).</p> <p>Additional information in the email submission noted the following which was reported by the inspector to the government official: <i>"There was an issue with the vessel failing to provide us Part A 48 hours prior to entering port. When I boarded it an hour after it coming alongside it had not been completed. I asked the Master to have Part A completed and a Spanish version was completed electronically and printed by the crew. I have attached it. I marked it with the date and time I received it and signed it. I made the Master aware of my concerns that they had breached 10/03 and he wrote a statement in Spanish at</i></p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p><i>my suggestion. The explanation as I understood it was that it was a communication error and overlooked due to having to offload an injured crew member.</i></p> <p><i>The crew member had cut off two fingertips. He was driven to the hospital by the shipping agent. Although in need of medical attention it was certainly not an emergency at that point."</i></p> <p>And in the government official's submission to the Secretariat they also noted:  <i>"Slight issue with lack of required notification but this is an internal NZ issue which we have remedied, the safety of crew member was paramount in this situation"</i></p>
03	Korea, Republic of		<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 5</b>, requires that inspections shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry.</p> <p>The Panamanian-flagged vessel Procyon entered the Korean port of Busan at 06:00 16 Sep 2023 and was inspected at 10:00 18 Sep 2023.</p> <p>Time delay of inspection after the 48-hour deadline: 4 hours</p>
04	Uruguay		<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 5</b>, requires that inspections shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry.</p> <p>The Uruguayan-flagged vessel Ainoha entered the Uruguayan port of Montevideo at 2100 28 Oct 2023 and was inspected at 1100 31 Oct 2023.</p> <p>Time delay of inspection after the 48-hour deadline: 14 hours</p>
05	France		<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 8</b>, requires the transmission of a port inspection report to the Secretariat within 30 days of the inspection date (or as soon as possible where compliance issues have arisen).</p> <p>The inspection of the French-flagged vessel Sainte Rose occurred on 08 March 2024 by French port officials and the transmission of the port inspection report occurred on 16 April 2024. The fishing activity occurred in Division 58.4.2 and Subareas 88.1 and 88.2.</p> <p>Time delay of transmission after the 30-day deadline: 9 days</p>
06	South Africa		<p><b>CM 10-03, paragraph 8</b>, requires the transmission of a port inspection report to the Secretariat within 30 days of the inspection date (or as soon as possible where compliance issues have arisen).</p> <p>The Secretariat identified the port inspection report by South Africa for the Korean-flagged vessel Southern Ocean which corresponded with the issuance of DCD KR-24-0009-E had not been submitted. The Secretariat emailed the South African CCEP Contacts on 9 July 2024 requesting a copy of the port inspection report.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The port inspection report was submitted on 29 July 2024 reporting the inspection on 10 March 2024.</p> <p>Time delay of transmission after the 30-day deadline: 111 days</p>
<b>CM 10-04</b>			
07	Chile	Antarctic Endeavour	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 21 Mar 2024 0225 UTC for the Antarctic Endeavour entry into Subarea 48.1 notifying the entry time of 20 Mar 2024 0126 UTC.</p> <p>Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 59 minutes</p>
08	France	Albius	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 1 Aug 2023 1300 UTC for the Albius entry into Subarea 58.6 notifying the entry time of 31 Jul 2023 0812 UTC.</p> <p>Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 4 hours 48 minutes</p>
09	France	Albius	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 02 Oct 2023 0635 UTC for the Albius entry into Division 58.5.1 notifying the entry time of 01 Oct 2023 0400 UTC.</p> <p>Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 2 hours 35 minutes</p>
10	France	Sainte Rose	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>Analysis of VMS data identified that a movement notice had not been provided by the Sainte Rose for entry into Subarea 48.1. The Secretariat requested a movement notice from the French VMS Contact Officers on 04 Feb 2024 2313 UTC.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat 05 Feb 2024 0803 UTC for the Sainte Rose entry into Subarea 48.1 notifying the entry time of 02 Feb 2024 1030 UTC.</p> <p>Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 45 hours 33 minutes</p>
11	Korea, Republic of	Greenstar	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 16 Apr 2024 0949 UTC for the Greenstar entry into Subarea 48.1 notifying the entry time of 13 Apr 2024 2245 UTC.</p> <p>The Secretariat identified the missing entry notification and requested it from Korea on 16 Apr 2024. Korea provided the following explanation along with the notification:  The Greenstar regarded she was still in the 88.3 when she was entering the subarea 48.1.  That is why she reported that she exited the CCAMLR from the 88.3 in the below email. It was our mistake. The office also has a responsibility to monitor our vessel’s movement and to educate our crews.  However, the office failed to monitor her movement during the weekend. We apologize for this mistake.</p> <p>Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 35 hours 04 minutes</p>
12	Spain	Tronio	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>Analysis of VMS data identified that a movement notice had not been provided by the Tronio for the exit from Division 58.4.4a and entry into Division 58.4.4b at approximately 0916 UTC 28 Oct 2023.</p> <p>The Secretariat contacted Spain to clarify the movement notices provided by Tronio in the 2023/24 season. Spain advised the Secretariat that they had investigated the matter and found that the Master of the vessel used the SSRU Map in CM 41-01 and reported movements based upon the SSRUs listed.</p>
13	United Kingdom	Nordic Prince	<p><b>CM 10-04, paragraph 13</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat within 24 hours of each entry to, exit from and movement between subareas of the Convention Area.</p> <p>A movement notification was provided to the Secretariat on 18 Apr 2024 1444 UTC for the Nordic Prince entry into Subarea 48.3 notifying the entry time of 13 Apr 2024 1533 UTC.</p> <p>The Secretariat identified the missing entry notification and requested it from the United Kingdom on 18 Apr 2024.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			Time delay after the 24-hour deadline: 95 hours 11 minutes
<b>CM 10-05</b>			
14	Argentina		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 7</b>, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Argentina validated 1 DED after the declared export date. Therefore, this shipment did not have a completed DED available to accompany it at the time of export. The identified DED accounts for &lt;1% of Argentina's exports and &lt;1% of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are: 1 DED was issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date</p> <p>The DED document number is available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
15	Chile		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Chile validated 75 DEDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DED available to accompany them at the time of export. The identified DEDs account for 2.6 % of Chile's exports and 1.5 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:            5 DEDs were issued between 1 - 2 days after declared export date            68 DEDs were issued between 6 - 10 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 51 - 100 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
16	France		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified France validated 3 DEDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DED available to accompany them at the time of export. The identified DEDs account for 1 % of France's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:            2 DEDs were issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 21 - 50 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
17	Netherlands		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified the Kingdom of the Netherlands validated 2 DREDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DRED available to accompany them at the time of export.</p> <p>The identified DREDs account for 13 % of Kingdom of the Netherlands' exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:  1 DRED was issued between 3 - 5 days after declared export date  1 DRED was issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
18	Peru		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Peru validated 6 DEDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DED available to accompany them at the time of export.</p> <p>The identified DEDs account for 6 % of Peru's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:            3 DEDs were issued between 1 - 5 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 3 - 5 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date            1 DED was issued between 21 - 50 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
19	South Africa		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified South Africa validated 18 DEDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DED available to accompany them at the time of export. The identified DEDs account for 38 % of South Africa's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:            8 DEDs were issued between 6 - 10 days after declared export date            10 DEDs were issued between 21 - 50 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
20	Spain		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Noting CCAMLR-42, paragraph 90, SCIC advised a moratorium on compliance assessments should be put in place for DED and DREDS older than two years, recognising that this is an administrative matter.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Spain validated 4 DREDS after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DRED available to accompany them at the time of export. The identified DREDS account for 2 % of Spain's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are:  3 DREDS were issued between 201 - 300 days after declared export date  1 DREDS was issued between 501 - 600 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DRED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
21	United States of America		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDS must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Noting CCAMLR-42, paragraph 90, SCIC advised a moratorium on compliance assessments should be put in place for DED and DREDS older than two years, recognising that this is an administrative matter.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified the United States of America validated 1 DRED after the declared export date. Therefore, this shipment did not have a completed DRED available to accompany it at the time of export.  The identified DRED account for &lt;1 % of the United States of America's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are: 1 DRED was issued between 501 - 600 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
22	Uruguay		<p><b>CM 10-05, paragraph 6</b>, requires that each Contracting Party and non-Contracting Party cooperating with CCAMLR by participating in the CDS shall require that each shipment of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. imported into, or exported or re-exported from its territory be accompanied by a DED or DRED. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited. The import, export or re-export of <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. without a DED or DRED is prohibited.</p> <p>CM 10-05, paragraph 7, requires that DEDs and DREDs must be completed as described in Annex 10-05/A. The use of the e-CDS to generate, validate and complete a DED and/or a DRED is mandatory. A DED and/or DRED is not completed nor validated in the e-CDS without the verification provided by a government official at section 5 of the DED template ("step 4: Export state confirmation" in e-CDS). Without this validation the import State will not have access to the document in the e-CDS.</p> <p>Analysis of the e-CDS data has identified Uruguay validated 31 DEDs after the declared export date. Therefore, these shipments did not have a completed DED available to accompany them at the time of export. The identified DEDs account for 29 % of Uruguay's exports and &lt;1 % of all CDS exports.</p> <p>The time difference between the export and validation for the identified documents are: 10 DEDs were issued between 1 - 2 days after declared export date 8 DEDs were issued between 3 - 5 days after declared export date 9 DEDs were issued between 6 - 10 days after declared export date 3 DEDs were issued between 11 - 20 days after declared export date 1 DED was issued between 21 - 50 days after declared export date</p> <p>A list of individual DED document numbers are available as an attachment to this record on the website.</p>
<b>CM 10-09</b>			
23	Panama	Frio Aegean	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transhipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1032 UTC 04 Apr 2024 from the Frio Aegean notifying its intention to tranship Krill and fuel with the Sejong at 0700 UTC 7 Apr 2024.</p> <p>Time difference: 68 hours 28 minutes</p>
24	Panama	Frio Aegean	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transshipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1243 UTC 13 Apr 2024 from the Frio Aegean notifying its intention to tranship fuel with the Shen Lan at 1200 UTC 16 Apr 2024.</p> <p>Time difference: 71 hours 17 minutes</p>
25	Panama	Frio Marathon	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transshipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1531 UTC 13 July 2023 from the Frio Marathon notifying its intention to tranship krill with the Sejong at 1030 UTC 16 July 2023.</p> <p>Time difference: 66 hours 59 minutes</p>
26	Panama	Frio Oceanic	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transshipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1654 UTC 24 Feb 2024 from the Frio Oceanic notifying its intention to tranship krill with the Sejong at 1400 UTC 27 Feb 2024.</p> <p>Time difference: 69 hours 06 minutes</p>
27	Panama	Procyon	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transshipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1247 UTC 22 Apr 2024 from the Procyon notifying its intention to tranship Krill with the Fu Xing Hai at 1100 UTC 25 Apr 2024.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			Time difference: 70 hours 13 minutes
28	Ukraine	More Sodruzhestva	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 2</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 72 hours in advance if any of its vessels intend to tranship within the Convention Area. CM 10-09, paragraph 3 clarifies that that this notification requirement covers the transshipment of harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 1937 UTC 23 Jan 2024 from the More Sodruzhestva notifying its intention to tranship fuel with the Antarctic Provider at 1800 UTC 26 Jan 2024.</p> <p>Time difference: 70 hours 23 minutes</p>
29	Norway		<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 3</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance from the transshipment of items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received notification from the Norwegian-flagged vessel the Antarctic Provider on 1601 UTC 29 Mar 2024 their intended transshipment of crew and provisions with the Saga Sea at 1630 UTC 29 March 2024.</p> <p>Time difference: 29 minutes</p>
30	Uruguay	Ocean Azul	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 3</b>, states that each Flag State shall notify the Secretariat at least 2 hours in advance from the transshipment of items other than harvested marine living resources, bait or fuel.</p> <p>The Secretariat received a notification on 12 Dec 2023 0838 UTC from the Ocean Azul notifying its intention to tranship spare parts with the Helena Ndume on 12 Dec 2023 1000 UTC.</p> <p>Time difference: 1 hour 22 minutes</p>
31	Norway		<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 5</b>, states that each Flag State shall confirm the information provided for a transshipment in accordance with paragraphs 2 or 3 to the Secretariat within 3 working days of having transhipped.</p> <p>The Secretariat received notification from the Norwegian-flagged vessel the Antarctic Provider on 1601 UTC 29 Mar 2024 their intended transshipment of crew and provisions with the Saga Sea at 1630 UTC 29 March 2024.</p> <p>No confirmation was provided for this transshipment by the Antarctic Provider, Saga Sea or Norway.</p>
32	Vanuatu	Hai Feng 718	<p><b>CM 10-09, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits a vessel to tranship within the Convention Area where a prior notification has not been provided.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The Secretariat received a confirmation on 9 Feb 2024 1243 UTC from the Hai Feng 718 confirming its transshipment of Krill and Fuel with the Hua Xiang 9 from 07 - 08 Feb 2024.</p> <p>No prior notification was provided.</p>
<b>CM 22-07</b>			
33	United Kingdom	Argos Georgia	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 8</b>, states that vessels shall report in accordance with CM 23-07 total benthos recovered in a daily period.</p> <p>In the C2 report for the Argos Georgia for December 2023 8.1 specimens of VME indicators reported on 19 December 2023. The corresponding daily catch and effort report did not report catches of any VME species</p>
34	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p> <p>The Alpha Crux reported in C2 data for 24 Dec 2023 on haul 9 line which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_881" which has a latitude of 72.321 S and 176.272 E.</p> <p>A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments</p>
35	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p> <p>The Alpha Crux reported in C2 data for 27 Dec 2023 on haul 15 setting and hauling a line which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_881" which has a latitude of 72.321 S and 176.272 E. A C2 VME segment midpoint was also reported within the VME risk area.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments
36	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p> <p>The Alpha Crux reported in C2 data for 3 Jan 2024 on haul 26 setting a line which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_881" which has a latitude of 72.321 S and 176.272 E. A C2 VME segment midpoint was also report within the VME risk area.</p> <p>A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments</p>
37	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p> <p>The Alpha Crux reported in C2 data for 4 Jan 2024 on haul 29 setting and hauling which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_881" which has a latitude of 72.321 S and 176.272 E. Three C2 VME midpoints were also reported with the VME risk area.</p> <p>A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments</p>
38	Uruguay	Proa Pioneer	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The Proa Pioneer reported in C2 data for 21 Dec 2023 on haul 16 setting and hauling a line which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_882_205028" which has a latitude of 74.17 S and 112.7933 W. A C2 VME midpoint was also reported with the VME risk area.</p> <p>A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments</p>
39	Uruguay	Proa Pioneer	<p><b>CM 22-07, paragraph 9</b>, states that a VME Risk Area shall remain closed for any fishery until reviewed by the SC and management actions are determined by the Commission.</p> <p>CM 22-07, paragraph 2 (v), defines a 'Risk Area' of having a 1 n mile radius from the midpoint of the line segment for which 10 or more VME indicator units are recovered. CCAMLR's VME registry is available here: <a href="https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry">https://www.ccamlr.org/en/document/data/ccamlr-vme-registry</a></p> <p>The Proa Pioneer reported in C2 data for 22 Dec 2023 on haul 19 setting and hauling a line which intersected with the VME risk area "CCAMLR_VMERiskArea_882_205028" which has a latitude of 74.17 S and 112.7933 W.</p> <p>A map is attached to this CCEP record which illustrates the fishing inside the VMS risk area. Map legend - black is the set line, green is haul line, blue is VME midpoint segments</p>
<b>CM 22-08</b>			
40	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 22-08, paragraph 1</b>, prohibits fishing in exploratory fisheries for <i>Dissostichus</i> spp. other than for scientific research purposes in depths shallower than 550 m.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 10 - " At 09:50 (UTC) on December 17, 2023, a tow was initiated from 491m in SET.4, and subsequently, the depth and tow location were adjusted to reflect a tow from 563m. "</p>
<b>CM 23-04</b>			
41	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 23-04, paragraph 3</b>, requires the total target catch must be reported by species and the total by-catch must be reported by species or to the lowest taxonomic level possible (e.g. species or genus).</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
42	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p data-bbox="842 280 2007 400">In Part 10 - " Although 86 sets of deployment and retrieval were recorded, a total of 87 sets were actually carried out. The first deployment occurred on December 11, 2023, at 15:30 (UTC), followed by retrieval starting at 19:15 (UTC) of the same day. However, due to damage to the main line, rendering all lines unable to be retrieved, the set was deleted without reporting the loss. "</p> <p data-bbox="842 437 2007 493">Section 7.2 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, instructs the procedure for reporting in the C2 data when gear has been lost.</p> <p data-bbox="842 529 2007 649">The Secretariat was notified as per SISO, Part A, paragraph h, of communications on 29 May 2024 between Russia (the Receiving Member) and Korea (the Designating Member) of discrepancies identified by Russia in the observer report which relate to this compliance issue. The Secretariat has not been notified by either party that they were unable to resolve such issues, as required by SISO, Part A, paragraph h.</p> <p data-bbox="842 670 2007 726"><b>CM 23-04, paragraph 3</b>, requires the total by-catch must be reported by species or to the lowest taxonomic level possible (e.g. species or genus).</p> <p data-bbox="842 762 2007 818">The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p data-bbox="842 855 2007 943">In Part 4 - "CHW gathered at one location at the hauling station and transported to the restaurant for consumption.(Figure 3) The weight and quantity were not recorded. In some sets, intentional exclusion of by-catch was observed. This practice was not discouraged by the Russian captain and crew. "</p> <p data-bbox="842 979 1240 1003">Figure 2 contains a photo of by-catch</p> <p data-bbox="842 1040 1957 1096">Figure 3 contains a photo of Chionobathyscus dewitti (Dewitt's icefish) in a tank with the caption "CHW edible"</p> <p data-bbox="842 1133 1480 1157">Figure 4 photo caption states "By-catch deliberate dropout "</p> <p data-bbox="842 1193 2007 1374">In Part 10 - " The investigation into by-catch species was not properly conducted. Intentionally, without confirming the quantity or weight, by-catch either deliberately stripped off during fishing operations or brought into the processing area was either ground up and discharged or released intact without inspection. When intentionally discarding by-catch species, neither the Russian captain, Russian navigator, nor any Russian crew members intervened. Regarding CHW, it was not sent to the processing area for consumption but was stored on the mid-deck and utilized for consumption without its quantity or weight being measured. It</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>was also noted that the details of the Observed Haul Catch related to by-catch were arbitrarily altered without the knowledge of the "</p> <p>The Secretariat was notified as per SISO, Part A, paragraph h, of communications on 29 May 2024 between Russia (the Receiving Member) and Korea (the Designating Member) of discrepancies identified by Russia in the observer report which relate to this compliance issue. The Secretariat has not been notified by either party that they were unable to resolve such issues, as required by SISO, Part A, paragraph h.</p>
<b>CM 25-02</b>			
43	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 25-02, paragraph 6</b>, prohibits the dumping of offal and discards while longlines are being set.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 6 in response to the question "On what percentage of sets did offal discarding take place during setting?" the observer reported "1.15"</p> <p>Figure 15 photo caption states: "On setting the line was disposal offal"</p>
44	New Zealand	Janas	<p><b>CM 25-02, paragraph 8</b>, requires a streamer line to be deployed during longline setting.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the New Zealand-flagged Janas from 14 Nov 2023 to 15 Feb 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2455, the following:</p> <p>"Whilst setting line 108, it was noted that the vessel had backed up into tori line (and the line caught in the propeller) prior to setting. There was no tori line during setting from mag 1 – 5, the crew quickly responded to the incident and assembled another. "</p>
45	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 25-02, paragraph 8</b>, requires a streamer line to be deployed during longline setting.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>Part 6.1 - " The first set did not deploy streamer lines due to heavy ice conditions. "</p>
46	France	Sainte Rose	<p><b>CM 25-02, Annex A, paragraph 3</b>, states that the streamer line shall be a minimum of 150 m in length.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>The SISO observer on the French-flagged Sainte Rose from 26 Nov 2023 to 7 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2500, the following:</p> <p>"Streamer line length (m): 120m The streamer achieved a horizontal extent of 60 m, calculated with the number of visible aerial lines. The streamer line is a polypropylene 10mm of 120 meters long. Streamers are PEBD double 6mm from 1 to 8 meters long with 3 meters apart."</p>
47	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 25-02, Annex A, paragraph 3</b>, states that the streamer line shall be a minimum of 150 m in length.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Figure 11: Configuration of bird scaring lines, the streamer line length (m) is reported as 70.</p>
48	Korea, Republic of	Sunstar	<p><b>CM 25-02, Annex A, paragraph 4</b>, states that the streamers must be branched each comprising of two strands of a minimum of 3 mm diameter.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Korean-flagged Sunstar from 26 Oct 2023 to 14 Feb 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2506, the following:</p> <p>"The total streamer length deployed by the vessel was 157m, made up of 1.5mm polypropylene line that consisted of 10 single streamers joined at intervals of 4.5m, Figure 16"</p>
			<b>CM 26-01</b>
49	Chile	Puerto Ballena	<p><b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.</p> <p>Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard at a later date shall be reported in the C2 data as "Retained" and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as "Discarded".</p> <p>From 02 Dec 2023 to 03 Feb 2024 the Puerto Ballena reported in their C2 data discarding south of 60°S 4 659 individuals (6 665.92 kg) across 22 different species.</p>
50	Namibia	Helena Ndume	<b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b> , prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard at a later date shall be reported in the C2 data as "Retained" and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as "Discarded".</p> <p>From 13 Dec 2023 to 29 Jan 2024 the Helena Ndume reported in their C2 data discarding south of 60°S 10 108 individuals (5 224.73 kg) across 6 different species.</p>
51	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.</p> <p>All fishing effort for the Alpha Crux within the Convention Area occurred south of 60°S in Subarea 88.1</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 1 - " 70% offal and discards was port side setting and hauling to disposal, 30% offal and discards was packed in bags and stored in the freezer or fish hold for disposal on shore "</p> <p>In Part 4 - " 70% offal and discards was crash to disposal for port side setting and hauling The quantity and weight were not recorded. "</p> <p>In Part 6 in response to the question "On what percentage of sets did offal discarding take place during setting?" the observer reported "1.15"</p> <p>In Part 6 in response to the question "On what percentage of sets did offal discarding take place during hauling?" the observer reported "70"</p> <p>In Part 8 - "70% offal and discards was crash to disposal for port side setting and hauling, 30% offal and discards was packed in bags and stored in the freezer or fish hold for disposal on shore."</p> <p>Figure 14 contains a photo taken by the observer of offal disposed on ice</p> <p>Figure 15 photo caption states: "On setting the line was disposal offal"</p>
52	United Kingdom	Argos Georgia	<p><b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.</p> <p>Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard at a later date shall be reported in the C2 data as</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>"Retained" and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as "Discarded".</p> <p>From 09 Dec 2023 to 01 Jan 2024 the Argos Georgia reported in their C2 data discarding south of 60°S 3 835 individuals (5 404.94 kg) across 6 different species.</p>
53	Uruguay	Ocean Azul	<p><b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.</p> <p>Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard at a later date shall be reported in the C2 data as "Retained" and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as "Discarded".</p> <p>From 11 Dec 2023 to 28 Jan 2024 the Ocean Azul reported in their C2 data discarding south of 60°S 39 220 individuals (33 082.02 kg) across 11 different species.</p>
54	Uruguay	Proa Pioneer	<p><b>CM 26-01, paragraph 8</b>, prohibits the dumping or discharging of offal or discards south of 60°S.</p> <p>Section 7.3 of the Commercial Data Collection Manual – Longline Fisheries – Version 2023, states that any species that is caught and retained on the vessel for discard at a later date shall be reported in the C2 data as "Retained" and any species landed on the vessels and then discarded overboard without processing is to be reported as "Discarded".</p> <p>From 19 Dec 2023 to 25 Jan 2024 the Proa Pioneer reported in their C2 data discarding south of 60°S 481 individuals (1 763.75 kg) of <i>Dissostichus mawsoni</i>.</p>
			<b>CM 31-01</b>
55	United Kingdom	Argos Georgia	<p>As stated in COMM CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70: CM 31-01 states that for each fishing season the Commission shall establish such limitations or other measures, as necessary, around South Georgia (Subarea 48.3).</p> <p>Argos Georgia was identified fishing for <i>Dissostichus eleginoides</i> in Subarea 48.3 in 2024 which Comm Circs 24/61 and 24/70 allege is contrary to CM 31-01</p> <p>A response from the United Kingdom has been circulated in COMM CIC 24/69</p> <p>This event is considered further on the Draft IUU Vessel List (COMM CIRC 24/68).</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
56	United Kingdom	Argos Helena	<p>As stated in COMM CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70: CM 31-01 states that for each fishing season the Commission shall establish such limitations or other measures, as necessary, around South Georgia (Subarea 48.3).</p> <p>Argos Helena was identified fishing for <i>Dissostichus eleginoides</i> in Subarea 48.3 in 2024 which Comm CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70 allege is contrary to CM 31-01</p> <p>A response from the United Kingdom has been circulated in COMM CIC 24/69</p> <p>This event is considered further on the Draft IUU Vessel List (COMM CIRC 24/68).</p>
57	United Kingdom	Nordic Prince	<p>As stated in COMM CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70: CM 31-01 states that for each fishing season the Commission shall establish such limitations or other measures, as necessary, around South Georgia (Subarea 48.3).</p> <p>Nordic Prince was identified fishing for <i>Dissostichus eleginoides</i> in Subarea 48.3 in 2024 which Comm CIRCs 24/61 and 24/70 allege is contrary to CM 31-01</p> <p>A response from the United Kingdom has been circulated in COMM CIC 24/69</p> <p>This event is considered further on the Draft IUU Vessel List (COMM CIRC 24/68).</p>
<b>CM 31-02</b>			
58	Norway	Antarctic Endurance	<p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 1</b>, states that following notification by the Secretariat of the closure of a fishery, all vessels in the area subject to the closure notice, shall remove their fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time.</p> <p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 4</b>, states that a vessel or vessel shall notify the Secretariat should the vessel appear likely to be unable remove all its fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time and the vessel shall make all reasonable efforts to remove all its fishing gear from the water as soon as possible.</p> <p>In COMM CIRC 24/53 the Secretariat notified that the trawl fishery for <i>Euphausia superba</i> in Subarea 48.1 will close at 2359 h UTC on 18/05/2024.</p> <p>Following the closure of the fishery C1 data for the Antarctic Endurance reported 17 unique trawls of two nets from 00:00 19 May 2024 to 10:00 20 May 2024 with a green weight <i>Euphausia superba</i> catch of 2 106 749 kg.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>Continuous trawl vessels report a "unique trawl" for every two hour period the net is in the water. The net setting and hauling date and time is also reported in the C1 data. The net was set before the closure date and hauled at 10:00 on 20 May 2024.</p> <p>A report on the delayed gear retrieval was provided by Norway in COMM CIRC 24/58</p>
59	Norway	Antarctic Sea	<p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 1</b>, states that following notification by the Secretariat of the closure of a fishery, all vessels in the area subject to the closure notice, shall remove their fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time.</p> <p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 4</b>, states that a vessel or vessel shall notify the Secretariat should the vessel appear likely to be unable remove all its fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time and the vessel shall make all reasonable efforts to remove all its fishing gear from the water as soon as possible.</p> <p>In COMM CIRC 24/53 the Secretariat notified that the trawl fishery for <i>Euphausia superba</i> in Subarea 48.1 will close at 2359 h UTC on 18/05/2024.</p> <p>Following the closure of the fishery C1 data for the Antarctic Sea reported 9 unique trawls of two nets and 1 trawl of one net from 00:00 19 May 2024 to 19:22 19 May 2024 with a green weight <i>Euphausia superba</i> catch of 1 077 404 kg.</p> <p>Continuous trawl vessels report a "unique trawl" for every two hour period the net is in the water. The net setting and hauling date and time is also reported in the C1 data. The net was set before the closure date and hauled at 19:22 on 19 May 2024.</p> <p>A report on the delayed gear retrieval was provided by Norway in COMM CIRC 24/58</p>
60	Norway	Saga Sea	<p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 1</b>, states that following notification by the Secretariat of the closure of a fishery, all vessels in the area subject to the closure notice, shall remove their fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time.</p> <p><b>CM 31-02, paragraph 4</b>, states that a vessel or vessel shall notify the Secretariat should the vessel appear likely to be unable remove all its fishing gear from the water by the notified closure date and time and the vessel shall make all reasonable efforts to remove all its fishing gear from the water as soon as possible.</p> <p>In COMM CIRC 24/53 the Secretariat notified that the trawl fishery for <i>Euphausia superba</i> in Subarea 48.1 will close at 2359 h UTC on 18/05/2024.</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>Following the closure of the fishery C1 data for the Saga Sea reported 16 trawls of two nets and 1 trawl of one net from 00:00 19 May 2024 to 10:00 20 May 2024 with a green weight Euphausia superba catch of 1 143 056 kg.</p> <p>Continuous trawl vessels report a "unique trawl" for every two hour period the net is in the water. The net setting and hauling date and time is also reported in the C1 data. The net was set before the closure date and hauled at 10:00 on 20 May 2024.</p> <p>A report on the delayed gear retrieval was provided by Norway in COMM CIRC 24/58</p>
<b>CM 41-09</b>			
61	Uruguay	Ocean Azul	<p><b>CM 41-09, paragraph 6</b>, If the catch of Macrourus spp. taken by a single vessel in any two 10-day periods in any SSRU exceeds 1 500 kg in each 10-day period and exceeds 16% of the catch of Dissostichus spp. by that vessel in that SSRU, the vessel shall cease fishing in that SSRU for the remainder of the season.</p> <p>Two breaches of the move-on rule were identified for the Ocean Azul in Small Scale Research Unit 88.1 I. The C2 data reported the following:</p> <p>For ten day period starting 21 Dec 2023  Macrourus spp. total: 2 053.60 kg  Dissostichus spp. total: 2 877.97 kg  Macrourus spp. percentage of Dissostichus spp. catch: 71.36%</p> <p>For ten day period starting 01 Jan 2024  Macrourus spp. total: 2 189 kg  Dissostichus spp. total: 5 858.23 kg  Macrourus spp. percentage of Dissostichus spp. catch: 37.37%</p> <p><i>Move-on rule now triggered, vessel should have left SSRU 88.1_I</i></p> <p>For ten day period starting 11 Jan 2024  Macrourus spp. total: 4 245 kg  Dissostichus spp. total: 6 951.92 kg  Macrourus spp. percentage of Dissostichus spp. catch: 61.06%</p> <p>For ten day period starting 21 Jan 2024  Macrourus spp. total: 4 635.50 kg  Dissostichus spp. total: 11 360.59 kg</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			Macrourus spp. percentage of Dissostichus spp. catch: 40.80%
<b>CM 91-05</b>			
62	Namibia	Helena Ndume	<p><b>CM 91-05, paragraph 24</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA.</p> <p>A movement notification for the Helena Ndume was provided on 15 Dec 2023 0210 UTC which notified entry into RSR MPA SRZ on 14 Dec 2023 2240 UTC.</p> <p>Time difference: 3 hours 30 minutes after entry</p>
63	Namibia	Helena Ndume	<p><b>CM 91-05, paragraph 24</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA.</p> <p>A movement notification for the Helena Ndume was provided on 19 Dec 2023 0141 UTC which notified entry into RSR MPA GPZ(i) on 18 Dec 2023 2143 UTC.</p> <p>Time difference: 3 hours 58 minutes after entry</p>
64	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>CM 91-05, paragraph 24</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA.</p> <p>A movement notification for the Alpha Crux was provided on 14 Dec 2023 0517 UTC which notified entry into RSR MPA SRZ on 14 Dec 2023 0137 UTC.</p> <p>Time difference: 3 hours 40 minutes after entry</p>
65	Spain	Tronio	<p><b>CM 91-05, paragraph 24</b>, requires Flag States to notify the Secretariat prior to entry of their fishing vessels into the MPA.</p> <p>A movement notification for the Tronio was provided on 26 Dec 2023 1614 UTC notifying entry into RSR MPA SRZ on 26 Dec 2023 0340 UTC.</p> <p>A revision was provided on 26 Dec 2023 1955 UTC notifying entry time as 26 Dec 2023 0447 UTC.</p> <p>Time difference between when the Secretariat was first notified and the final movement time: 11 hours 27 minutes after entry</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
66	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>Text of the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (i)</b>, states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not offer a scientific observer, either directly or indirectly, any gratuity, gift, favour, loan, or anything of monetary value, except for meals, accommodations or salary when provided by the vessel.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 10 - " During the investigation period of the vessel, on January 10, 2024, attempts were made to communicate with the Russian captain regarding CCAMLR Conservation Measure 26-01, but it was not properly conveyed. Subsequently, a request was made to the National Institute of Fisheries Science to receive the latest version of Conservation Measure 26-01 via email. However, the email was not delivered to the Korean observer, only confirmed by the Russian captain. A few days later, the navigator suggested twice that they could pretend not to know about the fishing situation on the vessel if a bribe of \$10,000 to \$20,000 was provided. Both offers were naturally declined. "</p>
67	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>Text of the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (ii)</b>, states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not intimidate, or interfere with the duties of a scientific observer.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 10 - " On January 1, 2024, while Russian crew members were gathering in the wheelhouse and drinking, a physical altercation ensued. During the altercation, verbal abuse and physical violence were exchanged, with the word "OBSERVER" being mentioned twice. Shortly afterward, while the Korean observer was sleeping, a Russian crew member opened the door to their quarters, stepped inside, observed quietly for 1-2 minutes, then left. Upon investigation, it was found that during the altercation, a Russian processor, who was assisting the Korean observer with biological sampling, was stabbed in the abdomen by another Russian crew member. Subsequently, the Russian processor was incapacitated, rendering them unable to perform their duties. As a result, the Korean observer was left alone to handle TOA processing and biological sampling. Requests for additional personnel from the Russian captain were met with refusal. "</p> <p>The Secretariat was notified as per SISO, Part A, paragraph h, of communications on 29 May 2024 between Russia (the Receiving Member) and Korea (the Designating Member) of discrepancies identified by Russia in</p>

Reference number	Party	Vessel	Implementation summary – Secretariat
			<p>the observer report which relate to this compliance issue. The Secretariat has not been notified by either party that they were unable to resolve such issues, as required by SISO, Part A, paragraph h.</p>
68	Russian Federation	Alpha Crux	<p><b>Text of the CCAMLR Scheme of International Scientific Observation, Part D, paragraph (b) (vii)</b>, states that the owner, Master, agent, and crew of a vessel on which a scientific observer is deployed shall not interfere with or prevent the observer from communicating with the Designating Member, including by preventing the scientific observer from having access to the vessel’s communication equipment.</p> <p>The SISO observer on the Russian flagged Alpha Crux from 16 Nov 2023 to 5 Mar 2024 reported in observer trip report number 2518, the following:</p> <p>In Part 10 - " The communication methods onboard the vessel were limited to wired telephone and email, but the email function was not operating properly. While emails sent to the Resource Management Authority were successfully transmitted, emails sent to the National Fisheries Research Institute were inexplicably failing to send for reasons unknown. "</p>

**Proposed Non-Contracting Party IUU Vessel List 2024/25 (Conservation Measure 10-07)**

**No changes recommended by SCIC to the existing [2023/24 NCP IUU Vessel List](#)**

**Proposed Contracting Party IUU Vessel List 2024/25 (Conservation Measure 10-06)**

**No changes recommended by SCIC to the existing [2023/24 CP IUU Vessel List](#)**

Appendix IV

South Africa made the following statement:

‘The *El Shaddai* is currently listed on the CCAMLR IUU fishing vessel list, following alleged unlawful fishing in the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) area 51 and CCAMLR closed areas.

When these transgressions from 2015 and 2016 came to the attention of the Department in August 2020, the Department conducted a comprehensive investigation in respect thereof. The findings of this investigation we presented to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for a decision regarding the prosecution of Braxton Security Services as the owner of the vessel.

On 18 April 2023 the DPP advised the Department that it had decided not to prosecute Braxton. On 19 June 2023 the DPP provided his full complete assessment of the evidence and shortcomings of the case. A copy is attached as appendix 1.

In his decision not to prosecute the, DPP advised, amongst others, that the permit conditions attached to the Braxton Patagonian Toothfish permit issued in terms of Section 13 of the Marine Living Resources Act did not clearly define where on the High seas Braxton was permitted to fish. In addition, it was stated that there were no conditions attached to Braxton’s high seas vessel license issued in terms of Section 41 of the Marine Living Resources Act explaining the permissible and impermissible fishing areas.

During October 2023, South Africa attended CCAMLR 42, SCIC and Commission meetings where South Africa representatives provided an overview of the actions undertaken by South Africa in respect of the *El Shaddai*. South Africa formally requested and motivated for the removal of the vessel from the contracting party IUU vessel list as per conservation measure 10-06 paragraph 14 (ii) and (iv).

South Africa’s motivation was based on the actions taken by the country following the decision not to prosecute Braxton due to unclear permit conditions relating to where the vessel was and was not permitted to fish. These actions included:

- inclusion of a comprehensive set of license conditions as part of the high seas fishing licenses.

- a complete review of the Patagonian Toothfish permit conditions clearly stipulating applicable international measures including those under CCAMLR.
- updating the Department 's vessel monitoring system to specifically include RFMO boundaries, so that it could be immediately determined when a vessel might be fishing inside a closed area for example.
- engagement with owners, rights holders and representatives of the *El Shaddai*, clearly explaining the nature of the contraventions and the seriousness of the conduct.
- commitment to the amendment of the Marine Living Resources Act.

At SCIC meetings last year some member countries indicated that the delisting of the *El Shaddai* would be more appropriately considered under conservation measure 10-06 paragraph 14 (iv) and not conservation measure 10-06 paragraph 14 (ii) as it was believed by members that South Africa had not taken effective action in response to the IUU activities, as no prosecution had occurred, and no sanctions were imposed. Concerns were also raised, amongst others, as to whether the measures which South Africa has taken was sufficient to ensure the vessel would not again engage in IUU fishing and that the High Seas license and fishing permit conditions submitted by South Africa remained unclear, including their application to the CCAMLR area. It was subsequently noted that there was an insufficient basis to remove the vessel from the contracting party IUU vessel list.

Consensus was not reached to remove the *El Shaddai* from the contracting party IUU vessel list at the CCAMLR 42.

Despite this the SCIC members encouraged South Africa to continue to explore avenues by which enforcement action could be pursued, including administrative and civil action against the vessel owner and invited South Africa to report back to this SCIC on further changes affected to the conditions of the high seas licenses and fishing permits and on amendments to the relevant legislation to demonstrate that the requirements of CM 10-06 (ii) and (iv) now have been met.

On return from the CCAMLR 42 engagements, South Africa extensively explored all avenues by which action could be pursued and accordingly hereby wish to inform CCMLR and the contracting party members countries of such actions taken.

Amendments were made to the conditions of the high seas vessel license in line with input received from members. These conditions, amongst others, made it clear where fishing can take place, where it cannot take place and where additional authorizations are required before such fishing can take place. A copy of these updated license conditions is attached as appendix 2 and members are referred specifically to condition 2 which deals with fishing areas.

Conditions attached to Patagonian Toothfish permits were likewise revised and enhanced. These permit conditions now specifically state that permit holders may not fish in any area which is subject to a RFMO / international agreement or treaty, which is located outside of the Prince Edward islands EEZ, (without following the relevant notification and other rules and measures of that body), even if part of that area is located within the PEI-EEZ - in this instance the permit holder may only fish in that part of the area subject to an R FM O/ international agreement/ treaty, which is located within the Prince Edward Island EEZ. Links to available map services have also been incorporated. As with the license conditions, feedback received from members of CCAMLR was considered in updating these permit conditions and the conditions were vetted through our Legal Department. A copy of these updated conditions is attached as appendix 3 and members are referred specifically to condition 3 which deals with fishing areas. Comm 24-96

The Department monitors the movement of vessels via VMS and on an electronic system, the Oceans And Coast Information Management System (OCIMS) to specifically include RF MO boundaries, including those previously excluded like SIOFA FAO 51 so that vessels in these areas can be monitored by officials from the operations room.

These officials were also briefed and tasked to prioritize the monitoring of South African vessels operating within the CCAMLR area of competence as well as other RFMO's. The importance of closely monitoring and reporting the movement of these vessels whilst in these areas has been strongly emphasized and reinforced.

South Africa has also visited the Norwegian Government Trade Fisheries Department during April 2024 and is currently cooperating to improve marine domain awareness to detect, address, deter and prevent IUU fishing and related activities.

The Department has, over the years engaged extensively with the owners and representatives of the *El Shaddai*.

As members are aware the criminal prosecution avenue was unsuccessfully exhausted. Another option available to South Africa would be to commence an administrative process to cancel or suspend Braxton's Patagonian Fishing right, meaning that Braxton could only fish for other right holders on the *El Shaddai* if the vessel is delisted, but not for itself. The administrative process was considered but not pursued as South Africa was of the view that similar arguments relating to the interpretation and clarity of permit conditions would be raised. These administrative processes would therefore have been subject to the same constraints and vulnerabilities as a criminal case.

However, since the IUU listing of the vessel, the Department has not issued Braxton with a fishing permit to fish and as such this has in effect meant that Braxton's right has been suspended for some three years since its listing in 2021, which is one of the likely sanctions which would have been imposed had the administrative process been finalized as described above. In addition, Braxton was unable to fish on behalf of the four Right Holders for which they previously fished. These consequences of the IUU vessel listing caused Braxton to suffer financial harm over an extended period of time.

With this in mind the Department requested Braxton to provide financial statements to explain their estimated financial losses caused by the IUU vessel listing. Braxton was specifically requested to provide financial statements for the period of the CCAML and SIOFA infringements accompanied by a signed affidavit explaining its financial statements and projected losses. This affidavit is also required to explain and consider profits from the sale of the Patagonian Toothfish sold during the specific CCAML and SIOFA infringement. This was forwarded to parties in COMM CIRC 24-101.

The Department has embarked on a process to amend the Marine Living Resources Act which is the primary legislation in South Africa which governs fishing. In this regard, the Department has been cooperating and engaging with international partners including the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

Although this process has commenced, it is a lengthy process requiring Parliamentary approval and it is therefore unlikely to be finalized soon. However, in this process, members' comments made during CCAML 43 will be considered and appropriate references to relevant RFMOs and international laws will be included.

It should be noted that Section 42 of the act currently deals with the implementation of international conservation and management measures and subsection 4 thereof states that the minister may from time to time publish by notice in The Gazette particulars of

any international conservation and management measures or international agreement concerning marine living resources. In addition Section 58 (2)(a) of the MLRA makes it an offence to contravene any international conservation or management measures. As such there are currently express references in the MLRA to international agreements. However, these provisions will, as indicated above, be further clarified with specific reference to RFMO's and where appropriate CCAMLR itself.

South Africa is of the view that the shortcomings identified by the DPP as set out above have been addressed as have concerns previously raised by members. The conditions now clearly specify where fishing is and is not permitted and Braxton has been repeatedly advised of the nature of the non-compliance and seriousness of the contraventions, including correct interpretation of the relevant RFMOs, which makes future transgression unlikely to take place. However, should there be a contravention of a conservation measure going forward, South Africa is of the view that the interpretational challenges faced by the DPP in the Braxton matter will not arise during prosecution and any other processes which may be instituted.

In addition, although Braxton was not criminally prosecuted and its Patagonian Toothfish right was not cancelled, its fishing right has effectively been suspended since the IUU listing, rendering Braxton unable to fish for itself or any other right holder, resulting in significant financial losses which ought to act as a strong deterrent to any repeated contravention.

In the light of above, South Africa hereby request CCAMLR to consider the removal of the *El Shaddai* from each IUU vessel list in terms of CM 10-06 (14)(iv).

We trust that you will find the above in order should you have any further inquiries please do not hesitate to contact us.'

South Africa made the following statement:

‘As members are aware, the *El Shaddai* was listed on the CCAMLR IUU Vessel List three years ago in 2021. At the SCIC meeting last year South Africa requested that the vessel be removed from the IUU Vessel List and explained what action it had taken both in respect of effective action and to guard against any future IUU fishing by a South African flagged vessel.

Australia then noted that the request should be in terms of paragraph 14(ii) of CM 10-06 and not 14(iv) as it was said that South Africa had not taken effective action because the prosecuting authority declined to prosecute. It was noted that under paragraph 14(ii) some actions were ongoing (such as amendments to licence and permit conditions) and it was therefore decided by SCIC that there was an insufficient basis to remove the vessel from the IUU list at that time.

Members requested South Africa do further work on the conditions and to report back on further actions taken including changes to licence and permit conditions and any civil or administrative action taken.

On 14 December 2023, South Africa responded by email to questions posed by members of SCIC around the licence and permit conditions. Correspondence in this regard was sent to Australia, the EU, Korea and the United States. South Africa advised that it had incorporated certain of the suggested amendments to the conditions and provided a response to each query. No response or follow up questions were received.

Following the lack of consensus at last year’s SCIC, COMM CIRC 24/96 was circulated to all members of the Commission on 18 September 2024 which detailed an exhaustive list of measures that South Africa had taken to date to guard against any future listing of a South African flagged vessel as well as advised why the administrative enforcement process was not formally followed.

South Africa had hoped that by circulating the extensive document to members 30 days prior to SCIC, any concerns which members had could be addressed upfront and prior to the meeting. Unfortunately, no comments on the COMM CIRC were received by South Africa.

However, during this SCIC meeting on 15 October 2024, three questions were posed to South Africa which South Africa promptly responded to. The first question related to what the fines are for these types of offences if there is a successful prosecution, the second again related to why South Africa did not take administrative or civil action (which had already been answered in the Coms Circ) and the third was why there is still no explicit reference to SIOFA in the High Seas Vessel Licence conditions. All of these questions have been answered and an amended set of conditions provided to the EU which explicitly prohibits fishing in SIOFA areas.

After the meeting, the EU submitted extensive comments on the High Seas Licence Conditions and Patagonian Toothfish Permit Conditions most of which were unrelated to the specific transgression which led to the listing of *El Shaddai*.

South Africa has done its best to respond to the EU's extensive comments on permit and licence conditions in a very short space of time (less than 24 hours) and in the interests of good faith South Africa has also made, and agreed to make, certain further amendments to the Licence and Permit conditions.

This commitment and willingness by South Africa to further cooperate with the EU must be understood in light of the fact that amending permit conditions is not a quick exercise and it takes time to ensure that any proposed amendments do not result in unintended consequences having regard to SA's broader legal framework. Despite this, it is South Africa's view, the conditions as they stand are more than sufficient to demonstrate compliance with paragraph 14(iv) of CM 10.06 and have incorporated comments made by members at last year's SCIC.

Against this background, South Africa believes that it has cooperated extensively with members and is grateful for the guidance provided by members throughout this process. At this point South Africa is of the view that it has addressed the concerns raised by SCIC last year and done everything possible to guard against any future transgression and to ensure that if such transgression transpires appropriate punishment will follow.

In addition, South Africa has committed to amending its legislative framework to further clarify and broaden the framework with respect to internal agreements and measures during the current amendment process underway in conjunction with the FAO.

At this time it is South Africa's position that further amendments to the permit and licence conditions as proposed at this late stage by the EU ought not to be determinant

on whether the delisting is supported or not. Conditions can always be improved and this is why South Africa updates all its conditions annually (it will be updated prior to next season starting 1 Dec – and which will consider the EU input received during this SCIC). South Africa believes that the conditions are now robust but despite this has committed to working with the EU to improve them where necessary.

Although South Africa has requested the removal of the vessel under paragraph 14(iv) and not 14(ii) of CM10-06, the EU again raised the issue of South Africa not cancelling Braxton's right under section 28 of the Marine Living Resources Act for non-compliance with a provision of that Act.

As members are aware, South Africa extensively explored all avenues by which action could be pursued as was described in comm circ 24\_96. The criminal prosecution avenue was unsuccessfully exhausted, as per the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) detailed reasons provided in the comm circ 24\_96.

As indicated, another option available to South Africa would have been to commence an administrative process to cancel or suspend Braxton's Patagonian Fishing right (Under sec 28 of the MLRA), meaning that Braxton could only fish for other right holders on the *El Shaddai* if the vessel is delisted, but not for itself. The administrative process was considered but not perused as South Africa was of the view that similar arguments relating to the interpretation and clarity of permit conditions would be raised. These administrative processes would therefore have been subject to the same constraints and vulnerabilities as a criminal case. The EU disagrees and says that South Africa might be successful in the section 28 process to cancel the right if reliance instead of being placed on permit conditions, is placed on section 58(2) of the Marine Living Resources Act.

Section 58(2) is the offence provision and provides that Section 58. (2) Any person who contravenes—

(a) a provision of an international conservation and management measure inside or outside South African waters, or otherwise fails to comply with any provision of Part 7 of Chapter 3, by means of a vessel registered in the Republic; or

(b) the conditions imposed in a high seas fishing permit or high seas fishing vessel licence, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding three million rand.

shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding three million rand.

It should be noted in that section 58(2) was heavily relied on in the criminal process and was included as a standalone charge in the criminal case. Nothing prevented the prosecutor from proceeding based on this discreet offence and excluding the offences relating to non-compliance with permit conditions. He however declined to do as in his view the permit conditions were unclear and had a bearing on Braxton's guilt. The Department raised the legal maximum that ignorance of the law was no excuse, yet this was not accepted because of the view which he took on the permit conditions. It is therefore South Africa's view, particularly in light of the prosecutor's decision, that the same arguments will be raised in any administrative proceedings and that any decision to cancel the right in terms of section 28 would be susceptible to a successful challenge if taken on review to the high court who would likely share the sentiments of the prosecutor as that document would form part of the record. This court process would take an estimated 3 years to conclude.

In addition, there was a sanction in the sense that Braxton was not issued permits to exercise its right for a three-year period which resulted in losses to the company. The Department could have issued such permits, nothing in law prevented this even while the criminal case was ongoing, and Braxton could have exercised its right on another vessel, but this did not happen. The right was effectively suspended.

However, as mentioned South Africa has not requested the removal of the vessel from the IUU list in terms of paragraph 14(ii) but rather 14(iv) as was suggested at last year's SCIC. The impression created at that SCIC was that removal could be requested under either paragraph and indeed that is how we understand paragraph 14.

In light of this, South Africa again formally requests the delisting of the *El Shaddai* with the support of all members.'